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Executive Summary
The present dissertation is based on four self contained, and independently
conducted studies, sharing one common theme:
The identiﬁcation of factors positively and negatively aﬀecting the
eﬀectiveness of decision-making under uncertainty in the unique
applied context of high-tech service innovation.
A multidisciplinary approach has been adopted, and in the four studies the
issue of decision-making eﬀectiveness was investigated from several diﬀerent
perspectives, making use of a variety of research methods. In the ﬁrst study,
academic literature on decision-making under uncertainty is reviewed. In this
study, the question is addressed, how the use of diﬀerent cognitive decision-
making styles may aﬀect decision-making eﬀectiveness. Based on a review of
the literature from various disciplines and research streams, propositions are
formulated about the relationships between task conditions and relative use
of information processing styles, as well as about various factors moderating
the validity of results obtained by making use of diﬀerent cognitive styles
under various circumstances. A comprehensive model is constructed, sum-
marizing these theoretical propositions. In this study, cognitive continuum
theory is extended with an extra dimension: Four primary decision-making
styles, based on the relative use of two fundamental information-processing
modes, are distinguished, instead of the traditional three.
III
IV EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The second study is based on an extensive case research, which was con-
ducted in the mobile telecommunication services industry. In this study the
questions; ’What characterizes the task conditions of managers in charge
of high-tech service innovation projects?’, and ’Which factors serve as an-
tecedents of eﬀective decision-making under these conditions?’ are addressed.
The study provides detailed insight, on a behavioral level, in the roles of pre-
vious experience and information in the innovation process. A major result
is the identiﬁcation of the moderating role of decision-makers’ insight in the
interfaces between the new service and the organization, the new service and
the customer, the new service and the technology, and ﬁnally between the
new service and the regulatory environment. Furthermore, the antecedent
role of a ﬂexible and balanced use of multiple decision-making styles is dis-
cussed.
The third study is based on a decision-making experiment. In this study,
the problems of information overload and escalation of managerial commit-
ment are addressed. Traditionally, decision-making has been conceptualized
as the choice of a course of action. We argue that decision-making leads to
both a choice of a course of action on the one hand and the development
of a decision-maker’s commitment to that choice on the other. Both types
of consequences of a decision appear equally important with respect to their
inﬂuence on decision-making eﬀectiveness. It is demonstrated in the study
that diﬀerent aspects of information have distinct eﬀects on choice and com-
mitment. Information that appears irrelevant to the decision problem, but
which aﬀects the morale of decision-makers, does aﬀect the decision-maker’s
commitment to the decision equally well.
The fourth study is based on a global survey of managers involved in high-
tech service innovation projects. In this study, the role information processes
Vplay in creating inter-ﬁrm diﬀerences in innovation success is investigated.
Eﬀects of information gathering, diﬀusion and utilization are demonstrated
in two distinct stages of the innovation process; the stage of the strategic
go-no-go decision, and the operational stage of new service development.
With respect to the initial go-no-go decision, the most important ﬁndings
are the positive contributions of a long-term and entrepreneurial attitude,
of the use of both internal and external information in the process and of
the involvement of strategically knowledgeable decision-makers. In the oper-
ational phase of the innovation process, organizational intelligence gathering
with respect to developments in technology and customer requirements was
demonstrated to contribute positively to innovative success. Informal com-
munication, an open organizational climate, which is favorable to innovation
related information exchange, as well as regular knowledge updating by man-
agers involved in the innovation process were also found to play an important
role in this stage.
Together, the four studies provide rich insight in the major challenges
decision-makers encounter in the high-tech service innovation process. In-
sight is also created into some of the factors that can be manipulated by
ﬁrms in order to increase the eﬀectiveness of their decision-making and im-
prove the chances of success of high-tech service innovation projects.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the focal theme of the disserta-
tion to the reader. A rationale for the research as a whole is presented, and
a general problem statement is formulated. The reader is then introduced to
the respective research questions, theoretical perspectives, objectives, and
intended contributions of the four self-contained studies that make up the
research. Finally, the reader is provided with an outline of the remaining
part of the dissertation.
1
2 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
This introductory chapter of the dissertation consists of three sections. In
Section 1.1, the focal theme of the dissertation will be introduced. A rationale
for the research is provided, and a problem statement is formulated for the
dissertation as a whole. In Section 1.2, the purpose, research questions, and
intended contributions of the separate chapters of the thesis are presented.
The four self-contained studies are also positioned in the broader context of
research in the management sciences. Finally, in Section 1.3, an outline of
the remaining part of the dissertation is presented.
1.1 Eﬀective Decision Making in High Tech
Service Innovation
In this section the subject matter of the dissertation is presented: manage-
rial decision-making in the high-tech service innovation process. The reader
will be provided with a number of reasons why this topic deserves special
attention. First, the phenomenon of high-tech services is introduced and it is
explained why the importance of high-tech services in the global economy is
still increasing. Furthermore, the role of innovation in the high-tech services
industry is clariﬁed. Subsequently, it is pointed out what makes innovation
in the high-tech services industry very risky, and why it is necessary to im-
prove the performance of the high-tech service innovation process. Finally,
arguments are presented as to why developing a better understanding of the
factors aﬀecting the eﬀectiveness of managerial decision-making in the inno-
vation process can lead to the desired result.
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1.1.1 High Tech Services
Over the past decennia, the world has witnessed what has been called the
ICT revolution. A range of major achievements in information and com-
munication technology (ICT) have paved the way for the development and
commercialization of a wide range of really new technology based services
(Lehmann 1997). These high-tech services can create substantial value for
the providers as well as for the consumers of the services (Van den Ende and
Wijnberg 2001). Oftentimes, these ICT-based services are replacing tradi-
tional, labor-intensive, services. This substitution can lead to a substantial
cost reduction for the provider. A familiar example from the ﬁnancial services
sector, demonstrating the power of information and communication technol-
ogy to substantially improve the productivity of services, is the substitution
of bank counters with ATM’s and online banking services. Other sectors of
the services industry, such as insurances, the stock exchange, the travel indus-
try, media, telecommunications, and IT-service providers are currently also
tapping into the potential of ICT-based services. Apart from cost-savings,
the use of modern information and communication technology also increases
the quality and the value added of existing services. At the same time, nu-
merous entirely new services are being developed and oﬀered that could not
have been imagined only recently, creating considerable entrepreneurial op-
portunities. As a consequence of these developments, the world of services is
changing dramatically in many respects, for the companies that conceptual-
ize, develop and commercialize these new ICT-based services, as well as for
their customers (Meuter 1999).
4 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1.2 Innovation in High Tech Services
Indeed, innovation is considered the lifeblood of the economy as a whole
(Schumpeter 1934) and an important source of prosperity in society (Green-
span 1996). The introduction of new products and services has been shown
to contribute in an important sense to the growth, competitiveness and prof-
itability of ﬁrms (Sua`rez and Utterback 1995; Tushman and Anderson 1996;
Tushman and Anderson 1986). The regular introduction of really new or
substantially improved ICT-based services – intended either as core services
or as customer services supporting other products - has become vitally im-
portant for the creation of customer value and satisfaction.
However, although the ICT revolution has provided many important en-
trepreneurial opportunities to service ﬁrms, it also threatens the survival
of companies in the sector. There is little doubt as to the fact that the
speed of technological change and the globalization of the marketplace have
severely intensiﬁed inter-ﬁrm competition in the high-tech service industry.
As a result of increased price transparency, customers are now able to com-
pare products and prices on a global scale. They have become much more
demanding with respect to product or service speciﬁcations, perceived value
and the convenience of delivery or fulﬁllment. Furthermore, the high speed of
technological developments has substantially reduced the life cycle of high-
tech products (Cooper 1996), and even very successful ICT-based services
seem to become rapidly obsolete and must be improved or replaced on a
regular basis. Innovations also spread much more rapidly and the creative
destruction of innovation (Schumpeter 1934) will occur much faster in a world
dominated by information technology. Major threats aﬀecting the ICT-based
service sector are thus rapidly changing customer requirements, intensiﬁed
competition, turbulent marketplaces, and the high speed of technological de-
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velopments and shortened life cycles of services. The fact that ﬁrms can
neutralize these important threats by constantly improving existing services
and eﬀectively introducing successful new services, underlines the importance
of innovation in the high-tech service industry as a major source of compet-
itive advantage.
Notwithstanding the urgent need for new service success, many high-tech
service innovations fail to live up to the expectations of both providers and
consumers, in spite of huge investments in research and development. Too
many services do not add the intended value to the customer, do not match
customer requirements with respect to service quality and user-friendliness,
or simply do not become commercial successes. At the same time, innova-
tion in high-tech services generally requires considerable investments in the
technological infrastructure, as well as extensive adaptations in the organi-
zational structure of the ﬁrm (Tushman and O’Reilly III 1997). The un-
certainty, dynamics and complexity of the high-tech service industry create
major challenges for innovating ﬁrms and negatively aﬀect the performance of
the innovation process, in terms of the success rate (e.g. Cooper and Edgett
1996). The observation of high failure rates and high levels of investments
leads to the conclusion that innovation in the high-tech service industry is
very risky. If survival chances of ﬁrms, active in the high-tech service sector,
are to be increased, a structural improvement of high-tech service innova-
tion process performance could be a good starting point. Based upon the
arguments presented above, we conclude that any research contributing to
improvements in the success rate of high-tech service innovations must be
considered of the greatest economic importance (Boulding et al. 1997).
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1.1.3 Decision Making in the High Tech Service Inno-
vation Process
Why is the failure rate in high-tech service innovation so high? The speed
and unpredictability of technological developments, the increased complexity
of the technologies in use, the globalization and turbulence of markets, as
well as rapidly changing customer requirements and the resulting uncertainty
about future states of the world are making high-tech service innovation an
extremely complex matter (Edvardsson et al. 1995). Nonetheless, as we
have argued, the new economy demands fast, continuous and highly eﬀective
innovation, in spite of the extreme complexity of the task, which in turn
requires the development of sophisticated, appropriately adapted and very
eﬀective new service development (NSD) processes (Cooper 1996).
To date, research with the intention of developing a better understanding
of high-tech service innovation and identifying new service success factors has
mainly focused on factors external to the new service development process
(Martin and Horne 1995). As a result, the internals of the high-tech ser-
vice development process are relatively underexposed in academic research.
In recent studies, eﬀective information processing and communication during
the new service development process have been put forward as important an-
tecedents of service innovation success (Lievens and Moenaert 2000a; Lievens
and Moenaert 2000c; Lievens et al. 1997). Managers transform information
into action through their decision-making (March 1991) and the performance
of organizational processes has been associated with the eﬀectiveness of man-
agerial decision-making (Galbraith 1973; Galbraith 1974; March 1999; Pen-
rose 1959). Therefore, the present dissertation approaches the problem of
high-tech service innovation success as a decision-making performance prob-
lem, and thus investigates the new service development process from the
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inside. The focus will be on the identiﬁcation of antecedents and moderators
of decision-making eﬀectiveness of managers in charge of the new service de-
velopment process. The central problem statement of the dissertation thus
reads:
• How can the eﬀectiveness of managerial decision-making under the con-
ditions present during the high-tech service innovation process be in-
creased?
1.2 Perspective and Intended Contributions
of the Various Parts of the Study
The problem statement of the dissertation will be addressed in four inter-
related studies. In each of these studies, we approach the problem from a
diﬀerent theoretical perspective. The role of cognitive decision-making styles,
antecedents of information utilization, and organizational information acqui-
sition, and diﬀusion are studied with respect to their eﬀect on the perfor-
mance of the new service development process. In this section, the diﬀerent
perspectives will be introduced and clariﬁed.
1.2.1 Study One
In existing behavioral literature on decision-making under uncertainty, as-
sociated with the discussion about the value of managerial use of intuitive
cognition, the eﬀectiveness of managerial decision-making has been related
to the decision-making style used by the manager. The use of a decision-
style that is better adapted to the cognitive requirements of the decision
context is associated with more eﬀective decision-making (Payne 1997). In
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the ﬁrst study in this dissertation, the general problem statement is therefore
approached with a focus on the cognitive decision-making style and its rela-
tionship with the task conditions of the decision-maker. The high-tech service
industry stands out with respect to the level as well as the sources of uncer-
tainty in the task environment of the ﬁrm’s key innovation decision-makers.
In this conceptual study, the relative value of diﬀerent cognitive styles for
the reduction of uncertainty is therefore assessed, under various categories of
decision-maker task conditions. The focus is on the identiﬁcation of inher-
ent diﬀerences in the eﬀectiveness and scope of cognitive styles. The used
methodology is an extensive review of the literature on decision-making un-
der uncertainty, combined with ﬁndings about information processing styles
from the ﬁeld of cognitive psychology. The problem statement guiding the
ﬁrst study is:
• What is the relationship between task conditions, the use of a particular
cognitive style and the eﬀectiveness of decision-making under circum-
stances prevailing during the high-tech service innovation process?
The purpose of the study is the development of a comprehensive conceptual
model, allowing decision-makers to evaluate diﬀerent cognitive styles theo-
retically for what they are worth under the extreme conditions encountered
during diﬀerent stages of the high-tech service innovation process.
1.2.2 Study Two
After the introduction of a more organic organization structure, and the re-
sulting far-reaching decentralization of decision-making authority in modern
high-tech industries, the role of individual product managers in charge of
innovation projects has become key to the performance of the innovation
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process as a whole (Burns and Stalker 2001). In the second study, a case re-
search perspective is adopted, which allows an in-depth investigation of major
antecedents of high-tech new service development process performance at the
level of individual project managers. The project manager has the formidable
task of selecting and integrating relevant information from specialists in var-
ious disciplines, and deal with the inherent dynamics and complexity of the
service innovation process. With the double purpose of developing in-depth
insight in the task conditions of managers in the high-tech service innovation
process, and to identify antecedents of eﬀective decision-making, a case study
of four telecommunications service innovations was conducted. The research
questions addressed in this study are:
• What do the task conditions of innovation project managers consist of,
in the high-tech service industry?
• Which cognitive and organizational skills contribute to more eﬀective
decision-making of project managers?
• How can ﬁrms facilitate eﬀective decision-making in the high-tech ser-
vice innovation process?
The purpose of the study is the development of a comprehensive model,
integrating antecedents and moderators of eﬀective decision-making in the
new service development process.
1.2.3 Study Three
In organizational decision-making theory it has become clear that not only
the choice of a preferred course of action plays an important role in determin-
ing decision-making eﬀectiveness. The strength of managerial commitment
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to that chosen course of action plays an equally important role (Staw 1997).
In spite of the highly undesirable economic eﬀects of so-called escalations of
commitment in high-tech innovation projects, very little research has focused
on the development of commitment during the decision-making process. Es-
pecially in decision-making under extreme uncertainty, and under dynamic
and ambiguous conditions, occurring during the high-tech service innovation
process, escalations of commitment seem to take place on a frequent basis
(Drummond 1998; Ghosh 1995; Keil et al. 1995). Existing literature on
bounded rationality has traditionally conceptualized decision-making as the
selection or choice of a preferred course of action, in order to maximize or
satisﬁce the decision-maker’s utility. This focus on choice has caused the re-
search strand to overlook the development of managerial commitment to the
chosen course of action. In the third study a perspective is therefore adopted
that is generally associated with the literature on bounded rationality and
the study of bias in the rationality of decision-makers, but speciﬁcally inves-
tigating the eﬀect of information on the development of initial commitment.
A decision-making experiment is conducted, with the purpose of exploring
the eﬀects of information on choice and commitment. The research question
guiding the study is:
• What are the eﬀects of information on managerial judgment and initial
commitment to a decision, under conditions of uncertainty caused by
information overload?
The objective of the study is to make two theoretical contributions to the
bounded rationality literature. First, the theory of bounded rationality is
extended to include an important outcome of managerial decision-making,
namely managerial commitment to a chosen course of action. Second, infor-
mation overload is considered as a unique cause of speciﬁc bias in managerial
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judgment.
1.2.4 Study Four
In previous research, it has been demonstrated that information processes
and communication play an important role in determining innovative suc-
cess (Lievens and Moenaert 2000b; Lievens et al. 1999b). With the objec-
tive of extending the literature about success factors in service innovation,
in a fourth study organizational characteristics are identiﬁed, related to in-
formation acquisition, diﬀusion and use, that act as antecedents of eﬀective
managerial decision-making and innovative success. In an empirical study,
data are collected about a large international sample of service innovations.
The problem statement guiding the fourth study is:
• Which factors aﬀect, through their inﬂuence on organizational infor-
mation processing and decision-making eﬀectiveness, high-tech service
innovation performance?
The purpose of this study is to explore the antecedents of high-tech service
innovation related decision-making eﬀectiveness on both a strategic and an
operational level and to integrate the ﬁndings in a comprehensive model.
1.3 Outline of the Dissertation
The fundamental purpose of this dissertation is to develop insight in factors
aﬀecting managerial decision-making eﬀectiveness in the high-tech service
innovation process. The central issues of the dissertation, eﬀective decision-
making under uncertainty and its antecedents, are approached from a number
of diﬀerent perspectives and with diﬀerent methods. The remaining part of
the dissertation consists of the following chapters:
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Although much research has been devoted to the study of decision-making
under uncertainty, a comprehensive model relating task conditions, cognitive
decision styles and moderators of decision-making eﬀectiveness is still lacking.
In Chapter Two, the results of a conceptual study, investigating the eﬀects
of using various managerial decision-styles on decision-making eﬀectiveness
under conditions of great uncertainty, are presented.
The high-tech service innovation process has not been studied extensively
from the inside. This is, however, the perspective that can teach us most
about the antecedents of innovation success. In Chapter Three, the results
of an extensive case study in the mobile telecommunications industry are pre-
sented. Based upon an analysis of four high-tech service innovation projects,
a theoretical model is constructed with respect to antecedents of eﬀective
decision-making in high-tech service innovation.
Most research in the area of decision-making under uncertainty has con-
ceptualized decision-making as a choice, based upon decision-maker’s maxi-
mizing or satisﬁzing of expected utility. But for the eﬀectiveness with which
the decision-maker manages a process, not only his choices are important.
Managerial commitment to those choices appears equally important. In
Chapter Four, the results of an experimental study, investigating the ef-
fect of information overload on managerial decision-making, are presented.
Decision-making is conceptualized in this study as choice and commitment.
In Chapter Five, the results of an empirical study, investigating orga-
nizational antecedents of eﬀective decision-making in high-tech service in-
novation, are presented. These factors are associated with the success of
high-tech service innovation projects. Inter-ﬁrm variance in high-tech ser-
vice innovation success is thus explained in terms of information processing
related antecedents of successful innovative decision-making.
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Figure 1.1: Overview of the Dissertation
In Chapter Six, the dissertation is concluded with a summary of the
results, managerial implications and suggestions for further research. The
approach taken in the dissertation is visualized in Figure 1.1.
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Chapter 2
Eﬀectiveness and Scope of
Decision Making Styles
In this chapter, cognitive aspects of decision-making are considered against
the background of high-tech service innovation. During the innovation pro-
cess, crucial decisions are made under challenging conditions. Managers
encounter signiﬁcant time pressure, complexity, and a lack of information.
Performance, conceptualized as decision-making eﬀectiveness, is associated
with the appropriate use of cognitive styles. Theories about decision-making
under uncertainty, and the use of managerial judgment and intuition, are
reviewed and integrated. Four basic cognitive styles are identiﬁed and evalu-
ated for relative eﬀectiveness under each of four elementary task conditions.
Propositions are developed about the relationships between task conditions
and the relative use of styles, and about moderators of style eﬀectiveness.
Contributions of the study are a conceptual clariﬁcation of the distinction
between intuition, heuristics, and bounded rationality, and the assessment
of the scope of various cognitive styles and moderators of their eﬀectiveness.
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Daß alle unsere Erkenntnis mit der Erfahrung anfange, daran ist gar kein
Zweifel. (Immanuel Kant, Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, p.27)
2.1 Introduction
As a result of a quick succession of substantial technological changes, and
hypercompetition in the marketplace, the macro environment of ﬁrms in
high-tech service sectors is currently characterized by great turbulence and
uncertainty (D’Aveni 1995; D’Aveni 1994). In such turbulent environments,
successful innovation is said to be key to ﬁrm survival (Lehmann 1997), since
it reﬂects the organizational ability to cope productively with high levels of
uncertainty and rapid change in the environment (Anderson and Tushman
2001; Hannan and Freeman 1989; Nelson and Winter 1982). The performance
of organizational processes, such as new service development, is generally
considered to be positively and strongly correlated to the eﬀectiveness of
related managerial decision-making (Galbraith 1973; Galbraith 1974; March
1999; Penrose 1959). In particular, the degree to which managers eﬀectively
make decisions in the innovation process will therefore have a major impact
on the performance of the process and as a result on survival chances of
high-tech service ﬁrms.
The task conditions of high-tech service innovation managers reﬂect the
turbulence and uncertainty in the ﬁrm’s macro-environment. Many decisions
must be made under very diﬃcult conditions, caused by considerable time
pressure (Payne et al. 1990; Simon 1997), extensive problem complexity
(Weick 2001), a lack of information, and resulting high levels of uncertainty.
Still, decision-makers in charge of the innovation process are not allowed or
supposed to simply throw dice (Bazerman 2001; Hammond 1996). They must
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respond in an appropriate manner to what they know about the situation
(Wagner and Sternberg 1986). In order to do so, they must make intelligent
use of a combination of available cues and their experience on the one hand
and their cognitive skills on the other (Hammond 1996; Simon 1997).
Previous studies seem to indicate that decision-makers principally deal
with conditions of considerable uncertainty by adapting their cognitive style
to the requirements of the circumstances (e.g. Agor 1986; Behling and Eckel
1991; Burke and Miller 1999; Harper 1988). A number of cognitive styles,
employed by managers in order to make decisions eﬀectively under various
circumstances, have been identiﬁed (Payne 1982; Payne 1976; Simon 1997).
With respect to an understanding of decision-making in the high-tech service
innovation process, knowledge is substantially lacking in several areas. For
example, little is known about the scope of each of the styles, i.e. the range of
situations to which a style may validly be applied, or about the eﬀectiveness
of particular styles in reducing the uncertainty, under varying task conditions.
Research is therefore urgently needed to investigate the following issue:
• What is the relationship between task conditions, the use of a particular
cognitive style and the eﬀectiveness of decision-making under circum-
stances prevailing during the high-tech service innovation process?
Four interrelated research questions have been formulated, in order to deal
with this problem statement:
RQ 1: Which fundamentally diﬀerent decision-making styles can
be distinguished and how are they related to underlying
cognitive mechanisms?
RQ 2: Which task conditions prevail in the high-tech service
innovation process, and how do these conditions aﬀect
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the relative importance of the styles?
RQ 3: Which factors moderate the validity of the use of cogni-
tive mechanisms and the resulting eﬀectiveness of each
style?
RQ 4: How does time pressure aﬀect the appropriateness of dif-
ferent styles?
The remaining part of the chapter is structured as follows. First, a prelimi-
nary theoretical framework is developed for the study. By means of a review
of relevant literature from diﬀerent disciplines and ﬁelds, four fundamental
decision-making styles are identiﬁed. Based upon an analysis of the cogni-
tive processes underlying the four decision styles, propositions are formulated
with respect to the suitability of the styles under various categories of task
conditions. Subsequently, the question is addressed which factors moderate
the validity of diﬀerent styles, and determine the eﬀect of time pressure. The
resulting propositions are integrated in a comprehensive model and the chap-
ter is concluded with managerial implications and a number of suggestions
for further research.
2.2 Decision Making Eﬀectiveness
Very high levels of uncertainty characterize each high-tech service innovation
project at the outset. The skill with which managers succeed in rapidly and
steadily reducing this initial uncertainty, through the collection of informa-
tion on the one hand and eﬀective decision-making on the other, determines
the extent to which they obtain control over the performance of the process.
Time pressure underlines decision-makers’ need to deal fast and eﬀectively
with uncertainty. Eﬀective decision-making, uncertainty, decision-making
2.2. DECISION MAKING EFFECTIVENESS 19
styles and time pressure are core constructs in the following discussion. First,
working deﬁnitions of these concepts and their interrelation will be proposed.
2.2.1 Eﬀective Decision Making
Performance objectives of a new service development (NSD) process, such as
the relationship between input (human and ﬁnancial resources) and output
(service features and quality) as well as desired development speed (Kessler
and Chakrabarti 1996), are generally determined by matters external to the
process. However, the performance of the innovation process – i.e. the extent
to which the managers achieve or exceed these objectives, will – all other
things being equal - be critically related to the quality of decision-making
inside the process. We therefore deﬁne eﬀective decision-making in such a
way, that, all other things equal, more eﬀective decision-making leads, in a
probabilistic way, to improved process performance. In other words, in the
following:
Decision-making eﬀectiveness is conceptualized as the probability
that a decision relating to a process contributes positively to the
performance of that process.
2.2.2 Uncertainty
In the following, the concept of uncertainty is used in an exclusively cogni-
tive sense, and not in an emotional sense. The decision-maker must have
a reasonably accurate and complete mental representation of the innovation
project and its interfaces with the world, in order to be able to make decisions
eﬀectively, and exert control over the performance of the innovation process.
His mental image is obviously never entirely accurate or complete. Parts of
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the picture are blurred, incomplete, missing, or simply wrong. From this
perspective, any improvement in the accuracy or completeness of the mental
image, or in other words the extent to which the decision-maker succeeds in
reducing the uncertainty about the state of aﬀairs, can be understood as a
major antecedent of eﬀective decision-making. However, it must be recog-
nized, that uncertainty reduction can equally well be seen as a consequence
of eﬀective decision-making. For example, as a consequence of the decision
to select a particular technology, the range of possible options for many other
decisions in the process will be limited.
Based on the reasoning above, we conceptualize ‘uncertainty’ in a very
general, cognitive and negative sense, as ‘ignorance’ or ‘not knowing’ (Lievens
1996). This deﬁnition underlines the fact that uncertainty is always and
necessarily subjective and relative to the decision-maker: it is the decision-
maker who does not know certain things that are useful for the decision
under consideration. Therefore:
Uncertainty is a subjective cognitive state of a decision-maker,
varying in level between two extremes. On the one extreme we ﬁnd
a total absence of useful knowledge and on the other the possession
of a maximum amount of useful knowledge.
In reality, uncertainty is always limited. The residual uncertainty is the gap
between available useful knowledge on the one side, and a ceiling of a max-
imal amount of useful knowledge on the other.1 It can be represented as a
knowledge ‘gap’ (Galbraith 1973; Galbraith 1974). Knowledge acquired be-
1This does not imply that all useful knowledge can really be obtained. The cost, or
eﬀort needed in order to obtain certain useful knowledge can be very high, or even inﬁnite.
The decision-maker decides which price he or she is prepared to pay, and as a consequence
the amount of risk he or she is prepared to take.
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Figure 2.1: Residual Uncertainty as a Knowledge Gap
yond the ceiling is redundant. In Figure 2.1, the suggested conceptualization
of the uncertainty of a decision-maker at a certain point in time, is visualized
as a knowledge gap.
The irregular upward slope of the lower line in Figure 2.1 reﬂects reality to
the extent that in practice the amount of acquired useful knowledge will in-
crease over time; sometimes fast, sometimes slowly, as a result of endogenous
eﬀorts, such as explicit information gathering, increasing experience or as the
result of key decisions. The determination of the precise shape of both lines
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lies outside the scope of the present discussion. Exogenous causes, such as
sudden changes in the technology, competitive action, or changes in industry
structure etc. may increase or decrease both the maximum amount of useful
knowledge and the relative amount of acquired knowledge, and therefore the
degree of uncertainty with which the decision-maker will have to deal. The
representation of the upper line as a knowledge ceiling may suﬃce for the
current purposes.
2.2.3 Time Pressure
Decision-making in high-tech service innovation processes generally occurs
under signiﬁcant time pressure. The causes of time pressure are partially
exogenous, and partially endogenous to the innovation process. First, hy-
percompetition causes great pressure on the ﬁrm to rapidly develop and
introduce new services (D’Aveni 1995; D’Aveni 1994). Second, the speed of
technological developments requires a fast innovation process. Time pressure
has the overall eﬀect that less information and knowledge can be acquired
and processed, and less time can be spent on preparing and making decisions.
2.2.4 Decision Making Styles
Decision-makers’ task conditions vary considerably over the innovation pro-
cess. Uncertainty will take many shapes and will be caused by a variety of
circumstances, e.g. changing customer requirements, or technological devel-
opments and decision-maker related factors such as a lack of decision-making
experience. Both the task conditions causing the uncertainty, and the result-
ing level can vary. Near the end of the innovation process managers will
most likely be dealing with relatively low levels of uncertainty. This im-
plies that they will proceed faster and make bigger steps at the end, when
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things become clearer, whereas at the beginning of the process the level of
uncertainty is very high and things may move more slowly. Especially in a
situation where great time pressure exists as a result of strong competitive
pressure, the relative performance of the innovation process will critically de-
pend on decision-making performance, i.e. the extent to which the involved
manager makes eﬀective decisions. Managers have always been searching
for ways to deal eﬀectively with elevated levels of uncertainty. For example,
improving decision-making eﬀectiveness could be achieved by employing a
decision-making style that is optimally adapted to the circumstances. We
conceptualize a decision-making style as:
The particular blend of cognitive activities used to transform given
information (i.e. the information and knowledge acquired at a
certain point in time) into a course of action.
In the ﬁeld of cognitive psychology, a relationship has been posited between
the extent to which individuals are able to adapt their cognitive style to
the requirements of the actual task conditions and the extent to which they
can successfully manage the challenges of that environment (Brunswik 1952;
Hammond et al. 1987; Meehl 1954; Payne et al. 1990; Payne et al. 1988). In
the following, the relationship between task conditions, cognitive style and
decision-making eﬀectiveness will be investigated.
2.3 The Scope of Decision Making Styles
In the following, literature with respect to human information processing
systems and decision-making styles will be reviewed and integrated.
24 CHAPTER 2. SCOPE OF DECISION STYLES
2.3.1 Two ‘Underlying Cognitive Systems’
Several managerial decision-making styles have been distinguished in the
literature (Sauter 1999). Based upon reﬂections on Barnard’s distinction
between logical and non-logical decision processes (Barnard 1938), Herbert
Simon ﬁrst distinguished two formally diﬀerent decision-making techniques,
an analytical and an intuitive style (Simon 1997; Simon 1987; Simon 1957).
He related the ﬁrst to the use of information and explicit reasoning, and the
latter to the use of expertise and experience.
Western epistemology, the theory of knowledge, has almost exclusively
focused on explicit, rational cognition, inspired by Aristotle’s works on logic,
and culminating in Descartes’ gloriﬁcation of human reason and rational sci-
ence. True knowledge was conceptualized as a symbolical representation of
an objectively – or at least intersubjectively – knowable reality. As a result,
for centuries intuitive cognition – generally considered a more obscure, prim-
itive2, subjective or even private form of intelligence, could not compete with
the objectively valid and universally reproducible truths of rational cognition.
In the twentieth century, however, and largely as a result of the work of Egon
Brunswik and Paul Meehl in cognitive psychology (Brunswik 1952; Meehl
1954), Herbert Simon in management theory (Simon 1997; Simon 1987) and
Kenneth Hammond (Hammond and Bremer 1973; Hammond et al. 1987)
in the social sciences, the phenomenon of intuitive intelligence has regained
serious academic and practical interest (Agor 1984; Isaack 1978; Taggart and
Robey 1981). Intuition was no longer universally seen as simply an inferior
and more primitive form of cognition, but has actually been endowed with
the potential of improving on rational cognition, in terms of decision-making
eﬀectiveness, under circumstances that impede rational cognition, such as
2Intuition has also been viewed as a ‘divine form of knowing’.
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for instance in strategic decision-making (Burke and Miller 1999; Eisenhardt
and Tabrizi 1995; Khatri and Ng 2000).
In psychology, the observation of two categorically diﬀerent forms of cog-
nitive activities has led scientists to posit the co-existence of two separate,
but interactive, information-processing systems in the human brain, a ratio-
nal and an experiential system (Denes-Raj and Epstein 1994; Epstein 1998;
Epstein 1994; Epstein et al. 1992). The two complementary systems appear
to be used in parallel, whereas the relative extent to which each system is
used could be said to reﬂect the cognitive style (Epstein 1998). The indi-
vidual preference for using one system over another has been viewed and
subsequently investigated as a personality trait (Briggs-Myers and McCaul-
ley 1985; Jung 1971). Some indications were found that the two cogni-
tive systems are actually located in physically diﬀerent parts of the human
brain (Bechara et al. 1997), albeit not in the traditionally suggested left
and right hemispheres (Simon 1987). The rational or analytical information
processing system has been associated with articulate, symbolic, and explicit
cause-and-eﬀect reasoning. The experiential system has been associated with
tacit, implicit, synthetic and, more recently, with associationist (connection-
ist) cognitive activities. The idea that human cognition is partially based
on associationist or connectionist processes gained in popularity after the
discovery of the workings of neurons and neural networks (Churchland 1995;
Dutta 1993). Characteristics of the two cognitive systems are contrasted in
Table 2.1.
The observation that in the actual practice of decision-making hybrid
styles - combinations of rational and intuitive processing - are used by man-
agers, has led to the development of a cognitive continuum theory (Hammond
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Feature Experiential System Rational System
Perspective Holistic Analytic
Control Automatic, Eﬀortless Intentional, Eﬀortful
Orientation Aﬀective: Pleasure-Pain Ori-
ented (What Feels Good)
Logical: Reason Oriented (What
is Sensible)
Structure of
Knowledge
Associationist Connections Logical Connections
Eﬀect on Behav-
ior
Behavior Mediated by “vibes”
from Past Events
Behavior Mediated by Conscious
Appraisal of Events
Form Encodes Reality in Concrete Im-
ages, Metaphors and Narratives:
Subjective
Objective Representation of
Reality in Abstract Symbols:
Words and Numbers
Productivity More Rapid Processing: Ori-
ented toward Immediate Action
Slower Processing: Oriented to-
ward Delayed Action
Adaptivity Slower and More Resistant to
Change: Changes with Repeti-
tive/Intense Experience
Changes More Rapidly and Eas-
ily: Changes with Strength of
Argument
Detail More Crudely Diﬀerentiated:
Broad Generalization Gradient,
Stereotypical Thinking
More Highly Diﬀerentiated
Coherence of
Output
More Crudely Integrated: Dis-
sociative, Emotional Complexes,
Context-Speciﬁc Processing
More Highly Integrated:
Context-General Principles
Control Experienced Passively and Pre-
conscious: we are Seized by Emo-
tion
Experienced Actively and Con-
sciously: we are in Control of our
Thoughts
Validity Self-Evidently Valid: “Experi-
encing is Believing”
Requires Justiﬁcation via Logic
and Empirical Evidence
Table 2.1: Two Cognitive Systems. Ad. from: Teglasi and Epstein (1998)
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Intuition Rational Analysis
Semi-Rational Cognition
Figure 2.2: The Cognitive Continuum. Adapted from: Shanteau (1992)
and Bremer 1973), contending that decision-making styles can be positioned
on a continuous scale with at one extreme entirely rational cognition, and
at the other extreme purely intuitive cognition. Between the two extremes,
diﬀerent degrees of semi-rational cognition can be located (Hammond 2000).
In Figure 2.2, we visually represent the cognitive continuum as proposed by
Shanteau (1992).
However, the representation of the cognitive continuum on a single line
seems to imply that a decrease in the intensity of rational processing always
coincides with an increase in intuitive processing and vice versa. The one-
dimensional scale does not allow for independent variation in the relative
use of the two information systems and the intensity or eﬀort with which
each of them is employed. When we take the existence of two independent
information-processing systems seriously, we must permit independent vari-
ation in the relative use of each system and in the ‘intensity of use’. This
observation is graphically represented in Figure 2.3, as a matrix, with four
quadrants.
Based upon deduction, and supported by the observation of practicing
decision-makers, we propose to distinguish four basic decision-making styles,
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Intensity of using the 
Experiential System
Intensity of using theRational System
Intuition Active 
Sense Making
Rational 
Analysis
Common Sense 
Heuristics &
Routine
Figure 2.3: The Cognitive Style Matrix
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represented by the four quadrants of the cognitive style matrix. First, a
largely analytical style is distinguished. Rational analysis is characterized
by an almost exclusive and intensive use of the rational system. Second, a
principally intuitive style is distinguished, characterized by the almost ex-
clusive and ‘intensive’ use of the experiential information processing system.
Third, a style characterized by the combined use of relatively limited analyt-
ical thinking and experiential cognition of a limited scope is identiﬁed, which
can be recognized in common sense, and also in heuristic or routine decision-
making. This style seems to be best characterized by the term ‘habit frozen
into memory’. Finally, a fourth style is characterized by a combination or
integration of high-intensity rational thinking and high-intensity experien-
tial cognition. This style is preliminarily denoted with the term active sense
making. The reason why will become clear further on. This style is charac-
terized by a maximum use of a combination of both information-processing
systems. Decision-makers thus have four basic decision styles at their dis-
position, based on the relative use of two fundamentally diﬀerent cognitive
information-processing systems. This answers the ﬁrst research question.
2.3.2 Decision Making Styles and Task Conditions
So far, in studies of management decision-making the relative use of cognitive
mechanisms in a decision-style has been said to reﬂect the requirements of
the speciﬁc problem or task conditions to which a decision-maker is exposed.
It has also been proposed that an optimal match exists between requirements
and decision style (Payne 1997; Payne et al. 1990; Shapiro and Spence 1997;
Spence and Brucks 1997).
Before addressing the question with respect to the relative eﬀectiveness
of the diﬀerent styles, in terms of their ability to reduce uncertainty under
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speciﬁc circumstances, ﬁrst a better understanding must be developed of how
information is processed when using diﬀerent styles, and which type of in-
formation is processed. With respect to the nature of the process, it is often
said that managers transform information or knowledge into action through
their decisions (March 1991). It seems very useful indeed, to conceptual-
ize the core cognitive activity involved in the decision-making process as a
‘transformation process’ of a ‘cognitive input’ into a ‘cognitive output’, which
drives subsequent actions. Since it is our intention to determine the relation-
ship between task conditions and the relative use of the respective cognitive
systems, we ﬁrst discuss existing knowledge with respect to the nature of
intuitive and rational cognitive processes, and of the respective output. With
the purpose of identifying factors moderating the validity of using various
cognitive mechanisms, thereafter the nature of the input of both processes is
discussed.
2.3.3 Information Processing Mechanisms
In the following, two fundamental information-processing systems are com-
pared and discussed, with respect to their input, output and the nature of
the transformation process. A special eﬀort is made, not to confuse intuition
with internalized analysis and systems of decision rules (Noorderhaven 1995),
which would confound it with memorized rationally obtained knowledge, but
to view it as a diﬀerent form of cognition altogether, with diﬀerent forms of
input, storage and output.
2.3.3.1 Rational or Analytical Information Processing
The rational process has been used as a preferred example for most episte-
mological theories and has thus been studied extensively and described in
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innumerable places. Moreover, since Kant made a distinction between the
logical and perceptual dimensions of human knowledge, much attention has
been paid to the logical structure of rational knowledge (Kant 1787). Here,
we will therefore focus on those features that distinguish rational cognition
most clearly from intuition. Rational thinking, or reasoning, is generally
thought of as an explicit and sequential process that can be controlled and
reproduced by the thinker and by any other person accepting the same rules
of logic. The development of rational knowledge is deductive and analytic.
The decision-maker follows a series of predetermined and communicable steps
that transform given external or internal (Kahneman and Tversky 1982) in-
formation according to these rules of logic. Reasoning is thus seen as the
processing of selected cognitive content, using the logic of causality: an inten-
tional, constructive, rule-based and conscious activity. The building blocks
of analytical or rational knowledge are pieces of information or judgments.
In other words, rational thinking provides the manager with high cognitive
control and high awareness, but is typically slow and can require intense
structuring eﬀorts from the decision-maker, depending on the complexity
of the problem to be solved. Rational decision-making occurs in steps and
allows the decision-maker to break up the problem, and if necessary, to dis-
tribute the parts over several experts. The eﬀects of emotions, which are
typically the result of individual experience, can be ﬁltered out or neutral-
ized in rational thinking, which makes the process more objective. Rational
processing can be controlled in terms of its ‘intensity’. The decision-maker
can determine into how much detail he will go.
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2.3.3.2 Output of the Rational or Analytical Process
Uncertainty is reduced by the reorganization of existing knowledge, the in-
tegration of extra (internal or external) information or a combination, and
based upon deduction. Rational output again takes the form of judgments
or knowledge that can be analyzed into logical components and it has a high
degree of internal validity. The meaning of rational judgment is or can be
communicated, shared and justiﬁed with the same arguments used to arrive
at the output. The decision-maker can determine the degree of detail. Ra-
tional output is always partial, necessarily incomplete. External validity of
rational output must and can only be obtained through empirical testing.
2.3.3.3 Intuitive or Experiential Information Processing
It has been observed by many decision-makers that intuitive cognition, con-
trary to rational activity, produces solutions in their entirety and instanta-
neously (Bowers et al. 1990). A complete solution emerges as it were in the
mind of the individual decision-maker. The person experiencing intuition
suddenly sees how something could be done (Parikh et al. 1994; Vaughan
1990). In general, intuitive decision-makers have genuine problems articulat-
ing their preference of one alternative solution over another (Morris 1967),
or how they arrived at that preference (Khatri and Ng 2000; Shapiro and
Spence 1997; Simon 1997; Vaughan 1990). They also cannot exert cogni-
tive control over the intuitive process, or break up the decision problem in
parts. At the same time, no control can be exerted over the ‘intensity’ or
comprehensiveness of the process. The intuitive process occurs non- or sub-
consciously (Bastick 1982; Rowan 1989), and is provoked rather than used.
Possibly as a result of this, it appears to be fast and not to require much eﬀort
(Bowers et al. 1990; Burke and Miller 1999; Hammond et al. 1987; Shirley
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Intuition Analysis
Cognitive Control Low High
Rate of Data Processing Rapid Slow
Conscious Awareness Low High
Organizing Principle Weighted Average Task Speciﬁc
Errors Normally Distributed Few, but Large
Conﬁdence in answer High Low
Conﬁdence in method Low High
Table 2.2: Contrasting Processes. Source: Hammond et al. (1987)
and Langan-Fox 1996). When confronted with a problem, individuals often
almost instantaneously have a feeling of what could be the right solution.
Intuition is therefore often compared to perceptual functions such as ‘seeing’
or ‘recognizing’ a truth. Another important observation is that intuitive cog-
nition is inductive (Agor 1984; Westcott 1968). Furthermore, it integrates
or connects distributed knowledge, or experience originating from diﬀerent
domains of reality (Kuo 1998) and from diﬀerent internal or external sensory
organs (Weick 1985). It is therefore also called ‘behavioral’ (McCall Jr. and
Kaplan 1990). The intuitive process is contrasted with rational cognition in
Table 2.2.
2.3.3.4 Output of the Intuitive or Experiential Process
Experiences acquired in diﬀerent domains of reality, in diﬀerent ways and
even via diﬀerent senses (Weick 1985) can get connected or associated into
intuitive knowledge (Agor 1986; Harper 1988; Kuo 1998). The generation of
intuitive knowledge appears to be passive, and the actor is not consciously
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involved in producing the knowledge. Most authors therefore stress that
output from the intuitive system is self-evident (Epstein 1998; Shirley and
Langan-Fox 1996; Vaughan 1990). Intuitive decision-makers simply ‘know’
the outcome and at the same time intuitive cognition inspires great conﬁdence
to the person experiencing the intuition (Bowers et al. 1990; Hammond et al.
1987; Shapiro and Spence 1997; Simon 1987). However, intuitive knowledge
seems to be the result of a highly individual process, both in terms of inputs
and of processing (or associating), and it is therefore diﬃcult to justify and
validate intuitive insights publicly, in an objective or even intersubjective
sense (Molloy and Schwenk 1995). As a result, it is generally not possible to
demonstrate the validity of intuitive knowledge in a similar way as the validity
of rational knowledge can be demonstrated. Based upon the characteristics
of the intuitive cognitive process a number of possible functions for intuitive
cognition have been established. These functions are listed in Table 2.3.
2.3.3.5 Hybrid Style One: Common Sense Based Decision Making
With the term common sense we refer to the use of what has often been
called ‘quick and dirty’ cognition. Common sense is characterized by a very
high degree of eﬃciency, under most common circumstances. It is therefore
applied in cases of relatively limited complexity and substance, and in cases
where little in-depth justiﬁcation is required. Heuristics, cognitive shortcuts,
and routine decision-making are all related forms of common sense. Common
sense seems to work best in situations that are characterized by a relatively
high degree of regularity. Decision-makers use new information very selec-
tively and rely on the validity of previous experience, with relatively little
eﬀort. The validity of judgments based on common sense is always indirect
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Function Explanation Feature
Intuitive
Discovery
Goes beyond simply providing answer to certain
problem but is an insight into the real nature of the
dilemma. It is likely to suddenly occur when the
mind is actually occupied with something other than
the problem to which the intuition is related.
Inductivity
Creative In-
tuition
Generates new ideas and involves alternatives and
possibilities rather than facts and provable informa-
tion.
Creativity,
Non-linearity
Intuitive
Evaluation
Leads to a feeling to prefer one alternative over the
other and leads to a feeling of certitude that tentative
conclusions are correct.
Integration of
Aﬀect
Operative
Intuition
Inﬂuences and prompts individuals’ actions without
entering consciousness and gives a particular direc-
tion of action that is unexplainable.
Tacit Knowl-
edge, Experi-
ence
Intuitive
Prediction
Deals with the unknown, under which circumstances
rational analysis is ineﬀective.
Synthesis,
Tacitness
Intuitive Il-
lumination
Transcends the other ﬁve functions of intuition and
is associated with a higher form of knowing and re-
sembles the more spiritual side of intuition.
Holistic Input
Table 2.3: Functions of Intuition. Adapted from Goldberg (1983; 1990)
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and often based upon textbook knowledge, or external authority.
2.3.3.6 Hybrid Style Two: Active Sense Making
Some decision-makers can combine intense rational analysis with a great
openness to intuitive insights. In what we have called active sense mak-
ing, the decision-maker puts much eﬀort into either reconciling his private
or subjective intuitive insights with what is objectively known, or indeed
into externalizing private knowledge. Therefore it seems that this mode can
be genuinely synthetic or creative in nature: It has the potential of pro-
ducing really new insights, a power that has traditionally - and seemingly
erroneously - been attributed to intuition alone (Bowers et al. 1990). It
seems, therefore, that only active sense making, precisely in its combination
of logical analysis and intuitive insights, is authentically creative (Goldberg
1983; Kuhn 1996; Prietula and Simon 1989), even visionary (Agor 1986).
This decision style seems to be suitable for very challenging conditions that
require limited justiﬁcation of separate steps, and much creativity, but where
the decision-maker is held accountable for the process as a whole rather than
for individual decisions or motivations3.
2.3.4 High Tech Service Innovation Task Conditions
Having distinguished four basic decision-making styles, four categories of
task conditions are now discussed, potentially aﬀecting decision-maker uncer-
tainty. The following categories have been identiﬁed in managerial decision-
making literature: the availability of information, problem complexity (We-
ick 1990), problem structuredness (Mintzberg et al. 1976), and the extent to
which solving a problem requires the use of practical skills or tacit knowledge
3Scientiﬁc research comes to mind as an excellent example of such a human activity.
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from the decision-maker (Wagner 1987; Wagner and Sternberg 1986; Wag-
ner and Sternberg 1987). Theoretical propositions will be formulated with
respect to the inherent appropriateness of the underlying cognitive styles for
dealing with these conditions.
2.3.4.1 The Availability of Information and Data
First, task conditions of decision-makers vary in terms of the availability
of high-quality data and information. Since strictly rational decision-making
requires accurate and well structured information (Schoemaker 1982), the ex-
tent to which uncertainty reduction through rational analysis can be achieved
will vary with the relative availability and quality of information. Newly ac-
quired information can immediately be integrated with the existing explicit
knowledge of the decision-maker and we expect that the availability of more
information will thus lead to more eﬀective rational processing:
Proposition 2.1 There will be a positive relationship between the relative
availability of high-quality information to the decision-maker and the extent
to which uncertainty can be eﬀectively reduced by using rational analysis.
Task conditions characterized by a lack of complete, accurate and timely
(high-quality) information (Harper 1988), seem to provoke a shift towards
the use of intuitive cognition. The argument is, that where there is not
much to process rationally, past experience could work as a substitute for
explicit information, arguably the only substitute we have. Furthermore, the
process of updating a decision-maker’s intuitive knowledge occurs relatively
slowly and new information will presumably not immediately add much to
the reservoir of intuitive knowledge. As a consequence we expect:
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Proposition 2.2 There will be a negative relationship between the relative
availability of high-quality information to the decision-maker and the extent
to which uncertainty reduction can be achieved by using intuitive knowledge.
2.3.4.2 Structuredness of the Decision Context
Second, decision conditions vary with respect to the so-called structuredness
of the decision context (Mintzberg et al. 1976). Rational processing requires
a well-structured decision problem: When the problem is clear to decision-
makers, they can make rational calculations. We thus expect:
Proposition 2.3 There will be a positive relationship between the relative
structuredness of the decision context and the extent to which uncertainty
can be reduced by using rational analysis.
In many cases, for example in strategic decision-making, problems are ill
structured. Ill structured problems are characterized by a high degree of
uncertainty about the actual situation, about the desired situation, or about
the way to get there, or a combination. Since rational analysis is unable to
deal with ill-structured problems, and intuition seems to deal with the context
in a more holistic way, not requiring a great degree of problem structuredness,
we expect:
Proposition 2.4 There will be a positive relationship between the relative
ill structuredness of the decision problem and the extent to which uncertainty
reduction can be achieved by using intuitive cognition.
2.3.4.3 Complexity of the Decision Problem
Task conditions also vary with respect to the complexity of the decision
context and the problems that are to be dealt with by the manager. Problem
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complexity could be abstractly described by the number of cues or issues that
play a role in a decision problem (Hammond et al. 1987). On the one hand,
rational decision-makers have problems with considerable complexity. On
the other hand, high levels of problem complexity require much processing
eﬀort from the decision-maker, a scarce resource under conditions of time
pressure. We therefore expect:
Proposition 2.5 There will be a negative relationship between the relative
complexity of the decision problem and the extent to which uncertainty can
be reduced by using rational analysis.
Expertise has been characterized as the ability to reduce complexity (Blat-
tberg and Hoch 1990; Simon 1987). Therefore the intuitive process, making
use of expertise, seems more eﬀective than rational processing in task envi-
ronments characterized by high levels of complexity. We expect:
Proposition 2.6 There will be a positive relationship between the relative
complexity of the decision problem and the extent to which uncertainty can
be reduced by using intuition.
2.3.4.4 Role of Tacit Knowledge
Decision conditions diﬀer in terms of the extent to which tacit knowledge
plays a role in the decision context (Polanyi 1969; Polanyi 1962; Polanyi
1966). For example, in the case of new service development, managers build
up a feeling for customer requirements over time. The skill to take customer
requirements into account when developing a new service is largely tacit.
The eﬀectiveness of decision-making can thus decrease when existing tacit
knowledge is ignored. Also, decision-makers access accumulated tacit, or
non-articulate knowledge through their intuition. We thus expect:
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Proposition 2.7 There will be a positive relationship between the relative
importance of tacit knowledge to the solution of a decision problem and the
extent to which uncertainty can be reduced by making use of intuitive knowl-
edge.
As a consequence of its nature, tacit knowledge cannot be easily or rapidly
articulated and will therefore be largely neglected in rational analysis. We
expect:
Proposition 2.8 There will be a negative relationship between the relative
importance of tacit knowledge to the solution of a decision problem and the
uncertainty reduction that can be achieved by exclusively using rational anal-
ysis.
We visually represent the relationship between the nature of the task con-
ditions and the likelihood that a cognitive style will help in achieving a re-
duction of the uncertainty in Figure 2.4. In this ﬁgure we relate the four
identiﬁed dimensions of task conditions, i.e. availability of data or informa-
tion, complexity, problem structuredness and articulation of the problem,
and the eﬀectiveness of the two fundamental cognitive processes. We have
argued that a greater use of intuitive cognition will lead to greater uncer-
tainty reduction in cases where the decision-maker is confronted with limited
availability of information, ill-structured problem contexts, situations where
tacit knowledge plays an important role and high levels of complexity. The
use of rational analysis will generally be more eﬀective in situations where
the opposite is the case.
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Figure 2.4: Task Conditions and Decision Style. Adapted from Shapiro and
Spence (1997).
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2.3.5 Factors Moderating the Eﬀectiveness of Decision
Making Styles
Adjustment of the decision style to the task conditions serves the primary
purpose to reduce uncertainty in as sound and eﬃcient a way as possible, un-
der given circumstances, in order to make decisions more eﬀectively. Having
established which task conditions call for which cognitive style, we must now
address the question which factors moderate the eﬀectiveness of each of the
two underlying cognitive systems, in validly reducing uncertainty. We will
infer diﬀerences in scope, and corresponding limitations with respect to the
validity of the two systems from the diﬀerences in the nature of the respective
input.
2.3.5.1 Scope of Intuitive Cognition
The intuitive process appears to diﬀer substantially from rational analysis
in terms of the form of its input. We therefore ﬁrst investigate if and how
the format of the cognitive input can possibly moderate the validity of each
of the styles. Whereof does the input of the intuitive process consist? An
important aspect of intuitive cognition is that, whatever the origin of the
knowledge, at the moment the intuitive insight occurs to the decision-maker,
its input is sourced internally rather than externally. With respect to the
origin of this knowledge, intuitive insight is often said to reﬂect individual
expertise (Kuo 1998; Simon 1997) and to be based on individual experiences
(Weick 1985). We therefore expect:
Proposition 2.9 The extent to which a decision-maker will be able to reduce
uncertainty eﬀectively by making use of intuitive cognition will be moderated
by the presence of valid individual experience or expertise in the mind of the
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decision-maker.
What can be considered valid experiential knowledge or expertise? Since
the intuitive decision-maker relies on past experiences and tacit learning, the
experientially acquired knowledge will be as domain-speciﬁc or non-speciﬁc
(Kuo 1998; Simon 1987) and as reliable as the experiences of the individual
decision-maker (Isenberg 1984). Therefore:
Proposition 2.10 There will be a positive relationship between the extent to
which the area of expertise, or the domain within which the decision-maker
acquired experience, match the decision-problem, and the validity of experi-
entially gathered knowledge.
An important input is said to consist of implicit or tacit knowledge, or skills
(Polanyi 1969), resulting from extensive experience (Agor 1986; Brockmann
and Simmonds 1997; Isenberg 1984; Perkins and Rao 1990; Rowan 1989;
Seebo 1993; Simon 1997; Wagner and Sternberg 1987). Tacit knowledge is
said to be stored in the form of condensed associative patterns in long-term
memory. As a result of the way it is built up and stored in memory, intuition
is stable and not easily disrupted. Updating of tacit memory, or the input
to the intuitive process, does not seem to occur directly, but rather through
repeated experiences of similar, but structurally changing patterns. As a
result, the validity of experientially gathered knowledge will be negatively
related to the speed of change in the area where the expertise is acquired.
If the speed of change is considerable, the experientially gathered knowledge
may rapidly become outdated. We thus propose:
Proposition 2.11 There will be an inverse relationship between the amount
of turbulence in a problem domain and the validity of experientially gathered
knowledge for decision-making in that area.
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Some authors have stressed that original (and consistent) emotional com-
ponents of the experience may play an important role in the production of
intuitive knowledge (Bastick 1982; Epstein 1998), since the associative pro-
cesses underlying intuitive knowledge production are holistic. The repeated
experience of any type of pattern-like perception, external or internal, can
contribute to the production of intuitive knowledge. Since emotional involve-
ment is generally considered to aﬀect the objectivity of the decision-maker’s
judgment in a negative sense, we expect:
Proposition 2.12 There will be an inverse relationship between the extent
to which the decision-maker was emotionally involved while acquiring the
experience, and the objective validity of the experientially gathered knowledge.
2.3.5.2 Scope of Rational Cognition
Now the question needs to be addressed, which factors moderate the eﬀec-
tiveness of rational processing in achieving a reduction of uncertainty. In
existing literature about bounded rationality in managerial decision-making,
but also in epistemology, a number of moderators have been identiﬁed. The
input of any rational or logic information processing system, be it human
or electronic, must consist of articulate arguments with well-deﬁned seman-
tics (Wittgenstein 1953), built on informational components, each reﬂecting
facts or observations (Wittgenstein 1922). The input of the rational system
is formal and explicit, and expressed in a more or less symbolic language.
The actor of the transformation process is required to select the inputs of
the rational process. As a result the author of the process also has control
over, and responsibility for, the (ﬁnite) input. Since the human information
processing capacity is limited, the decision-maker can and must deliberately
include certain information and exclude other (Simon 1997). The decision-
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maker must also consciously assign weights or values to each fact, reﬂecting
relative importance and meaning and is therefore prone to bias (Kahneman
et al. 1982). What is actually selected as an input of rational processing
is therefore dependent on the extent to which the decision-maker is able to
make sense out of the situation (March 1997; Weick 1995). This brings in a
dimension of bounded rationality. Values and weights are generally discussed
and established in agreement with the dominant logic of the company (Bettis
and Prahalad 1995; Grant 1988; Prahalad and Bettis 1986). Summarizing
these arguments, we expect:
Proposition 2.13 The eﬀectiveness with which a decision-maker will be able
to reduce the uncertainty by making use of rational analysis will be moderated
by various bounds imposed on the rationality of the decision-maker.
Since time pressure not only decreases the amount of time available to the
decision-maker, which hinders the time-intensive rational decision process,
but also reduces the amount of high quality information available to the
decision-maker, we expect:
Proposition 2.14 The extent to which a decision-maker will be able to re-
duce uncertainty by exclusively using rational analysis will be strongly mod-
erated by time pressure.
In Table 2.4 an overview is presented of all propositions developed in this
chapter.
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Table 2.4: Overview of the Propositions
Nr. Proposition
P 2.1 There will be a positive relationship between the relative availability of
high-quality information to the decision-maker and the extent to which
uncertainty can be eﬀectively reduced by using rational analysis.
P 2.2 There will be a negative relationship between the relative availability of
high-quality information to the decision-maker and the extent to which
uncertainty reduction can be achieved by using intuitive knowledge.
P 2.3 There will be a positive relationship between the relative structuredness
of the decision context and the extent to which uncertainty can be reduced
by using rational analysis.
P 2.4 There will be a positive relationship between the relative ill structured-
ness of the decision problem and the extent to which uncertainty reduc-
tion can be achieved by using intuitive cognition.
P 2.5 There will be a negative relationship between the relative complexity of
the decision problem and the extent to which uncertainty can be reduced
by using rational analysis.
P 2.6 There will be a positive relationship between the relative complexity of
the decision problem and the extent to which uncertainty can be reduced
by using intuition.
P 2.7 There will be a positive relationship between the relative importance of
tacit knowledge to the solution of a decision problem and the extent to
which uncertainty can be reduced by making use of intuitive knowledge.
P 2.8 There will be a negative relationship between the relative importance of
tacit knowledge to the solution of a decision problem and the uncertainty
reduction that can be achieved by exclusively using rational analysis.
P 2.9 The extent to which a decision-maker will be able to reduce uncertainty
eﬀectively by making use of intuitive cognition will be moderated by the
presence of valid individual experience or expertise in the mind of the
decision-maker.
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Table 2.4: continued
Nr. Proposition
P 2.10 There will be a positive relationship between the extent to which the
area of expertise, or the domain within which the decision-maker acquired
experience, match the decision-problem, and the validity of experientially
gathered knowledge.
P 2.11 There will be an inverse relationship between the amount of turbulence in
a problem domain and the validity of experientially gathered knowledge
for decision-making in that area.
P 2.12 There will be an inverse relationship between the extent to which the
decision-maker was emotionally involved while acquiring the experience,
and the objective validity of the experientially gathered knowledge.
P 2.13 The eﬀectiveness with which a decision-maker will be able to reduce the
uncertainty by making use of rational analysis will be moderated by var-
ious bounds imposed on the rationality of the decision-maker.
P 2.14 The extent to which a decision-maker will be able to reduce uncertainty
by exclusively using rational analysis will be strongly moderated by time
pressure.
2.3.6 Construction of a Theoretical Model
Theorists and practicing decision-makers agree that the use of both the intu-
itive system and the rational system potentially contribute to the reduction of
uncertainty in all decision-making. Most decision-making therefore occurs as
quasi-rational thinking (Hammond and Bremer 1973). Quasi-rational think-
ing is conceptualized as a combination of analytical and intuitive cognitive
processing (Shapiro and Spence 1997; Simon 1997). The relative potential
contribution of each of the systems will depend on the task conditions en-
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Figure 2.5: Task Conditions, Relative Eﬀectiveness of Fundamental Informa-
tion Processing Modes, and Moderators of their Validity.
countered by decision-makers, and on the presence of moderators inﬂuencing
the eﬀectiveness of each of the cognitive mechanisms. In Figure 2.5 we sum-
marize the theoretical model, based upon the propositions developed earlier.
2.4 Conclusion
The main purpose of this chapter was to develop coherent theoretical insight,
at the level of the individual decision-maker, into the appropriateness, poten-
tial beneﬁts and liabilities of diﬀerent decision-making styles under various
conditions. The underlying aim of the study was to determine which style
would, at least theoretically, lead to the most eﬀective decision-making in
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the high-tech service innovation process. The work consisted in a thoughtful
evaluation and recombination of existing theories in the ﬁeld of cognitive psy-
chology and decision-making under uncertainty. This has led to a number of
new insights, and the construction of a coherent theoretical model. First, it
was proposed to extend the cognitive continuum with an extra dimension, the
intensity of use of the respective information processing modes. This has led
to the distinction of four, instead of two fundamental decision-making styles,
allowing a distinction between substantially diﬀerent forms of semi-rational
decision-making, strategic sense making on the one hand and heuristics on
the other. Second, the two underlying cognitive styles were related to realis-
tic task conditions and we indicated which style would be preferable under
which task conditions. Finally, based upon the input of the decision-making
styles, propositions were formulated with respect to the factors moderat-
ing the eﬀectiveness of the use of diﬀerent styles. These propositions were
integrated in a comprehensive model.
As was argued at the beginning of this chapter, task conditions are not
constant during the new service development process. An evolution will take
place from extreme uncertainty at the outset, to a level that can be man-
aged with rational analysis at the moment of launch. Based upon the model
we have developed, we argue that under the circumstances of relative prob-
lem ill-structuredness, complexity, lack of data, inarticulateness and time
pressure that occur at the outset of the new service development process,
decision-makers could gain increased control by using intuitive cognition.
The further decision-makers proceed in the innovation process, the more in-
formation will become available, and problems will become more and more
structured. During this stage, active sense making would be the most ap-
propriate style. At the end of the process, we expect that most decisions
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can be made on a mainly rational basis. With respect to the eﬀect of the
moderators that were identiﬁed, we expect that, especially at the outset of
a new service development process, managers with accumulated experience
and who developed expertise in the high-tech service innovation context to
be relatively more eﬀective and to be faster decision-makers. However, in
view of the presented conceptual model, the validity of experientially gained
knowledge will be highly dependent on the relative stability of the problem
area and the eﬀorts and ability of the decision-maker to keep up with changes
in their ﬁeld of expertise or experience.
2.4.1 Managerial Implications
A recommendation to decision-makers would therefore be, to be careful with
both overly intuitive (inductive) and overly rational (deductive) decision-
making strategies in very turbulent decision environments. Under these con-
ditions, it seems, it is in the ﬁrst place necessary to be ‘up-to-date’ and very
knowledgeable about trends and developments, such as changes in customer
requirements and technology, and second, whenever possible to validate per-
sonal insights with insights of peers active in the same environment. This
strategy could compensate on the one hand for a lack of valid individual
experience and on the other hand for the lack of time needed for reliable
rational decision-making.
A general recommendation to the high-tech service ﬁrm would be to de-
ploy the most experienced4and up-to-date product managers in those new
service development processes involving the greatest uncertainty and requir-
ing the greatest speed. At the same time, it seems advisable to let these
managers confer with peers and validate insights with colleagues. Group
4In terms of decision-making.
2.4. CONCLUSION 51
decision-making, provided that the group consists of experts, may be prefer-
able in case of very important and highly consequential decisions.
2.4.2 Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research
The scope of the present study was limited. A range of areas has been re-
vealed requiring further attention. In the ﬁrst place, a conceptual model
was developed, which needs to be operationalized. Reliable measurement
instruments must be developed, in order to allow a quantiﬁcation of the rela-
tionships between diﬀerent constructs. This is needed to obtain better insight
in the relative importance of various antecedents and moderators of eﬀective
decision-making and their dependence on task conditions. Furthermore, the
cognitive continuum was reconceptualized as a matrix with four quadrants.
Although a fair amount of experimental research has been conducted with re-
spect to the two traditional decision-making extremes, intuitive and rational
decision-making, as well as with respect to heuristics and routine decision-
making, research into the information requirements and validity of the hybrid
style of active sense making, which seems to play a much more important role
in dynamic and complex business environments, and probably in scientiﬁc
and medical problem solving as well, is entirely lacking, but seems now of
the utmost importance.
In the present discussion an abstract and very general deﬁnition of un-
certainty was used; the absence of knowledge that is relevant for the decision
problem at hand. Uncertainty was thus conceptualized as ignorance that in
principle could equally well be reduced through rational and intuitive knowl-
edge. Uncertainty can take many forms, however. In order to further op-
erationalize the model, more behavioral detail is needed. However, decision
conditions vary substantially between industries. To develop a better under-
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standing of the nature of the uncertainty confronting decision-makers, and to
obtain more behavioral detail we suggest that case studies be conducted in
various industries. This could then lead to the construction of a more speciﬁc
model that can be operationalized and validated. Each of the task conditions
must be studied as a unique origin of uncertainty, whereby hierarchical eﬀects
should also be investigated. Interaction eﬀects between the various factors
should be expected and investigated, in order to determine the relative im-
portance of various cognitive skills and the role of electronic decision aids,
such as expert systems, artiﬁcial intelligence and decision support systems.
The problem of information overload has not been adequately addressed
in this chapter. More research is needed in this area, since information over-
load seems to be a unique antecedent of uncertainty.
Potential advantages and drawbacks of group decision-making in high-
tech service innovation processes, as an alternative for individual decision-
making, could also be considered and should be studied in detail.
Chapter 3
New Service Development in
Mobile Telecommunications
This chapter is based on a case study performed in the mobile telecom-
munication services industry. In dynamic and uncertain business settings
the performance of the new service development process depends increas-
ingly on the ability of individual managers to stay in control of the process,
i.e. to make eﬀective decisions fast. We articulate the decision-makers’
unique task conditions and identify antecedents and moderators of eﬀective
decision-making in four high-tech service innovation projects. Findings are
integrated in a theoretical framework. The study reveals the crucial role
of decision-makers’ balanced use of diverse cognitive skills, their proactive
attitude, and their capability to mentally represent innovation interfaces
with the customer, technology and the ﬁrm.
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3.1 Introduction
Rapid technological developments, never-ending change in customer require-
ments and hypercompetition characterize high-tech service industry sectors
such as the mobile telecommunication services business (Bogner and Barr
2000; D’Aveni 1995; D’Aveni 1994). As a result of the turbulence, most
high-tech services have very limited life cycles and continuous innovation has
become a necessity for survival in the industry (Lehmann 1997). However,
many new information and communication technology (ICT-) based services
fail to meet expectations with respect to ﬁnancial performance or with re-
spect to the creation of customer value (Cooper and Edgett 1996). Since
investments in high-tech service innovation projects are high, as well as the
current failure rates, an urgent need exists in the industry to increase control
over the innovation process (Cooper 1996).
Most previous research regarding success factors in service innovation
has focused on issues external to the new service development (NSD-) pro-
cess (Edvardsson et al. 1995). Nevertheless, in very dynamic industry sec-
tors, factors internal to the NSD process have become increasingly impor-
tant. In these sectors, companies generally employ an organic (Burns and
Stalker 2001) and ﬂexibility oriented organization structure (MacCormack et
al. 2001), and many have implemented highly decentralized decision archi-
tectures. As a result, the performance of the individual decision-makers in
charge of innovation projects is playing an increasingly important role with
regard to the success of the new service development process as a whole.
In previous service innovation research the eﬃcacy of communication and
information processing eﬀorts have already been put forward as important an-
tecedents of NSD project performance (Lievens and Moenaert 2000b; Lievens
and Moenaert 2000c; Lievens et al. 1997). In fact, decision-making is the
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ultimate way managers process information and transform it into action and
maintain control over the process (March 1999). Therefore, the ability of
individual decision-makers to acquire, integrate and coordinate information
and expertise from diﬀerent sources and functional domains, and to trans-
form this information into a pattern of eﬀective decisions, must be consid-
ered a crucial determinant of the performance of high-tech service innovation
projects.
In this chapter we explore antecedents of eﬀective high-tech service inno-
vation related decision-making at the level of the individual manager. Three
research questions will be addressed in the study, centering on an articula-
tion of the decision-maker’s task conditions, and the identiﬁcation of neces-
sary personal as well as of organizational antecedents of eﬀective decision-
making:
RQ 1: What do the task conditions of innovation project man-
agers consist of, in the high-tech service industry?
RQ 2: Which cognitive and organizational skills contribute to
more eﬀective decision-making of project managers?
RQ 3: How can ﬁrms facilitate eﬀective decision-making in the
high-tech service innovation process?
A case study has been developed in order to explore decision-making in ICT-
based service innovation.
We have structured this chapter as follows. Since features of the in-
dustry’s macro-environment will aﬀect the task conditions of the decision-
makers, ﬁrst an analysis of the mobile telecommunication services industry
in the European Community (EC), where the study was performed, is pre-
sented. Based upon this analysis, the research design is presented as well as
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the criteria used in order to select the cases. We then present the cases and
ﬁndings from the study. Based upon these ﬁndings a theoretical framework
is constructed. Finally we formulate a series of managerial implications and
suggestions for further research.
3.2 The Mobile Telecommunication Services
Industry
Decision conditions vary substantially between industries, since the macro
context of an industry strongly aﬀects the task conditions of managers active
in that industry. It is therefore important to study the innovation process
on an industry-by-industry basis (Judge and Miller 1991). We decided to
study the phenomenon of innovation related decision-making in the mobile
telecommunication services industry, because this industry stands out for
reasons of extreme dynamics, complexity and uncertainty. A unique industry
structure, a highly competitive environment and quickly changing customer
requirements, as well as fast and unpredictable technological developments,
standardization wars and rather arbitrary government regulations are the
factors that determine the macro environment of the industry. We start with
an analysis of these factors and describe the impact of the factors on the task
conditions of the decision-makers.
3.2.1 Deregulation of the Industry and the Current
Competitive Situation
The telecommunication services industry is one of the most dynamic sectors
of the European economy. After partial deregulation of the national telecom-
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munication markets in the EC, and the subsequent privatization of the state-
owned telecommunications providers, only a limited number of operators are
admitted in each country. The national markets for telecommunication ser-
vices are therefore currently characterized by intense competition between
limited numbers of rivaling ﬁrms. The relentless competitiveness of the in-
dustry directly aﬀects the working conditions of the managers. A number
of potential beneﬁts have generally been associated with accelerated product
development and a faster speed-to-market in the very competitive settings
present in the high-tech services industry (Kessler and Chakrabarti 1996),
although no universal empirical support has been found for the relationship
between faster product development and competitive advantage (Bayus et al.
1997; Ittner and Larcker 1997). The existing rivalry thus leads to substantial
pressure with respect to the speed with which the product managers bring
new products to market. Apart from this universal competitive pressure,
there is additional external pressure on companies active in the telecommu-
nication services industry in the EC, which aﬀects the innovation process. Re-
cently, national governments in the EC have auctioned new frequency ranges,
needed for high-bandwidth communications, at unprecedented prices. Com-
munication providers were virtually obliged to make excessive investments
in order to acquire the licenses in the ﬁrst place. Second, they were also
obliged to upgrade the network infrastructure. This has resulted in huge
debts, strongly aﬀecting telecommunication stock performance, threatening
the survival of some operators, and increasing the pressure on the manage-
ment of all players. The resulting need to use resources eﬀectively also leads
to attempts to reduce new service development time and increases the time
pressure on the decision-makers.
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3.2.2 Changing Markets, Customer Requirements and
Hypercompetition
In the past decade, the market for telecommunication services has radically
changed. Initially, the number of new users of basic mobile communication
services grew very rapidly, but in the EC the market size now approaches
saturation. This has fundamental consequences for the importance of new
service development. Cross selling of new high-tech services to a relatively
stable customer base has become an important growth strategy. At the same
time, consumption patterns and customer requirements change continuously,
and services become rapidly obsolete, resulting in increasingly short product
life cycles. New and improved technologies and services are introduced on a
very regular basis and the time companies can reap the fruits of innovations
is thus limited. Due to the increasingly global nature of the telecommunica-
tions industry, ideas spread rapidly and the swift imitation or adaptation of
successful products has become a universally adopted strategy. This results
in a hypercompetitive marketplace, making a fast and eﬃcient new service
development process an essential competitive competence. Virtually with-
out exception, all surviving operators in the European market are therefore
highly innovative and dynamic companies, with a ﬁrmly competitive culture.
3.2.3 Technological Change and Competing Standards
Technological change is without doubt one of the factors contributing most
dramatically to the dynamics of the technology-driven telecommunication
services industry. On the one hand, rapid developments occur continuously
in the design and features of hardware, software and systems used for commu-
nication. The current developments in the electronics and software industries
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are reminiscent of Schumpeter’s waves of creative destruction, provided that
they are continuous (Schumpeter 1934). As a result, the bandwidth and
speed of available networks and communication devices have been increasing
exponentially, paving the way for all sorts of entirely new services. Con-
current developments aﬀecting the industry are media convergence and the
integration of mobile phones and handheld computers into so-called wireless
digital assistants (WDA). On the other hand, new communication technolo-
gies such as GPRS, UMTS, DoCoMo’s I-mode and M-stage etc. compete
in order to become global standards. At the same time, proposed inter-
face standards like Bluetooth, a wireless protocol governing the connection
between mobile devices and desktop appliances such as computers and pe-
ripherals, and new regulations communications services have to comply with
are introduced on a regular basis. All these changes contribute to the am-
biguity, uncertainty, unpredictability and complexity of the industrial macro
environment and of the task conditions of decision-makers alike.
3.2.4 Consolidation
Finally, the structure of the telecommunications industry is currently char-
acterized by considerable instability. In part inspired by the diﬃcult condi-
tions ﬁrms encounter, there is at present substantial consolidation activity.
Strategic alliances, mergers and acquisitions, aimed at achieving economies
of scope and scale, aﬀect decision-makers at a product level indirectly, as
they cause changes in organizational settings, rapid turnover of top manage-
ment and frequent radical changes in strategic objectives. They also cause
frequent shifts in the competitive landscape, creating a need for a high level
of awareness and responsiveness to these changes.
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3.3 Research Design
A case study was developed in order to investigate the high-tech service
innovation process in the mobile telecommunication services industry in de-
tail. The case study methodology is appropriate for the study of contempo-
rary phenomena, when there is a strong interrelationship between the phe-
nomenon under scrutiny (decision-making eﬀectiveness) and its immediate
environment (the high-tech service innovation process), whereas it is diﬃ-
cult to separate the two (Yin 1993; Yin 1994). We make use of a method
proposed by Eisenhardt (1989) and Lievens et al. (1999a) designed to en-
able the construction of a theoretical framework from our observations by
means of induction (Judd et al. 1991). In order to increase the validity of
our constructs we apply a heuristic method of iterative concept development
(Kerlinger 1986).
3.3.1 Sampling
In the choice of cases, a purposive sampling strategy was employed. Cases
needed to be selected in such a way that their investigation would optimally
contribute to the understanding of the interrelation between task conditions,
decision strategy and the probability with which decisions contributed to a
successful new service development project. Therefore selection criteria were
chosen for the innovation projects based upon two dimensions. ITo allow
the identiﬁcation of factors that would make a critical diﬀerence between
successful and non-successful projects, i.e. projects leading to a successful
or a non-successful service, the extent to which the company considered the
resulting new service to be successful was chosen as a ﬁrst dimension. By
asking two experienced managers to select the successful and unsuccessful
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cases from a wide range of both supporting and core services, it was assured
that they used a balanced set of performance indicators (Easingwood and
Percival 1990; Easingwood and Storey 1993), and did not treat new service
performance as a single dimension (Cooper and Kleinschmidt 2000).
On the other hand, the task conditions were expected to vary substan-
tially with the extent to which the new service could be considered innovative.
The second dimension thus covered the continuum between services that were
new to the organization, but not to the market (so-called me-too innovations)
and services that were entirely new to the market as well as to the organiza-
tion (really new services). The objectives of the research as well as selection
criteria for the innovation projects were presented to two senior staﬀ mem-
bers of a large European mobile telecommunication service provider. They
selected four cases from the large number of innovation projects the company
had completed over the past years, and provided the researchers with access
to company documentation with respect to the projects and staﬀ involved in
the respective projects. Figure 3.1 represents the chosen case study design.
3.3.2 The Research Site
First, the features of the focal company are described that are relevant for
a good understanding of how the innovation process is embedded in the
organization. This focal company, a subsidiary of one of Europe’s former
state-owned telecommunications companies, is like most of its competitors a
relatively new player in the ﬁeld. Founded only a few years ago, managers
and staﬀ alike are relatively young, highly dynamic, and moderately inex-
perienced, enthusiastic workers with a highly proactive ‘learning’ attitude.
Partially due to the relatively short existence of the subsidiary, partially due
to industry dynamics, the organizational structure had not entirely crystal-
62 CHAPTER 3. THE CASE OF MOBILE TELECOMMUNICATIONS
Su
cc
es
s
Innovativeness
I
III IV
II
Figure 3.1: Case Study Design
lized at the time of the case study and was considered ﬂexible and being
adapted to the changing requirements. A major choice, however, having
had a considerable eﬀect upon the organization of the innovation process,
was the decision to use an adapted stage-gate process model for new service
development (Cooper 1992). This provided the innovation process with a
comparatively structured framework. The adapted stage gate process model
allowed for the coordination of parallel development activities in diﬀerent
functional departments, all related to the same innovation, and thus reduces
the product development time, albeit at the cost of higher complexity. The
gains in terms of development speed were considered more important, how-
ever, than the disadvantages related to an increase in complexity.
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3.3.3 The Case Study
The ﬁrst innovation project that was investigated (project I, successful, me-
too service) was the development of a voice- and fax mail service. The unique
beneﬁt of the service consisted in oﬀering the consumer the possibility to
retrieve, at the moment of their choice, voicemail messages and faxes hav-
ing arrived, while their mobile phone was switched oﬀ or when they were
unavailable. This service had already been commercialized successfully by
competitors between six months and a year before the establishment of the
focal company. As this was a me-too innovation, there was tremendous pres-
sure from top management, to get the service fast on the market. At the
same time, the service had to oﬀer a great degree of user-friendliness, if pos-
sible more than incrementally improving on the existing competitive oﬀers.
It was one of the ﬁrst new services the company developed.
The second service innovation that was studied (project II, successful,
really new service) was the development of an entirely new tariﬀ structure
and corresponding invoicing system. Instead of invoicing customers per ﬁxed
time unit, which is common practice among mobile communication service
providers, the company launched the option to be invoiced by a ﬁxed debit
amount. The beneﬁt for the consumer would be the freedom to spend a
previously agreed amount of credit on his or her own choice of services. The
invoicing system was highly innovative and its beneﬁts to the consumer had
to be promoted heavily, since nothing comparable existed.
The third innovation (project III, not successful, me-too service) related
to the development of a supplement to existing mobile services. The new
service made it possible for the subscriber to display the original caller ID on
their phone, of a caller that was transferred to their phone via another num-
ber. The basic technology needed for the supplementary service was already
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embedded in the network design. Service development therefore consisted
of a rather technical implementation process within the company, assuring
compliance to legal and technical standards. Complexity was very high, and
although the service was implemented successfully in terms of the technolog-
ical and regulatory requirements, it was not considered a commercial success.
The service was originally developed in compliance with a large contract with
an important business customer that did not allow any deviations from the
original speciﬁcations.
The last project being selected (project IV, not successful, really new ser-
vice) was the development of a premium branded service oﬀer. The idea be-
hind the new service package was to introduce an executive communications
package that typically included the most sophisticated communication device
on the market, and oﬀered all possible advanced options, most of which were
already available to other customers against extra charges. There was strong
pressure from the parent company to develop this package, as the idea was
originally theirs. However, the subsidiary had other priorities at that mo-
ment, such as developing a broad customer base and positioning their own
still rather unknown brand. This resulted in a bad match between the sub-
sidiary’s own objectives and operations and the new service. A summary of
the distinctive features of the four innovation projects can be found in Table
3.1.
3.3.4 Data Collection and Processing
In the present study a number of data collection methods were combined.
Desk research involved the in-depth study of company documents relating
to the four innovation projects, such as the original service speciﬁcations
and progress reports, marketing materials that had been used for the com-
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Project I Project II Project III Project IV
Description Voice- and Fax
Mail
Tariﬀ Structure
and Invoicing
System
Display Caller
ID
Premium
Branded Pack-
age
Success Successful Successful Not Successful Not Successful
Novelty Me-too Really New Me-too Really New
Complexity High High High Low
Time Pres-
sure
High Medium Medium High
Control Decentralized Decentralized Centralized Centralized
Beneﬁt Oﬀers User
more Freedom
and Conve-
nience
Oﬀers User
more Control
over Credit and
Expenditures
Oﬀers User ex-
tra Information
and Security
Oﬀers User Lux-
ury and State of
the Art Technol-
ogy
Target Audi-
ence
Private and
Business
Private and
Business
Business Business
Table 3.1: Features of the Four New Services
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mercialization of the new services, the company website, publicly available
information such as the mission statement, ﬁnancial year reports and press
announcements. This was done in order to develop insight in the new ser-
vice development and marketing strategies of the company, as well as in the
position of the four new services in the total oﬀer. In the second place, an
archive of newsletters from mobile telecommunications providers active in
various national markets was studied. Most mobile telecommunication ser-
vice providers distribute newsletters to their subscribers either in print or via
the Internet, and use them to introduce new technologies and services and
explain their sometimes highly complicated beneﬁts. Here, the purpose was
to develop a better appreciation of the industry and its dynamics.
After thus having developed an understanding of the company, its relative
position in the industry, and the prevailing macro-environmental conditions,
the researchers proceeded to the ﬁeld research. In-depth interviews were
conducted with decision-makers involved in each of the innovation projects,
with a technical manager involved in a number of projects, as well as with
two top managers. These interviews were conducted in as open a format
as possible. An interview guide was constructed, based upon the research
themes mentioned and a selection of relevant managerial decision-making
literature (Hammond 1996; Hastie and Dawes 2001; March 1999; Weick 2001)
and writings on service innovation (Lievens and Moenaert 2000b). Most
interviews lasted between an hour and ninety minutes. The interviews were
transcribed in their entirety. The transcripts were studied in terms of their
content, with the double objective of identifying recurring themes on the
one hand, as well as capturing the diﬀerences in terms of task conditions and
innovation performance between the four projects on the other. Additionally,
the research team met on a regular basis with key informants at the company,
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to discuss the progress and ﬁndings of the study. Finally, during a feedback
workshop, the interviewees were confronted with a preliminary model that
was developed based on the ﬁndings, and their comments were subsequently
used for further reﬁnement of the propositions. This was done in order to
increase the internal validity of the model.
3.4 Case Study Findings
With the purpose of developing a better understanding of the nature of
the problems the decision-makers experienced in the high-tech innovation
process, they were asked to describe what they considered to be eﬀective
decision-making. The researchers then asked them to articulate the unique
circumstances and challenges they encountered during high-tech service in-
novation projects.
From the interviews it became clear that in an innovation project large
numbers of interrelated and interdependent decisions have to be made. Ac-
cording to the decision-makers, due to the parallel organization of the new
service development process, decisions were often made that actually required
knowledge of other choices that were made only later on in the process. As
a result of the interdependency and interrelatedness of decision outcomes
the ‘valences’ of options of one decision often depend on other choices later
on in the project. Hence, again according to the interviewees, it is often
very diﬃcult to judge the ‘quality’ of individual decisions, or their individual
contribution to project performance. Even ex post facto it often remains
diﬃcult to judge whether or how any particular decision contributed posi-
tively to the success of the new service development project. One manager
formulated this dilemma of decision-making as follows:
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‘Often you simply have to make a decision, and as a result of
the uncertainty and complexity you simply cannot decide which
option is best. No one ever could. However, for the sake of
progress, you simply make a decision and later on, when things
have become a bit clearer you make adjustments as you go’
In contrast with theories of rational decision-making, where it is, at least in
retrospective, possible to calculate for each particular decision which option
was optimal (Schoemaker 1982; Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1947), we
use the concept of ‘eﬀective decision-making’ in the present study, not focus-
ing on the rationality of individual decisions, but rather on the rationality of
the process of decision-making as a whole. Since the concept of the quality
of individual decisions cannot be universally deﬁned in this highly complex
context, ‘eﬀective decision-making’ is deﬁned, in agreement with the inter-
viewees, as making decisions in such a way that, on average, the decisions
contribute positively to maintaining control over the process, i.e. maintaining
an appropriate balance between speed and quality of the new service develop-
ment process. In this sense, eﬀective decision-making contributes positively
to the performance of the new service development project and ultimately
to new service success. In ICT-based service innovation projects, the per-
formance of the new service development process is thus moderated by the
eﬀectiveness of decision-making at the level of individual decision-makers in
charge of the projects.
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3.4.1 Factors Threatening Decision Making Eﬀective-
ness
Having decided on the dependent variable of the research, i.e. the eﬀective-
ness of decision-making, the interviewees were asked to describe the factors
directly aﬀecting decision-making eﬀectiveness in the new service develop-
ment process. Three major recurring themes were identiﬁed in all recorded
accounts, regarding the task conditions. The decision-makers described their
decision-making eﬀectiveness, or the extent to which they were able to ex-
ert control over the process, as most powerfully threatened by the typical
combination of dynamic complexity, uncertainty and time pressure they en-
countered in their work. By further probing, a more detailed picture of these
three factors was obtained.
3.4.1.1 Interactive Dynamic Complexity
The ﬁrst issue that came up in most interviews was the tremendous complex-
ity of many decision problems. The managers speciﬁed that the number of
issues that had to be dealt with in the decisions was not the only explanation
for the problem complexity. Most of the time, they would have to take into
account a large number of interdependent issues from multiple disciplines
and perspectives. The state of aﬀairs in some of these areas was relatively
stable (e.g. organization structure, resources and capabilities), whereas it
was in a constant ﬂux of change in other areas (e.g. market, technology
and regulatory environment). The complexity was increased by the fact that
most innovation projects in our focal company were not divided into a series
of consecutive projects, but rather into a number of interdependent projects
that were partially run in parallel. As we already discussed, each decision
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with respect to one part of the project, in turn aﬀected the available deci-
sion options and their valences in other parts. A major challenge for the
decision-makers was to make sense out of what has appropriately been called
this interactive dynamic complexity (Weick 1990). We therefore propose:
Proposition 3.1 In high-tech service innovation projects, decision-making
eﬀectiveness is negatively related to the perceived level of task complexity.
When we probed further into the nature of the interactive dynamic complex-
ity they had to deal with, the complexity was described as a function on
the one hand of the number of issues to be considered, the multidisciplinary
nature of the issues, their interrelatedness and their changeability.
3.4.1.2 Uncertainty
Permeating all managerial decision-making, but decision-making in high-tech
service innovation projects in particular, is a high level of uncertainty. Un-
certainty in the innovation project was articulated as the extent to which
reliable and detailed knowledge of important issues was not available to the
decision-maker at the moment the decision had to be made. Decision-makers
acknowledged that the innovative uncertainty could only be reduced to a cer-
tain extent and that relatively high levels would always persist throughout the
project. They considered uncertainty in the high-tech service innovation pro-
cess to be an important trade-oﬀ with respect to speed. Most managers were
very well aware of this trade-oﬀ, as well as of the fact that in high-tech service
innovation projects a ﬁrm amount of residual or irreducible (Hammond 1996)
uncertainty is inevitable. At the same time, perceived task uncertainty, they
felt was a major threat to eﬀective new service related decision-making (Daft
and Lengel 1986; Tushman and Anderson 1986). Consequently, we propose:
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Proposition 3.2 In high-tech service innovation projects, decision-making
eﬀectiveness is negatively related to the perceived level of task uncertainty.
Factors contributing most to the perceived task uncertainty were the nov-
elty of the service in an absolute sense, i.e. its novelty to the world or the
market, but also its relative novelty to the organization. Much of their task
uncertainty was also related to the technology involved. Certainly at the
beginning of a project, the nonexistence of reliable information on the pre-
cise speciﬁcations of the new service, or the precise requirements from the
market, the relationship between the new service and the existing portfo-
lio of services, the precise technology, regulations etc. caused high levels of
uncertainty. In the course of the project, the uncertainty would indeed be
gradually reduced in some areas, but it could still increase in other areas,
as it was aﬀected by competitive actions, and by changes in technology and
regulations or company policy.
3.4.1.3 Time Pressure and Stress
Another phenomenon all managers found to be threatening their decision-
making eﬀectiveness was the combination of time pressure and stress. In
industries such as the telecommunication services industry, where services
have exceedingly short life cycles, there is often extreme time pressure. Even
a small delay in the innovation project can make the diﬀerence between a
great success and a failure. The circumstance that for the focal company
many innovations were me-too innovations even increased the time pressure.
These so-called me-too innovations had already proven successful elsewhere.
If the new service had been commercialized in the market where the focal
company was active, a fast time to market would decrease the ﬁrst-mover
advantage of directly competing ﬁrms. If the innovation had been commer-
72 CHAPTER 3. THE CASE OF MOBILE TELECOMMUNICATIONS
cialized in other markets, e.g. by the parent company, the focal company
could be the ﬁrst to introduce the service in their market and thus enjoy a
ﬁrst-mover advantage. In both cases pressure to get the service out as fast
as possible was very high.
Decision-makers described the time pressure sometimes in a negative
sense, as a ‘lack of time’. Time pressure indeed reduces the time available
to do project based research, i.e. to collect and process information related
to the service under development and thus to reduce the task uncertainty.
This in itself was considered an substantial challenge. However, after some
probing, it was also acknowledged by the managers that they perceived time
pressure as more than simply a lack of time. It was also, more positively,
experienced as pressure, which could lead to variable amounts of stress. The
decision-makers stressed that they did not necessarily and always experience
this as a negative thing, since a certain amount of stress is known to increase
creativity and productivity. Severe stress is known to aﬀect judgment qual-
ity negatively, however, through a reduction of the consideration set. We
therefore propose:
Proposition 3.3 In high-tech service innovation projects, there exists a curvi-
linear (inverted u-shaped) relationship between time pressure and decision-
making eﬀectiveness.
In the two projects considered to be unsuccessful, we detected another source
of stress. Role ambiguity, i.e. the absence of decision authority, where the
decision-makers were actually the most knowledgeable employees, was also
felt to contribute directly to a feeling of stress.
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3.4.2 Antecedents of Eﬀective Decision Making
Even under the extreme conditions of dynamic interactive complexity (We-
ick 1990), uncertainty, and time pressure surrounding their work, decision-
makers continuously have to make decisions, and have to make these decisions
coherently, fast and conﬁdently. The purpose of the second research question
was to identify major antecedents of eﬀective decision-making under these
task conditions. In the interviews, we therefore asked the managers in the
ﬁrst place, which skills helped them most to make the decisions eﬀectively, i.e.
to make decisions that would on average increase their control over the pro-
cess and contribute to the probability of success of the projects. We recorded
two categories of answers. One category was related to the cognitive skills
the managers employed in order to deal with the challenges in their task.
The second category had to do with more psychological skills employed to
deal with the negative eﬀects of uncertainty, complexity and time pressure.
3.4.2.1 Cognitive Antecedents
The interviewees without exception aﬃrmed that the diﬃculty of their task
demanded much of their cognitive skills. They also all agreed that the diﬃcult
task conditions could be best dealt with by employing a balanced combination
of rational analysis, common sense and intuition.1 None of the decision-
makers had a clear preference for any of the mentioned cognitive styles; all
agreed that it was precisely their ﬂexibility in choosing the appropriate style
at the right moment that enabled them to deal with the task. They stressed
1The fourth decision-making style we identiﬁed in Chapter 2, ’active sense making’, was
not explicitly mentioned by the interviewees; they stressed that an appropriate balance of
decision-making styles should be achieved, without going into much detail as to which
decision-making styles they employed.
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that it was largely a matter of experience2 to know which decision style should
be used best under which conditions, in order to maintain control over the
speed and quality of the process.
When we probed further into the appropriateness of the use of diﬀerent
styles, they aﬃrmed that rational analysis was used most appropriately, as
far as possible with respect to the relative lack of hard data, in the cases
where highly consequential decisions had to be made, e.g. at the gates of the
stage-gate process. The process of rational and decision-making and explicit
justiﬁcation of the outcome, although by all decision-makers considered to
lead to high quality decisions, was considered the most time consuming of
the three styles. For reasons of time pressure and lack of data it could
simply not be applied all the time, and explicit rational analysis was therefore
generally concentrated around the gates. These were also the moments when
their decisions had to be justiﬁed to top management. All decision-makers
perceived these moments as the anchor points of the projects, the moments
that complexity and uncertainty were forcibly and temporarily reduced to
a relative minimum. These were also the scarce moments of reﬂection that
made them really feel in control of the project. We propose:
Proposition 3.4 In high-tech service innovation projects, a positive rela-
tionship exists between the extent to which rational analysis is appropriately
used and the extent to which the decision-maker succeeds in dealing with the
uncertainty and complexity of the task.
Obviously, at many times during the projects information was very scarce
and time pressure and complexity overwhelming. At these points in time,
2The kind of experience the interviewees referred to here should be seen, not as the
amount of time they spent in the industry, but rather as the amount of time they spent
making professional decisions.
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insuﬃcient information was available for any kind of reliable rational analysis.
On the other hand the turbulence of the environment did not give them the
feeling that they could trust their intuition either. In such moments they
said they would simply use as much common sense as possible. Knowing
that they would arrive at one of the anchor points of the projects sooner
or later, when they could revise their decisions based on a more detailed
analysis, they would make use of fast and dirty common sense. Between the
anchor points, common sense was considered the option providing the best
balance between speed and eﬀectiveness. We propose:
Proposition 3.5 In high-tech service innovation projects, a positive rela-
tionship exists between the extent to which common sense is appropriately
used and the extent to which the decision-maker succeeds in dealing with the
uncertainty, complexity and time pressure of the task.
Another cognitive skill they used at set times was their intuition. They used
their intuition to counter the uncertainty and complexity of decision-tasks,
when they felt they had a lot of useful personal experience, or when the
complexity was such, that it was diﬃcult to articulate arguments. They also
used their intuition when decisions had to be made based upon their insight
in customer requirements, when there was no time for market research and
no hard data were available. Intuition was hardly ever used for arriving at
the ‘hard ’ decisions at the anchor points, but instead it was regularly applied
as a sanity check of the conclusions. They felt that their intuition sometimes
functioned like their conscience. We therefore propose:
Proposition 3.6 In high-tech service innovation projects, a positive rela-
tionship exists between the extent to which intuition is appropriately used
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and the extent to which the decision-maker succeeds in dealing with the un-
certainty and complexity of the task.
3.4.2.2 Psychological Antecedents
We continued with the psychological aspects of the diﬃculty of their task.
The interviewees all considered their individual proactive attitude towards
the diﬃculties of innovation projects to be an important asset. The decision-
makers told, that it was often a mix of personal and professional ambition to
master the complexity, and their attitude to see the diﬃculties as a challenge
rather than as a problem, that actually helped mastering them. We will refer
to this mind-set as their proactive attitude and propose:
Proposition 3.7 There will be a positive relationship between the proactive
attitude of the decision-maker and the extent to which they succeed in dealing
with the uncertainty and complexity of the task.
They added in the margin that they could keep up their spirits largely because
they felt conﬁdent that they could deal with the uncertainty, complexity and
time pressure.
3.4.3 Expertise as a Moderator
The interviewees acknowledged that as a result of their diﬃcult task condi-
tions, nobody would make ‘the right decisions all the time’. At the same
time, however, they stressed that what they called ‘their expertise’ strongly
supported them in whatever cognitive skill or attitude they used in order to
deal with the complexity, uncertainty and time pressure in their tasks, or as
one manager expressed it:
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‘We are the experts’ (in the innovation project) ’and there is
simply no one else who could actually make adequate decisions’.
Having identiﬁed decision-makers’ ‘expertise’ as an important moderator of
their eﬀectiveness in dealing with the task, we subsequently asked them to
explain what they thought their expertise consisted of. It appeared that
they did not conceive of their expertise in an entirely traditional sense, as
a domain related expertise or skill. What they referred to was actually a
multidisciplinary proﬁciency in their job as managers of high-tech service
innovation projects. In order to get a better grip on this complex concept,
we asked for their own interpretation of expertise. It became clear that what
they referred to, was their unique grasp of the coherence between the ‘the
features of the new service’, ‘the organization of the new service development
process’ as it was practiced in the focal company, and various interfaces
of the new service with relevant dimensions of reality. When we inquired
further into the concept of expertise, it became apparent that the interviewees
thought, that the application of skills was moderated by the extent to which
the decision-maker possessed an adequate mental image of the new service
itself. This mental image was delimitated by its interfaces or contact points
with the organization, the customer and the market, the technology and the
regulatory environment. In the following we discuss these interfaces, as the
decision-makers described them, in some more detail. We have graphically
represented decision-makers’ mental image of the new service and its four
interfaces in Figure 3.2.
3.4.3.1 Service Organization Interface
As a ﬁrst aspect of the adequate mental representation of the service, the
decision-makers brought up a good understanding of the ﬁt between the new
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Figure 3.2: The New Service and its Interfaces
service and the organization. Superior insight in the service-organization in-
terface substantially helped them in dealing with uncertainty, complexity and
time pressure, which would in turn lead to more eﬀective decision-making.
This insight was deemed especially important for a smooth coordination of
the innovation project. The decision-makers mentioned that a profound un-
derstanding of the organization structure, its culture, its dynamics and the
prevalent resource allocation mechanisms, which they got to know during
previous innovation projects, was very helpful in ‘picturing’ this interface ac-
curately. Time pressure made this knowledge even more valuable. As there
was a need for fast decisions, their understanding of the decision process
from previous projects was considered very valuable. At the same time, they
recognized that a good understanding of the service-organization interface
was what they lacked most in the early projects and what made a timely
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completion of their ﬁrst projects very diﬃcult. An accurate mental image of
the service-organization interface contributed to a realistic representation of
‘What is possible and feasible’
Having this realistic mental image of the organizational possibilities, with
respect to the innovation, meant that they would come up faster with more
relevant decision options, which in turn helped them making decisions faster.
Their experience with the innovation-organization interface taught them not
necessarily ‘which option to choose’, but rather what the relevant options
were, thus contributing to more eﬀective and faster decision-making. In
short, they deemed a good understanding of the service-organization inter-
face very advantageous for the smoothness of the coordination of the projects
and the speed of decision-making. Because organizations vary substantially
with respect to the emphasis they put on the diﬀerent information processing
activities (Moorman 1995), a good understanding of the limitations of orga-
nizational information gathering and dissemination activities will also help
managers decide which supplementary information they need and how to ob-
tain this, in order to reduce the uncertainty more eﬀectively. We therefore
propose:
Proposition 3.8 The extent to which the decision-makers can use their cog-
nitive skills in order to deal successfully with the task conditions will be mod-
erated by the extent to which they mentally represent the service-organization
interface accurately.
Insight in the service-organization interface was largely based on experience
acquired during previous projects. During the interviews, most managers
explicitly contrasted their experience with the service-organization interface,
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in terms of its usefulness, with e.g. the technical knowledge they had ob-
tained in previous projects. They stated that it was extremely diﬃcult to
use e.g. technical details they had learned in previous projects, because the
services they developed had often very little in common with respect to the
technology. They also noted that ‘technology moves forward with the speed
of light’, rapidly making their experience in that area obsolete. All conﬁrmed
that the service-organization interface was the domain they actually learned
most in.
3.4.3.2 Service-Customer Interface
Although high-tech service innovation is often considered largely technology
driven, all decision-makers we interviewed stressed that a ﬁrm customer-
orientation and a good understanding of customer requirements were nec-
essary conditions of eﬀective decision-making. Consequently, the second in-
terface deemed important by all decision-makers was the interface between
the new service and the customer. The decision-makers contended that they
made many of their decisions, whilst keeping in mind their private compre-
hensive understanding of customer requirements, or as one manager called
it:
‘The feeling how the customer behaves and moves’
In the focal ﬁrm, the need for speed often did not allow for extensive project
related market research, and as a result, this ‘understanding of the customer’
appeared to play a key role in all projects. In successful projects, ‘customer
knowledge’ acted as a success factor helping the project managers to make the
right decisions. In the unsuccessful projects however, such as the projects III
and IV, the decision-makers’ customer knowledge acted as an ‘early warning
sign’ or an indicator of potential problems. Especially in decisions with
3.4. CASE STUDY FINDINGS 81
respect to the service developed in project III, the project manager was
not allowed to use this customer knowledge, as the service was developed
according to speciﬁcations that had been laid down in an inﬂexible contract.
We propose accordingly:
Proposition 3.9 The extent to which the decision-makers can use their cog-
nitive skills in order to deal successfully with the task conditions will be mod-
erated by the extent to which they mentally represent the service-customer
interface accurately.
When probing into the origins of this ‘customer knowledge’, we noticed that
the decision-makers, most of them having a background in marketing, agreed
that there are a number of problems with conventional market research in
the area of high-tech new service development. In the ﬁrst place it was often
considered to be too time consuming. In an industry where speed to market is
assumed to play such an important role in the success of the new services, the
trade-oﬀ between speed and a higher degree of certainty was crucial. In many
cases, according to the decision-makers, an increase in speed was considered
to largely outweigh a greater degree of certainty. In the second place, in high-
tech services consumer tastes and needs evolve very rapidly, and co-evolve
with new technologies that become available. It is therefore very diﬃcult to
assess with any certainty how consumer needs and requirements will develop.
The intangibility aspect of services, especially prominent in high-tech services
where it is very diﬃcult for the consumer to imagine the service until it is
actually there, was also mentioned as a problem contributing to the diﬃculty
of assessing consumer reactions to prototypes of the service. In this context,
managers repeatedly said that an intuitive understanding of the ‘consumer’
and their ability to imagine and anticipate their requirements and possible
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reactions accurately was an important skill in their function, that would
help them make the right decisions. Even when modern or alternative ways
of product development are used, such as rapid prototyping and evolutionary
development (MacCormack 2001), whereby the consumer is participating in
the product development process, by e.g. testing Beta-versions, an intuitive
understanding of the customer will continue to add value through a better
anticipation of customer requirements.
The focal company regularly organized market studies, sometimes at the
level of the parent company and sometimes at the level of the subsidiary,
thus providing the managers with hard data about general trends and de-
velopments in customer requirements. In order to update their representa-
tion of ‘the customer’ the decision-makers made use of this information, and
merged it with their ‘intuitive understanding’. Their mental representation
of the desires and possibilities of the customer based on their own desires
and possibilities, corrected for the fact that they considered themselves
‘crazy about telecommunications’
and corrected for their own technical proﬁciency was complemented and com-
pleted with market information from retailers, the Internet and many other
sources. One manager remarked:
‘Dealers and retailers, that’s where you get your ‘feeling’ from’.
Decision-makers also said that they make faster sense out of the results of
formal market research, the more experience they had in the area:
‘The longer you’re in business the faster you go’.
This can be explained by the build up of absorptive capacity (Cohen and
Levinthal 1990) or the capacity to correctly interpret and assimilate new
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information. This absorptive capacity is built over the years and grows with
experience.
3.4.3.3 Service-Technology Interface
A third aspect of what the decision-makers called their expertise was tech-
nology. More precisely, they referred to their non-technical insight in rele-
vant technological developments or what we will call the interface between
the new service and technology. Clearly, the decision-makers were not sup-
posed to be technical experts, there were suﬃcient other people involved in
the innovation project with detailed technical expertise. They were however
supposed to have the ability to communicate eﬀectively and eﬃciently with
the technical department. They also had to integrate their understanding of
technological problems and possibilities in their decision-making. We thus
propose:
Proposition 3.10 The extent to which decision-makers can use their cog-
nitive skills in order to deal successfully with the task conditions will be mod-
erated by the extent to which they mentally represent the service-technology
interface accurately.
When we probed into the origins of this insight, the managers aﬃrmed that
more than in other cases they had to use their communicative abilities to
extract the relevant information from the technical staﬀ. They had to adapt
to the jargon of the technical staﬀ, translate it or project it onto what they
viewed as the ‘real human world’ of the service innovation. At the same
time, the accuracy of the mental representation of the service-technology in-
terface depends on the decision-maker’s understanding and anticipation of
technological developments. A certain aﬃnity and familiarity with informa-
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tion and communication technology was therefore considered a prerequisite
of an accurate mental representation of the service-technology interface.
3.4.3.4 Service-Regulations Interface
Another important factor, also being mentioned by most decision-makers,
was the need to comply with externally imposed regulations and standards.
These regulations originated from both the suppliers of the network technol-
ogy and from governmental regulators. Whereas the three other dimensions
for most managers had a positive connotation, implying that better insight
would lead to decisions that could contribute positively to the success of
the innovation, their understanding of the regulatory environment rather
served as a limiting device and better knowledge of the regulatory forces
would only lead to a more ‘cautious choice of options’. In the view of the
decision-makers, the regulatory environment limited, rather than created op-
portunities. Nonetheless, the managers agreed that their familiarity with the
regulations and the extent, to which they somehow understood their logic,
helped them making correct decisions more rapidly. We therefore propose:
Proposition 3.11 The extent to which the decision-maker can use their cog-
nitive skills in order to deal successfully with the task conditions will be mod-
erated by the extent to which they mentally represent the service-regulations
interface accurately.
For each project the ﬁles consisted of many pages of highly technical and
legal information. Since they mostly agreed that it was
‘entirely impossible to keep up with changes and know all current
regulations’
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they would develop an intuitive feeling with respect to the regulations and
base most decisions on this intuitive feeling about the boundaries. The propo-
sitions are summarized in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Overview of the Propositions
Relation Nr. Description
Mediator 3.1 Decision-making eﬀectiveness is negatively related to the per-
ceived level of task complexity.
Mediator 3.2 Decision-making eﬀectiveness is negatively related to the per-
ceived level of task uncertainty.
Mediator 3.3 There exists a curvilinear (inverted u-shaped) relationship be-
tween time pressure and decision-making eﬀectiveness.
Antecedent 3.4 A positive relationship exists between the extent to which ra-
tional analysis is appropriately used and the extent to which
the decision-maker succeeds in dealing with the uncertainty
and complexity of the task.
Antecedent 3.5 A positive relationship exists between the extent to which com-
mon sense is appropriately used and the extent to which the
decision-maker succeeds in dealing with the uncertainty, com-
plexity and time pressure of the task.
Antecedent 3.6 A positive relationship exists between the extent to which intu-
ition is appropriately used and the extent to which the decision-
maker succeeds in dealing with the uncertainty and complexity
of the task.
Antecedent 3.7 There will be a positive relationship between the proactive
attitude of the decision-maker and the extent to which they
succeed in dealing with the uncertainty and complexity of the
task.
Moderator 3.8 The extent to which the decision-makers can use their cognitive
skills in order to deal successfully with the task conditions will
be moderated by the extent to which they mentally represent
the service-organization interface accurately.
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Table 3.2: continued
Relation Nr. Description
Moderator 3.9 The extent to which the decision-makers can use their cognitive
skills in order to deal successfully with the task conditions will
be moderated by the extent to which they mentally represent
the service-customer interface accurately.
Moderator 3.10 The extent to which decision-makers can use their cognitive
skills in order to deal successfully with the task conditions will
be moderated by the extent to which they mentally represent
the service-technology interface accurately.
Moderator 3.11 The extent to which the decision-maker can use their cognitive
skills in order to deal successfully with the task conditions will
be moderated by the extent to which they mentally represent
the service-regulations interface accurately.
3.4.4 Construction of a Theoretical Model
The ultimate purpose of this study was the development of a theoretical
framework, integrating the unique task conditions of the ICT-based service
innovation process and antecedents of eﬀective decision-making as expressed
in the propositions. A model was constructed based upon an analysis of the
cases, feedback from the interviewees and key-informants and a match with
existing literature. The three prevailing new service development task con-
ditions are viewed as mediators (Baron and Kenny 1986) between decision-
makers’ use of cognitive skills and eﬀective decision-making. In order to
improve the eﬀectiveness of decision-making, the managers in the ICT-based
new service development process must deal with these three mediating vari-
ables, interactive dynamic complexity, uncertainty, and time pressure. It
was proposed, that decision-makers can successfully deal with the factors
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mediating eﬀective decision-making through the balanced use of a number of
cognitive skills and attitudes. Their expert insight in four service interfaces
seems to moderate the eﬀect of the antecedents in the new service develop-
ment process substantially. A theoretical model integrating the propositions
is graphically represented in Figure 3.3. The lines connecting the constructs
in this model represent the propositions.
3.5 Conclusion
We conducted the present study with the purpose of identifying major deter-
minants of eﬀective decision-making in high-tech service innovation. In the
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study we assumed that eﬀective decision-making at the level of the project
managers contributes substantially to the success of innovation projects and
ultimately to new service performance. Therefore, the focal points of the
present study study were the decision-makers charged with the supervision
of new service development projects. The study has provided us with a
number of refreshing insights. In the ﬁrst place we identiﬁed the unique
task-conditions of the individual decision-makers, namely complexity, uncer-
tainty and time pressure as major mediators of eﬀective decision-making. In
the second place we found antecedents of eﬀective decision-making in the
ﬂexible, balanced and appropriate use of various cognitive skills and decision
styles: rational analysis, common sense and intuition. On a more psycho-
logical level, the ‘proactive attitude’ of the managers was also identiﬁed as
an important antecedent of dealing successfully with the diﬃcult task condi-
tions. Furthermore, the expertise of the decision-makers, consisting of their
understanding of the interfaces between the new service, the organization,
the customer, the technology and the regulations, plays an important role.
The expertise of the managers in these areas moderates the eﬀectiveness of
the use of their skills in dealing with the task conditions considerably. Based
on the present study, we therefore conclude that decision-maker’s cognitive
skills, an extensive ﬂexibility in the use of these skills, and the presence of
expertise, determine the extent to which the decision-makers are able to exert
control over the innovation process and to manage the projects successfully.
The indispensable expertise of the decision-makers is built up over time as a
result of their experience on the job and in the industry.
Apart from this, we also noticed during the case study that the two unsuc-
cessful cases (projects III and IV) shared the common circumstance that the
scope of the projects was, as one manager remarked, ‘dictated from above’.
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This observation seems to conﬁrm the theory of contingency of organizational
decision architecture and environmental conditions, proposing that decentral-
ized decision-making, occurring in real-time is preferable in turbulent market
environments (Beach and Mitchell 1978; Moorman and Miner 1998). In both
failed projects, more or less complete and rather rigidly deﬁned new service
concepts were handed to the decision-makers, with the task to develop the
service. In these cases, the decision-makers did not have the authority to devi-
ate from the original design, or even stop the new service development if they
felt this to be appropriate. With respect to the Caller ID display technology
(project III), an important business customer negotiated the inclusion of the
service as part of a larger contract. Neither service speciﬁcations nor design
were negotiable. With respect to the premium brand service package (project
IV), the idea came from headquarters. In both cases, the rather rigid delin-
eation of the projects severely restricted the scope of decision options. The
decision-makers lacked decision authority and suﬃcient resources, notwith-
standing the fact that they were the most knowledgeable on the projects
and the requirements. As a result, the decision-makers, not able to identify
completely with the projects, and therefore not endorsing the projects as
their own, considered themselves to be simply carrying out a project. Both
managers reported a strong intuitive feeling, that the projects ‘weren’t right ’
for the company or the market. They based their feelings on intuitions about
the market, customer requirements and their understanding of the company,
rather than on hard data. Although in both cases the decision-makers were
probably the most knowledgeable and most experienced decision-makers the
company had, they were not allowed to use their experience and intuitions
about the product or the product/market combination.
The two successful cases, on the contrary, had in common that the decision-
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makers were highly involved in the full design and development of the project
and were able and allowed to make use of and integrate their intuitions and
common sense with respect to the requirements of the market, the possi-
bilities of the company and the available technology. In the two successful
cases, (projects I and II) the decision-makers we interviewed intellectually
‘owned’ the projects. Based upon this observation, an additional proposi-
tion could be made, namely that an eﬀective decentralization of innovation
related decision-making is a necessary condition of eﬀective decision-making.
In a turbulent business environment, the organization should empower the
most knowledgeable decision-makers to actually produce the eﬀective deci-
sions they are capable to.
3.5.1 Managerial Implications
Based upon these ﬁndings a number of recommendations can be made to
ﬁrms in the high-tech services industry. In the ﬁrst place, we would obviously
recommend carefully selecting candidates for the function of decision-makers
in charge of high-tech service innovation projects. The task conditions are
very demanding with respect to candidates’ cognitive skills and their ﬂexibil-
ity in using them. Candidates must possess both the necessary skills and the
‘proactive attitude’ to deal with the combination of dynamic interactive com-
plexity and time pressure and must posses a strong desire to learn in many
diﬀerent disciplines. They also need to possess a non-dogmatic approach to
dealing with information and decision-making, in the sense that they must
allow common sense, creativity and intuition to support or complement more
analytical techniques. Candidates, dogmatically tending to an either purely
‘analytical’ or to an entirely ‘intuitive’ approach, seem less suitable in this
context. With respect to the expertise of candidates, it seems that it takes
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time to acquire the necessary know-how and therefore it would make sense
to select candidates that already had the opportunity to get to know the in-
novation process and the organization from the inside, rather than external
candidates.
In quickly evolving environments, decision-makers need to remain up-to-
date in all areas. In the ﬁrst place, the organization may therefore consider
supporting the decision-makers by introducing an adapted high-velocity in-
formation acquisition and diﬀusion system. The intelligence system should
keep track of developments in the market, the competitive environment
and the technology and make this information available in real-time to the
decision-makers in an eﬃcient way. In the second place, we recommend that
in highly dynamic and complex environments the individual absorptive ca-
pacity of the decision-makers be actively maintained. The ﬁrm could create
favorable conditions by letting the decision-makers attend training seminars
and conferences in all relevant disciplines.
An additional condition of eﬀective decision-making was identiﬁed in the
autonomy of the decision-makers to use their insights and decide about the
project, i.e. the extent to which innovation related decision-making is really
decentralized. A further recommendation would therefore be to decentralize
the decision authority eﬀectively.
3.5.2 Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research
In this study, multiple sources of information were combined, while an it-
erative procedure was used in order to increase the internal validity of the
constructs, and the extent to which the inferences from the cases correctly
represent reality (Yin 1994). The purpose and scope of the present study were
essentially exploratory. Based upon the researchers’ observations, a number
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of propositions were developed and integrated into a theoretical framework
that should be reﬁned and validated in further research. This research could
for example consist of a cross sectional design, applied to a large sample of
high-tech service innovation projects. Valid and reliable measurement in-
struments need to be developed for many of the constructs brought forward,
such as ‘eﬀective decision-making’ and ‘decision-maker expertise’, etc. These
are complex and latent constructs that should be measured on many levels
and in many dimensions.
The study revealed that decision-makers use various cognitive skills and
decision styles in order to deal with the diﬃcult conditions in their task.
Very little is known, however, about the relative value and validity of the
use of analysis, intuition and common sense under these conditions and in
what sense or to what extent their eﬀectiveness is moderated by expertise.
Research is needed in order to determine how decision-makers adapt their
cognitive style to the task conditions and order to develop a better under-
standing of the trade-oﬀ between ‘speed’ and ‘quality’ of various decision
styles under real world conditions.
The study also revealed the important role of expertise as a moderator
of decision-making eﬀectiveness. The questions how expertise, in the present
study conceptualized as decision-makers’ understanding of the four service-
interfaces, originates and is maintained were considered beyond the scope
of the present research. However, a major challenge for organizations in
the telecommunication services industry, as well as in many other high-tech
service industries, is the high turnover of staﬀ in management functions.
Since part of the expertise is tacit, the loss of experienced staﬀ implies the
loss of expertise and therefore the loss of an important competitive resource.
We know exceedingly little about factors aﬀecting the learning, maintenance
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and transfer of expertise and knowledge in very turbulent environments. We
suggest therefore that research be conducted in this area.
The scope of the research was limited in another sense. We focused on
individual key decision-makers. However, decision-makers are part of an
extensive information network and depend on external parties, such as the
company’s suppliers and retail outlets, for information about future develop-
ments and trends in technology and consumer behavior. It seems therefore
worthwhile to study the decision-maker as a node in an information network
that connects suppliers, developers, providers and customers. The adequacy
of decisions and ultimately the performance of newly developed services will
be dependent on the quality of the ties the decision-makers maintain in this
network and the extent to which they manage such a network successfully
(Burt 1992). We know very little about the precise structure of these net-
works. Therefore, the study of innovation decision-makers from a social
networking perspective could help discover ways to optimize the network
structure and eﬃciency by ﬁnding structural holes.
A limitation brought about by the design of the case research was the fact
that we studied fully completed innovation projects, most of which had been
achieved some time ago. Although it is understandable that companies active
in the high-tech services industry are reluctant to share information about
projects in progress, for obvious competitive reasons, it would be beneﬁcial
with respect to the study of decision-making to conduct longitudinal research
over the full length of the innovation project. This would also permit the
collection of less memory- and otherwise biased information, as we now,
partially, had to rely on the representation of facts by the involved managers
themselves.
Finally, an objective assessment of the performance of ICT-based service
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development projects with respect to perceived quality and the creation of
customer value requires the development of reliable and valid measurement
instruments. Here, we can only repeat that the currently available service
quality scales, developed for services where personal interaction between the
provider and the consumer plays an important role, are not suitable for high-
tech services (Bitner et al. 2000; Dabholkar 1996; Zeithaml et al. 2000).
Research in this area must therefore be considered an absolute requirement
for all further high-tech service research.
Chapter 4
Information: Eﬀects on Choice
and Commitment
This chapter is based on on a decision-making experiment. Professional
decision-makers must currently assess and ﬁlter large amounts of real-time
information for relevant cues. In previous research, limitations have been
identiﬁed to the rationality with which managers make decisions under im-
portant uncertainty caused by information scarcity. The present study ex-
tends existing theories of bounded rationality for conditions of information
overload. In order to obtain a more realistic and more complete repre-
sentation of decision-making under uncertainty, we broaden the generally
prevailing - narrow - conceptualization of decision-making as choice, and
include decision-makers’ development of initial commitment to the chosen
course of action in the model. We demonstrate that spurious information,
information that is - in a strict sense - irrelevant to the decision problem at
hand, potentially aﬀects a manager’s initial commitment.
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4.1 Introduction
Rapid technological developments in the recent past have led to an aﬄu-
ence of information. But more is not always better and the availability of
more information does not necessarily seem to lead to better decision-making.
This is substantiated in numerous reports about disastrous decision processes
(Drummond 1998; Drummond 1994; Ghosh 1995; Keil et al. 1995; Keil and
Montealegre 2000). Decision-makers are plagued by enormous amounts of in-
formation, much of it landing on their desktops via information systems like
MIS, Enterprise Systems, e-mail, mobile devices and the World Wide Web.
This information often contains cues to the solution of problems at hand,
but it also contains much material that is, strictly speaking, not directly
relevant. Especially in marketing and innovation management, the availabil-
ity of large amounts of information creates serious processing challenges for
decision-makers. Managers must continuously search and ﬁlter data for rel-
evant cues and intelligently combine this information with their experience
and expertise, in order to produce adequate decisions (Bucklin et al. 1998;
Glazer 1993; Glazer et al. 1992; Wierenga and van Bruggen 1997; Wierenga
and van Bruggen 2000). Decision-makers’ processing diﬃculties increase as
more information becomes available. It appears that information overload is
becoming a more important source of uncertainty than information scarcity
(Bucklin et al. 1998; Simon 1996).
Various categories of problems have been associated with decision-making
under considerable uncertainty. Managers make biased decisions, take inap-
propriate risks or are irrationally committed to the implementation of their
previous decisions (Bazerman 2001; Boulding et al. 1997; Clancy and Shul-
man 1991; Foxall 1984; Keil and Montealegre 2000). Problems in these
categories seem to occur frequently, and often simultaneously, in innovation
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(Schmidt and Calantone 1998) and new product marketing projects, where
time pressure and high levels of complexity reinforce the problem of infor-
mation aﬄuence.
Not surprisingly therefore, theories of decision-making under uncertainty
receive growing attention in marketing research (Lilien et al. 1998; Spence
and Brucks 1997; van Bruggen et al. 1998; Wierenga and van Bruggen
1997; Wierenga et al. 1999) and research related to the innovation process
(Bourgeois III and Eisenhardt 1988; Eisenhardt 1990; Leonard-Barton 1995).
4.1.1 Limitations to Previous Research
Behavioral decision research has extensively explored systematically occur-
ring biases in decision-making under uncertainty and the bounds of man-
agerial rationality in general (Kahneman et al. 1982; Simon 1997). In the
light of current developments, however, limits to the theoretical scope of
this research are becoming apparent, that restrict its explanatory power. A
ﬁrst limitation seems to result from a limited conceptualization of decision-
making. Psychological or behavioral decision research (Barnard 1938; Cyert
and March 1992; March and Simon 1993; Simon 1997), borrowed its concep-
tualization of decision-making in a basically unchanged form from economic
decision theory (Schoemaker 1982; Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1947). In
this tradition, decision-making has traditionally been represented as the se-
lection or choice of a course of action that, up to a certain extent, is intended
to maximize the decision-maker’s utility (Schoemaker 1982).
This conceptualization takes into account only one, albeit important,
output of the decision-making process, the choice or selection of a best or
prefered decision option. The choice of a course of action that maximizes
or satisﬁces (March and Simon 1993) utility, is not the only output of the
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decision-making process, however. Managers estimate and evaluate risks and
beneﬁts of diﬀerent options and make a choice on the one hand, but on the
other hand they also develop a relatively stable aﬀective state or attitude,
often referred to as commitment, towards this course of action (Mintzberg
1979). We contend that the strength of commitment1 to a chosen course of
action is - at least partially - a result of conscious or subconscious mental
processes and aﬀected by information presented to the decision-maker.
Several categories of cognitive bias have been identiﬁed, occurring in judg-
ments or choices made under uncertainty (Kahneman et al. 1982), that lead
to decisions that violate theories of rational choice. Since the strength of
managerial commitment to a decision can be considered an important de-
terminant of the eﬀectiveness of decision-making2, it deserves to be inves-
tigated whether the strength of initial commitment could not be similarly
aﬀected in decisions made under uncertainty, e.g. caused by problems such
as information overload. Notwithstanding the availability of a rich body of
academic literature on the process of escalation of managerial commitment,
the cognitive activities during decision-making, leading to the development
of initial commitment, have been neglected. More speciﬁcally, there is a lack
of research on the role information plays in the initial development of com-
mitment. Therefore, it seems desirable to extend behavioral decision theories
with research on the cognitive activities involved in the development of initial
commitment.
1With the term ’commitment’ in this context we do not refer to what has been de-
scribed in the literature as ’goal commitment’ or ’organizational commitment’. Although
commitment to the implementation of a decision can be considered to be related to or
embedded in these broader forms of commitment, it is certainly not identical. We use the
term to refer speciﬁcally to the attitude towards the choice made by the decision-maker.
2We refer to Chapter 2 for a deﬁnition of ’decision-making eﬀectiveness’
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Furthermore, with the exception of some research focusing on the use of
managerial intuition (Blattberg and Hoch 1990; Glazer et al. 1992), much
previous research has focused on the identiﬁcation of mechanisms responsible
for biases in judgments made under uncertainty caused by a lack of informa-
tion, rather than an overload. Questions remain about the generalizability
of the results for conditions of uncertainty arising from information overload.
Combining these two research opportunities, the question guiding the present
study becomes:
• What are the eﬀects of information on managerial judgment and initial
commitment to a decision, under conditions of uncertainty caused by
information overload?
In order to address this research problem, we must deal with a number of
related issues:
RQ 1: Can we discriminate between choice and commitment as
decision outputs?
RQ 2: Is there such a thing as rational commitment?
RQ 3: Which antecedents of commitment are aﬀected by irrel-
evant information, especially under conditions of infor-
mation overload?
RQ 4: Which antecedents of choice are aﬀected by irrelevant
information, especially under conditions of information
overload?
4.1.2 Contribution
As information overload is becoming a signiﬁcant problem for managers, it
is important to study its eﬀects on all cognitive activities involved in the de-
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cision process. Biased judgments, inappropriate risk behavior and escalation
of commitment can each bring great risk to a company when they occur, and
may be aggravated by information overload. The current conceptualization
of decision-making explains these phenomena insuﬃciently. In this study
we therefore intend to investigate the potential eﬀects of various aspects of
information on decisions made in an information-rich environment.
4.1.3 Approach and Structure of this Chapter
First, we must conceptually distinguish the two outputs of decision-making.
We develop a framework that will form a basis for a number of propositions.
Then we will present an experiment with a fair degree of contextual richness
(Staw 1997), developed in order to test the propositions. In this experiment,
the eﬀects of relevant and irrelevant information on choice and the strength
of initial commitment are tested, under conditions of substantial uncertainty
caused by an aﬄuence of information. We speciﬁcally consider eﬀects of
information that is not directly relevant to the decision problem at hand. We
subsequently discuss the ﬁndings and present an overview of the limitations of
the current study. Implications for further research and managerial practice
are ﬁnally discussed.
4.2 Literature Review and Development of
Propositions
Can the mental processes leading to the choice of a course of action on the
one hand and the development of initial commitment to that choice on the
other be separated? The two forms of output of the decision process can be
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distinguished conceptually. This is demonstrated in the following example.
Two managers, deciding about a new product marketing project, each pro-
vided with diﬀerent information, may choose to implement the same course
of action. One could initially be strongly committed to her decision, whereas
the other may only feel weak initial commitment. For the company, this
may ultimately lead to considerably diﬀerent outcomes. The more strongly
committed manager will, for example, react very diﬀerently upon receiving
negative feedback regarding the progression of a project, than the manager
who, for some reason or other, was less committed. This may lead to very
diﬀerent outcomes for the ﬁrm. Diﬀerences in the strength of initial com-
mitment can lead to diﬀerences in the magnitude of subsequent resource
allocations to a project, and therefore to various degrees of success.
Two managers could also reach diﬀerent conclusions with respect to the
magnitude of resource allocations, but still support their decisions with sim-
ilar degrees of commitment. Again, two diﬀerent situations arise, with dif-
ferent outcomes for the ﬁrm. This example substantiates that the output of
a decision-process can be separated into a choice element and a commitment
element. Relatively independent mental processes appear to be responsible
for a choice on the one hand and for the formation of commitment to that
choice on the other.
Disproportionally high, or nonrational (Bazerman 2001) commitment to
a decision occurs, when continuous and abundant negative feedback about
the progress of a project does not lead to its abandonment. Under cer-
tain circumstances managers ignore negative feedback about the success of
projects. This type of undesirable managerial behavior (Bazerman 2001) has
been conceptualized as an escalation of commitment (Staw 1981; Staw 1976).
Too much commitment, or resistance to change, can be very harmful to the
102 CHAPTER 4. CHOICE AND COMMITMENT
interests of the company, as it may lead to continued investments in doomed
projects (Drummond 1998; Drummond 1994)
We suggest calling commitment appropriate or rational, when decisions
with respect to the continuation or withdrawal of a project are made in a
rational way, i.e. when positive and negative feedback are both acknowledged
and taken into account to the appropriate extent. Early abandonment –
e.g. in the case of disappointing ﬁrst results - of potentially very successful
projects may result, if commitment is inappropriately low.
Most researchers see a strong link between cognitive limitations and sub-
optimal choices of a course of action (Kahneman et al. 1982). So far, an-
tecedents of (disproportionate) commitment have not been sought in biased
mental processes, but rather in the psychological constitution of the manager.
A number of project-related, psychological, organizational and structural ex-
planations of escalation behavior have been proposed in escalation literature
(Newman and Sabherwal 1996), but eﬀects of bounded rationality in the
processing of information on the development of commitment have, not yet
been studied as such.
When choice and commitment indeed represent distinct and separable
output elements of a decision, and result from distinguishable mental activ-
ities, it must also be possible to distinguish the antecedents of both dimen-
sions. We therefore ﬁrst propose:
Proposition 4.1 Information presented to a decision-maker may have dis-
tinct eﬀects on the choice of a course of action and on initial commitment
to that choice.
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4.2.1 Choice
In order to identify eﬀects of aﬄuent information on decision-maker output,
we ﬁrst consider the ‘choice’ element. This is the element of the decision that
has ﬁrst been studied in depth in economically, or game-theoretically (Von
Neumann and Morgenstern 1947) inspired decision research. In this tradition
decision-making has been conceptualized as an intentionally rational (Simon
1997), informed choice between decision alternatives, generally with the pur-
pose of maximizing expected utility (Schoemaker 1982). Inspired by the work
of Barnard (1938), behavioral decision theory has taken into account a range
of limitations to the rationality with which this choice is made (Kahneman
et al. 1982; March and Simon 1993; Simon 1997; Simon 1987). Behavioral
decision research has taken on the conceptualization of decision-making as
choice. Research in this tradition was therefore limited to the identiﬁcation
and study of factors causing a bias in the rationality of the choice or judgment
component of the decision. In this tradition a decision is considered biased
to the extent that the actually chosen solution deviates from the choice that
would have resulted from an entirely rational calculation under conditions of
perfect information (Bazerman 2001). In managerial practice, it is argued,
even if decision makers try to make substantively rational decisions (March
and Simon 1993), they can only do so within certain boundaries, imposed
by limits upon the availability and quality of information, the way the hu-
man cognitive system functions and the extent to which decision-makers are
embedded in a social structure (Simon 1957). Managerial or indeed human
judgments and the resulting decisions suﬀer from bounded rationality under
speciﬁc conditions and due to a number of factors. Here a discussion of condi-
tions and factors that are related to information and information processing
is presented.
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4.2.2 Causes of Bias
Bias in judgments occurs in part because managers never have access to
perfect or complete information. At the same time, managerial problems
are very complex, whereas humans have a limited amount of attention and
can therefore only deal successfully with problems of limited complexity.
Furthermore, especially in managerial decision-making, most decisions are
made under time pressure. Imperfect information, problem complexity and
time pressure3 have generally been identiﬁed as conditions under which biases
in judgments are likely to occur (Bazerman 2001; Kahneman et al. 1982;
Simon 1997).
Three types of bias have been identiﬁed. In the ﬁrst place, it has been
proposed that in order to deal with insuﬃcient information, complexity, and
time pressure managers use heuristics or shortcuts (Tversky and Kahneman
1974). Heuristics do not always lead to unbiased or substantially rational
results, due to limitations in our capability to make proper statistical cal-
culations (Bazerman 2001; Kahneman et al. 1982). Second, it has been
proposed that due to the fact that fast, intuitive, or non-explicit cognitive
processes are involved biasing eﬀects can be expected from strong emotions
(Simon 1987). March and Simon (1993) have identiﬁed a third factor af-
fecting the substantive rationality of judgments. They made the observation
that managers often ‘satisﬁce’ under time and organizational pressure, i.e.
they do not necessarily look for optimal solutions when making a decision,
but rather go for a solution that is acceptable under the given circumstances
(March and Simon 1993). In other words, decision-makers do not consider all
possible options, but tend to stop looking for better alternatives, once they
3These are the task conditions identiﬁed in the case study presented in Chapter 3, which
innovation managers consider to aﬀect their decision-making eﬀectiveness negatively
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have found a course of action that satisﬁes certain predetermined minimum
requirements.
4.2.3 Decision Making as Resource Allocation
Managers choose their actions in order to maximize (Schoemaker 1982) or
satisﬁce (Simon 1997) expected utility, with respect to certain predetermined
objectives. For managers the majority of decisions concern the allocation
of scarce company resources. The objectives of such decisions could be to
reach previously established sales targets, proﬁtability targets, growth rates
or most probably a combination of these. Within the limits suggested by the-
ories about bounded rationality, marketing managers are generally assumed
to be economic actors and therefore choose to distribute their scarce resources
over diﬀerent projects with the purpose of maximizing or at least satisﬁcing
expected utility. In order to make decisions managers select and consider
information that is relevant to the decision problem. It was found that more
experienced managers distinguish rapidly between information that is rele-
vant for the problem at hand and information that is not (Perkins and Rao
1990). This implies that managers ignore part of the available information,
the part that appears irrelevant. In order to judge certain information to
be irrelevant they ﬁrst have to consider it, however. Does information that
is appropriately considered irrelevant and ignored by experienced managers
not have an eﬀect upon the decision at all, for example when it aﬀects the
decision-maker in other respects than in the direct context of the decision
problem? Does it not play a role at all in the decision-process?
Consider the decision process in a resource allocation decision. Before
a manager can decide about the allocation of scarce resources to a project,
he must develop performance expectations for that project, with respect to
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the risks and beneﬁts for the company and himself. These expectations will
largely be based on information about the project. The mental represen-
tation of the project and its potential outcomes will be the result of the
selection and processing of information about the project and the company
in an ongoing sensemaking process (Weick 1995). According to the afore-
mentioned decision theories, the amount of resources allocated to a project
will be relative to the utility the manager expects to derive from the project,
corrected for the estimated chances of success of that project (Smidts 1997).
Although managerial expectations as such may well be biased (Kahneman
et al. 1982; Simon 1997), all decision theories would predict a strong rela-
tionship between performance expectations reported by managers and their
subsequent resource allocations. We therefore expect:
Proposition 4.2 There will be a strong positive relationship between ex-
pected utility of a project, formed on the basis of relevant information, and
the subsequently chosen allocation of scarce resources to that project.
Based on theories and research about intuitive and heuristic judgments (Kah-
neman et al. 1982; Simon 1957), it has been proposed that two relatively
independent information-processing systems coexist in the human mind: a
rational-analytical, conscious and explicit information processing mode and
an experiential or intuitive mode (Denes-Raj and Epstein 1994; Epstein et
al. 1992; Teglasi and Epstein 1998)4. Under conditions characterized by
moderate levels of uncertainty, time pressure and complexity, an explicit
information-processing mode prevails. Under these circumstances managers
dispose of suﬃcient time and attention to make their assumptions explicit,
conduct market studies and deliberately select an advantageous course of
4See Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion.
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action. It has been suggested that decisions and judgments made under con-
ditions of time pressure, high complexity, information inadequacy and there-
fore substantial uncertainty involve other than strictly rational information
processing modes (Agor 1986; Brockmann and Simmonds 1997; Eisenhardt
1990; Perkins and Rao 1990). Marketing decision-making often occurs under
conditions of extreme time pressure, complexity and uncertainty. Sometimes
hundreds of product-market decisions have to be made in a very short time
span, leaving little time for explicit reﬂection, let alone market research. Un-
der these circumstances it can be expected that managers, at least partially,
use the intuitive, more synthetic or experiential information-processing sys-
tem, which is characterized by its relative speed, the direct use of previous
experience in the form of pattern recognition and readily available decision
premises (Weick 2001). There are indications that rapidly made complex
judgments and decisions that involve the use of intuitive reasoning are prone
to inﬂuences from strong emotion caused by non-relevant information (Forgas
and Moylan 1988). In the case of a manager deciding about the allocation
of company resources, these emotions could well be caused by precisely the
information decision-makers consider to be irrelevant to the problem at hand.
We therefore expect that irrelevant information causing positive or negative
emotions in the decision-maker will aﬀect the formation of performance ex-
pectations, if this takes place under conditions of great uncertainty caused
by information overload and time pressure. In the context of a product man-
ager making decisions based upon his expectations, this would lead to biased
(either too low or too high) allocations. We therefore expect:
Proposition 4.3 Under conditions of uncertainty caused by an aﬄuence of
information, performance expectations of a decision-maker will be aﬀected by
emotionally laden information that is irrelevant to the decision problem.
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More precisely:
Proposition 4.4 When information, that is not directly relevant to the prob-
lem under consideration, but which has a positive (negative) eﬀect upon the
decision-maker’s emotional state, is presented together with relevant informa-
tion, managers will optimistically (pessimistically) adjust their (performance)
expectations.
4.2.4 Commitment to a Chosen Course of Action
In environments characterized by dynamic interactive complexity (Weick
1990), decisions that are substantially rational at the moment they are made,
may still lead to wrong and even fatal outcomes, if disproportionate commit-
ment to the decision is preventing managers from acknowledging information
that should lead to adjustments later on in the project. The problem of es-
calation of commitment seems to occur often in new product development
projects, projects involving information technology, and other projects sur-
rounded by much uncertainty (Drummond 1998; Drummond 1994; Keil and
Montealegre 2000; Schmidt and Calantone 1998; Staw 1981). In spite of per-
suasive negative feedback, managers often remain committed to the imple-
mentation of their decisions, apparently choosing to ignore this information.
This implies that in some situations initial managerial commitment to the
implementation of a decision is not aﬀected by new information that is rele-
vant to the decision. This in turn implies that initial managerial commitment
is an important decision output, and that we have to look for the antecedents
of initial commitment, if we want to understand escalation behavior better.
Antecedents of managerial commitment, especially goal commitment, have
been studied in organizational research, particularly in the context of mo-
tivation (DeShon and Landis 1997; Hollenbeck et al. 1989). In analogy to
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a commonly used deﬁnition of commitment (Williams and Hazer 1986) we
may deﬁne managerial commitment to a decision positively as engagement
(Kahn 1990) or as an attitude expressing willingness to expend (more) eﬀort
in the future, in order to reach the objectives of the decision. This attitude
is generally positively valued in a manager. On the other hand, commitment
can also, in a negative sense, be framed as the unwillingness to change one’s
mind about a decision, once it is made (Bazerman 2001). This is the type
of attitude that causes nonrational escalations of commitment. According to
expectancy theory (Vroom 1964), the strength of managerial engagement or
commitment to a chosen course of action is determined by extrinsically and
intrinsically motivating factors that make the achievement of objectives de-
sirable. Extrinsic motivation to be committed to a decision will by deﬁnition
be generated by information that is relevant to the decision at hand, e.g. the
size of the remuneration that is awarded in case of success. Relevant infor-
mation, inducing certain expectations with respect to the performance of a
new product, will have an eﬀect on the decision-maker’s extrinsic motivation.
Therefore we expect:
Proposition 4.5 When a new product is announced, performance expecta-
tions with respect to that new product will aﬀect a manager’s commitment to
a decision to allocate resources to the marketing of that product.
Intrinsic motivation, and self-conﬁdence on the other hand, may be aﬀected
by information that is not necessarily related to the decision problem, but
that relates to the wider context of the company, the industry or the work-
ing environment. We therefore expect information that aﬀects the overall
attitude of the decision-maker towards their working environment, to aﬀect
commitment to decisions made within the context of that company. The over-
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all attitude of the decision-maker towards his working environment shows in
his morale. We therefore propose:
Proposition 4.6 Information that inﬂuences a manager’s overall attitude
towards the professional environment, or morale, through eﬀects on intrinsic
motivation or self-conﬁdence, will aﬀect managerial commitment to a deci-
sion even when the information itself is irrelevant to the decision problem.
More precisely:
Proposition 4.7 Information that inﬂuences morale positively (negatively)
aﬀects managerial commitment to a decision positively (negatively).
4.2.5 Perceived Information Quality
A factor that may directly or indirectly inﬂuence a decision-maker’s attitude
towards his choice of a speciﬁc course of action could be his conﬁdence in the
substantive rationality of that choice. In other words, decision-makers’ con-
ﬁdence in the rationality of a decision will probably aﬀect their commitment
to that choice. The certainty, with which a manager makes a choice, or his
conﬁdence in the quality of his choices, is inﬂuenced by his perception of the
quality of the information he is using. When a manager perceives the quality
of the available information to be bad, e.g. if it contains insuﬃcient cues, he
will perceive a higher degree of uncertainty. Although he would still make the
decision to the best of his ability, it would make him feel less conﬁdent with
respect to the rationality of his decision. Conversely, the extent to which
a manager perceives the information upon which he bases his decisions as
complete will positively impact his conﬁdence in the appropriateness of his
decisions. We therefore expect there to be a positive relationship between the
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perceived quality of the available information and the resulting commitment
to the decision. We propose:
Proposition 4.8 Perceived quality of the information used in a decision will
have a positive eﬀect on managerial commitment to that decision.
On the other hand, we expect that personality characteristics of the decision-
maker, in particular risk attitude, will moderate the eﬀect of perceived infor-
mation quality on commitment. Risk-averse managers are more cautious, and
therefore more open to adapt their subsequent choices to feedback. We there-
fore expect them to develop a lower level of initial commitment to projects
that are perceived as risky, such as the allocation of company resources to
the introduction and marketing of highly innovative products. We therefore
expect a direct eﬀect of the level of risk-aversion on commitment and propose:
Proposition 4.9 There will be a direct relationship between the risk attitude
of the decision-maker and the level of commitment to a resource allocation
decision pertaining to a project perceived as risky.
If the decision-maker has the impression that the quality of available infor-
mation is low, or the reliability of the source is not certain, he or she will be
even less certain about the chances that the project will succeed. This will
aﬀect a risk-averse manager more than a risk-neutral colleague. In addition
we therefore propose:
Proposition 4.10 The eﬀect of perceived information quality on commit-
ment will be moderated by the risk attitude of the decision-maker.
The proposed relationships between constructs are summarized and graphi-
cally represented by the model in Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1: Antecedents and Mediators of Decision Outcomes
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4.3 Research Design and Measurement
We chose to test the propositions in a controlled experimental setting. We
decided to study the relationships between information, morale, choice, and
commitment in the context of new product marketing5 and designed a real-
istic marketing decision-making simulation. For the duration of the experi-
ment, participants were asked to assume the role of a Marketing Manager.
They were provided with abundant information and had to make resource
allocation decisions with respect to the introduction of an innovative product
in their market.
The sample consisted of ninety fourth-year business administration stu-
dents, enrolled in an advanced course in marketing decision-making at a
medium-sized European university. Individual participants studied various
5There are a number of reasons for this choice. Although much marketing decision-
making can and will be automated in the future, new product marketing related decision-
making remains an exception, in the sense that managerial skills will continue to play
an important role in this domain. This is due to the fact that a global and ever more
dynamic marketplace is making consumption trends increasingly diﬃcult to predict in
most industries, especially so with respect to highly innovative products that are either
entirely new to the market or to the organization. In such cases no useful experience
is available with respect to the organization of business processes, as these innovations
have little in common with previously carried products. Therefore it is diﬃcult to make
structured use of data available with respect to other products. Dealing with large amounts
of unstructured information is therefore required. Second, the need for quick decisions
in the case of innovative products in highly competitive markets often does not allow
time for any structured data collection process and a rigorous analysis. New product
marketing related decisions will therefore continue to depend largely on the human skill to
process large amounts of information quickly in order to solve often very complex decision
problems.
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information packages and then ﬁlled out a questionnaire. The experiment
lasted for approximately one hour.
4.3.1 Description of the Experiment
After we explained the procedure of the experiment in detail, we provided all
participants with a detailed job description of the marketing manager they
were supposed to impersonate. Participants were asked to adopt the role of
a regional marketing manager in a globally operating educational publishing
company. Subsequently we distributed a second, more extensive information
package.6 This second package contained abundant and very detailed in-
formation about the company employing them, the product range they had
responsibilities for, the complexities of the market and the political, com-
petitive and technological environment etc. This information package also
explained whereof their assignment consisted: They would have to decide
about the allocation of scarce company resources to the marketing and dis-
tribution of a really new product. This product, a web-based educational
tool was entirely new both to the market and to the company. The informa-
tion package contained a fact sheet about the new product, providing them
with abundant technical and marketing details. After having been allowed
to study the information package for ten minutes, the participants received
ﬁve pages of printed e-mail messages, addressed to the manager they imper-
sonated. These e-mail messages originated from diﬀerent senior managers
and secretaries inside and outside their company and contained information
that was strictly speaking irrelevant to the new product marketing problem,
but had to do with events organized by the company and corporate deci-
sions about alliances, divestures etc. These messages were intended to reﬂect
6The information package is included in the Appendix at the end of this dissertation.
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the average mail a marketing manager may receive on a typical day. We
produced two distinct sets of e-mail messages. The messages in one set con-
tained information that was meant to induce a positive overall disposition
in the participants. The messages in the other set were meant to have the
opposite eﬀect. For samples of the messages that were distributed to the
participants we refer to Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Examples of Colored Information
Sample of Negative e-mail: Sample of Positive e-mail:
The Annual Company Ball that was due
on Hawaii in September will be cancelled.
You will receive more information soon.
The Annual Company Ball in Septem-
ber will not be organized in the Phoenix
Hilton, as has been the case in the past,
but instead will take place on Hawaii!
Hope to see you all in that splendid lo-
cation! Bring your dancing shoes!
Your order for a new chair for your oﬃce
has not been approved. Our ﬁnancial di-
rector gave no further explanation for the
refusal. Would you be so kind as to send
me an overview of the other oﬃce mate-
rials you and your staﬀ will need for the
upcoming two months.
The order for a new chair for your of-
ﬁce has been approved. The chair will be
shipped to you next week. Great design
you chose! Would you be so kind as to
send me an overview of the other oﬃce ma-
terials you and your staﬀ will need for the
upcoming two months.
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Table 4.1: continued
Sample of Negative e-mail: Sample of Positive e-mail:
The sick trees in front of your oﬃce will be
cut down. The deed will be done next Fri-
day. There will be inconvenience caused
by the noise. I have ordered the engineer-
ing department to install a sunscreen to all
oﬃces on your side of the building, as the
sun will plague you without the trees. The
works will only start next month. I hope
the inconvenience will be limited.
The sick trees in front of your oﬃce will
be cut down. The deed will be done next
Friday. In order to limit the inconvenience
caused by the noise I grant all staﬀ in your
oﬃce a day oﬀ. Make the best out of it!
As a consequence of the restructuring of
our domestic Sales force we have decided
to reduce the duration of the National
Sales Meeting from ten to ﬁve days. You
will receive an updated program soon.
In response to the publication of very fa-
vorable ﬁrst quarter sales ﬁgures, we have
decided to increase the duration of the Na-
tional Sales Meeting from ten to twelve
days. You will receive an extended and
updated program. We are pleased to an-
nounce an additional two-day company
tour to the Grand Canyon, to reward you
for your hard work.
In total, ﬁfty copies of the negative sets and forty of the positive sets were
distributed at random over the participants. By explicitly announcing that
the information packages would be taken away from the participants within
ten minutes, we imposed a fair amount of time pressure on the participants,
with respect to the processing of the information.
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4.3.2 Data Collection
After gathering the information packages back from the participants we dis-
tributed a questionnaire. This questionnaire consisted of two parts. The
ﬁrst part contained questions related to the assignment. The second part
contained questions with respect to the participants’ perceptions of the de-
scribed situation and perceived cognitive requirements of the assignment.
4.3.2.1 The Assignment
In the ﬁrst part of the questionnaire the participants were required to indi-
cate how well they expected the hypothetical new product to perform in a
number of diﬀerent dimensions. Subsequently, they were asked to indicate to
which extent they would allocate a variety of scarce company resources to the
introduction of the really new educational product in the territory assigned
to them. Finally, they had to indicate how strongly they were committed to
their resource allocation decisions.
4.3.2.2 Background Information
In the second part of the questionnaire we asked the participants about their
attitude towards the job, the company, and the business. In this way we
wanted to measure their general disposition or morale. Furthermore we asked
them to report their perception of the quality of the provided information.
All responses were measured as self reported attitudes towards a number
of statements. We asked the participants to indicate the extent to which
they agreed with these statements on seven item Likert scales.
118 CHAPTER 4. CHOICE AND COMMITMENT
4.3.3 Operationalization of the Model
The ﬁrst variable that needed to be measured was ‘performance expecta-
tions’. We interpreted performance expectations as a complex and latent
construct, and produced a number of indicators, each measuring expecta-
tions in a diﬀerent performance dimension. We followed a similar procedure
for ‘resource allocation’. Again a number of indicators were constructed,
measuring resource allocations in a number of ﬁelds, such as training of the
sales force, marketing and distribution.
We measured decision-maker’s ‘commitment’ to the chosen course of ac-
tion by slightly adapting the indicators proposed by Hollenbeck et al. (1989)
and reduced and reﬁned by DeShon and Landis (1997), as it was found that
the original commitment scale deﬁned by Hollenbeck et al. (1989) actually
confused performance expectancies and goal commitment. We decided to
start with the adapted scale proposed by DeShon and Landis (1997) and
adapt the indicators further, in order to measure commitment to the deci-
sion, rather than commitment to the organization, for which the indicators
were originally intended.
The next important variable we needed to measure was ‘morale’, which
we have deﬁned as an information-induced overall disposition of the partic-
ipant towards their job and the company. As we did not ﬁnd any existing
measurement instrument for this variable, it was decided to measure it as the
extent to which decision-makers agreed with a number of statements about
their overall attitude towards the company and the assumed job.
We also wanted to measure the participant’s overall perception of the
quality of the information we had provided them with. Questions about
the perceived level of ambiguity, the extent to which the information was
observed as confusing and the ease with which the decision-maker could judge
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the presented information for relevance were therefore included, in order to
measure this latent construct.
Finally we measured the ‘risk attitude’ of the decision-makers. No vali-
dated measurement instruments were available in the literature for this type
of overall managerial risk attitude. We therefore designed a simple instru-
ment using three indicators, one measuring risk attitude with respect to the
new product decision under consideration and two measuring more generally
the personal risk attitude of the decision-maker. The results of a conﬁrma-
tory factor analysis performed in Lisrel are reported in Table 4.2. In this
table we present the items used and their loadings on the three factors, as
well as the internal consistency of the factors as expressed in Cronbach’s
alpha.
4.4 Data Analysis, Findings and Discussion
We ended up with eighty-four completed questionnaires. A number of respon-
dents left early, or did not ﬁll in all questions. Participants having received
negative e-mails submitted forty-eight questionnaires and participants hav-
ing received positive e-mails thirty-six. In order to reduce the number of
variables we performed a number of factor analyses on limited subsets. One
factor analysis was carried out on the explanatory variables of the experiment:
‘performance expectations’, ‘perceived information quality’ and ‘morale’.
In the indicators that were intended to measure ‘performance expecta-
tions’ we found two factors (using the common cut-oﬀ value of ’1’ for the
Eigenvalues) in a principal component analysis, which we interpreted as
‘short-term expectations’ and ‘long-term expectations’. Items and factor
loadings obtained in a conﬁrmatory factor analysis, obtained in Lisrel, are
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Item Morale Risk At-
titude
Information
Quality
Reliability: α=.88 α=.74 α=.63
Would Take Risks – .64 –
Taking Risks Professionally – .88 –
It is a Good Attitude to Take
Risks
– .89 –
Love to Work for Company .89 – –
Love to Work in Position .85 – –
Have Good Feeling about Com-
pany
.79 – –
Have Good Feeling about Job .87 – –
Information was not Confusing – – .79
Information Easy to Judge for
Relevance
– – .62
Information was not Ambiguous – – .79
Table 4.2: Measurement Analysis: Independent Variables
4.4. DATA ANALYSIS, FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 121
Item Short-term
Expectations
Long-term
Expectations
Reliability: α=.85 α=.70
Increases Financial Performance .83 –
Increases Commercial Performance .83 –
Improves Reputation & Brand Equity .83 –
Improves Customer Satisfaction .83 –
Market Develops Positively .83 –
Optimistic about Success .84 –
New Product will be a Success .81 –
Create Opportunities for Other Innova-
tions
– .83
Create Opportunities for Diﬀerentia-
tion
– .82
Table 4.3: Measurement Analysis: Independent Variables Continued
reported in Table 4.3. The data showed a reasonable ﬁt to our two-factor
model. We obtained the following ﬁt values: χ2: 19.42, P: 0.15, AGFI: 0.87
and RMSEA: 0.062. The internal consistency of the factors as expressed in
Cronbach’s alpha is also reported in this table.
Subsequently, we performed a conﬁrmatory factor analysis on the ex-
plained variables of the research, being ‘resource allocation’ and ‘commit-
ment’. Results of this factor analysis are presented in Table 4.4. Again the
data showed a reasonable ﬁt to the two-factor model. We obtained the fol-
lowing ﬁt values: χ2: 45.12, P: .077, AGFI: 0.86 and RMSEA: .060. The
internal consistency of the factors as expressed in Cronbach’s alpha is also
reported in this table.
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Item Resource
Allocation
Commitment
Reliability: α=.76 α=.75
Will allocate Financial Resources .55 –
Will allocate Human Resources .54 –
Will allocate Managerial Resources .78 –
Will allocate Technical Resources .52 –
Will allocate Marketing Resources .72 –
Will allocate Logistical Resources .65 –
Am strongly Committed to Decisions – .38
Believe I am Right about Decisions – .44
Would strongly Defend Decisions – .87
Diﬃcult to Change my Mind – .79
Table 4.4: Measurement Analysis: Dependent Variables
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ResAll LtExp StExp Comm Morale InfQual
ResAll 1
LtExp .277** 1
StExp .544** .141* 1
Comm .291** .95 .302** 1
Morale .176 -.145 .306** .303** 1
InfQual .184 .064 .384* .456** .321** 1
RiskAtt .272** .265** .296** .425** .027 .162
**. Correlation signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
*. Correlation signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
Table 4.5: Pearson Correlation between Main Constructs
Based upon the results of these factor analyses, it was decided to compose
the main constructs as averages of the scores for the components. In order
to explore the data a correlation table was contructed, containing all core
constructs. Correlation coeﬃcients between the core-constructs are presented
in Table 4.5.
We posited the ‘morale’ construct as a mediator between irrelevant infor-
mation, decision-maker’s expectations and the decision outcomes. A ﬁrst
concern was to establish whether the two diﬀerent sets of e-mail packages
had indeed had distinctive eﬀects upon the morale of the participants. A
dummy variable with two values was contructed. In order to test the eﬀects,
a one-way ANOVA was performed on ‘morale’. From this analysis it has
become clear that the two groups had reported signiﬁcantly diﬀerent overall
attitudes towards their company and job. For the results we refer to Table
4.6. Those having received positive e-mails had clearly a much more cheer-
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Dependent Mean
Square
F Sig.
Morale Between Groups
Within Groups
23.583
.725
32.547 .000
LtExp Between Groups
Within Groups
.084
1.011
.083 .774
StExp Between Groups
Within Groups
.190
1.010
.188 .666
Table 4.6: Manipulation Test (ANOVA)
ful disposition towards their job and employer, than those having received
negative e-mails.
In order to investigate the proposition that under conditions of infor-
mation overload and time pressure decision-maker’s expectations would be
inﬂuenced by the aﬀective content of irrelevant information, another ANOVA
was performed with the same dummy, but now on ‘short-term expectations’
and ‘long-term expectations’. The results of this ANOVA analysis are also
presented in Table 4.6.
From this table it is clear that the manipulation of the irrelevant informa-
tion, though having a signiﬁcant eﬀect upon the participants’ morale, does
not aﬀect their performance expectations. The data do therefore not provide
support for the proposition that emotions aﬀect performance expectations
formed under information overload and time pressure (Propositions P4.3 and
P4.4).
The next objective was to test the predicted relationships between the
various dependent and independent variables. A MANCOVA analysis was
performed, which included all explanatory variables, ‘long-term expectations’
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Source Dependent Variable F Sig.
Corrected
Model
ResAlla
Commitmentb
10.297
11.160
.000
.000
Intercept ResAll
Commitment
12.081
3.595
.001
.061
StExp ResAll
Commitment
26.773
.011
.000
.917
LtExp ResAll
Commitment
5.266
.001
.024
.974
Morale ResAll
Commitment
.591
4.187
.444
.043
InfQual ResAll
Commitment
.328
13.732
.568
.000
RiskAtt ResAll
Commitment
.822
17.173
.367
.000
a. R Squared = .347 (Adjusted R Squared = .313)
b. R Squared = .365 (Adjusted R Squared = .332)
Table 4.7: Mancova on the Dependent Variables
(Lt-Exp), ‘short-term expectations’ (St-Exp), and ‘morale’ as covariates. The
constructs ‘resource allocation’ (ResAll) and ‘commitment’ were included
as dependent variables. We included ‘risk attitude’ (RiskAtt) as a control
variable. The results of the analysis are presented in Table 4.7.
Table 4.7 shows that variance in ‘short-term performance expectations’
appears to be responsible for a substantial part of the variance in ‘resource
allocation’, whereas long-term performance expectations have a considerably
weaker, but signiﬁcant (at 10% level) eﬀect. We expressed this in our propo-
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sition P4.2, which is therefore supported. No other independent variable was
signiﬁcantly related to ‘resource allocation’. Therefore propositions P4.3 and
P4.4 are not supported by the data. However, this could be explained by
the possibility that the experimental conditions did not suﬃciently simulate
the eﬀects of time pressure or complexity on the decision-makers, in order to
make this eﬀect visible.
We expected a positive eﬀect of relevant information on commitment,
through the extrinsically motivating eﬀect of performance expectations. This
proposition, P4.5, is partially supported by the data: In Table 4.5 it can be
seen, that signiﬁcant correlation only exists between ’short-term expecta-
tions’ and ’commitment’. This could be explained by the absence of explicit
information about long-term remuneration or bonus-schemes. Apparently
the participants, no business decision-makers, did make a link between ex-
pected product performance and the size of their rewards.
At the same time it becomes clear that the three other independent vari-
ables ‘morale’, ‘information quality’ and ‘risk attitude’ largely explain the
variance in the other dependent variable ‘commitment’ (adjusted R2 = .33).
The eﬀect of morale on intrinsic motivation was expected to be reﬂected in
the strength of commitment, as expressed in P4.6 and P4.7 These propositions
are both supported at a .05 signiﬁcance level: there is an undeniable eﬀect
of ‘morale’ on ‘commitment’.
To test the eﬀects of information quality and risk attitude on commit-
ment, a multiple regression analysis was conducted. The results of this anal-
ysis are presented in Table 4.8.
The proposition positing a direct positive eﬀect of perceived information
quality on commitment, P4.8 is supported by the data. A strong direct
eﬀect of Risk Attitude on commitment was also found, as proposed by P4.9.
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Independent B Std. Error Beta t Sig.
Constant 1.217 .494 2.466 .015
Inf. Quality .367 .093 .338 3.927 .000
Risk Att. .299 .067 .365 4.480 .000
Morale .129 .059 .185 2.175 .032
Risk * Inf. .003 .075 -.037 -.464 .644
F=14.173 Sig.= .000 Adj. R2= .341
Table 4.8: Regression on Commitment
The mediation of the eﬀect of information quality on commitment by the
participant’s risk attitude, as posited by P4.10, is not supported by the data.
To avoid problems caused by high levels of multicollinearity between the
components of the interaction term and the term itself, the interaction term
was not directly included in the regression equation. Instead we included the
residuals of a second order regression, performed according to the residual
centering method proposed by Lance (1988).
Intriguing and most important ﬁnding of the present study is the fact
that antecedents of the two decision outcome variables are distinct and even
mutually exclusive. This provides more support for the proposition P4.1, that
commitment is not formed based upon the same aspects of information as
preference or choice. An overview of the results is presented in Table 4.9.
4.5 Conclusion
The most important outcome of the present study is that signiﬁcant eﬀects
have been demonstrated of perceived information quality, non-relevant infor-
mation (information that has no direct relevance to the decision problem)
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Nr. Description Result
P 4.1 Commitment and Choice have Distinct An-
tecedents
√
P 4.2 Performance Expectations are Antecedents of Re-
source Allocation
√
P 4.3
P 4.4
Irrelevant Information aﬀects Resource Allocation
under Overload Conditions
–
P 4.5 Performance Expectations aﬀect Commitment (
√
)*
P 4.6
P 4.7
Morale aﬀects Commitment under Overload Con-
ditions
√
P 4.8 Perceived Information Quality aﬀects Commit-
ment
√
P 4.9 Decision Maker’s Risk Attitude directly aﬀects
Commitment to a Risky Project
√
P 4.10 Risk Aversion mediates the Eﬀect of Information
Quality on Commitment
–
*Partially supported: only for Short-Term Expectations
Table 4.9: Overview of the Propositions
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and risk attitude on reported initial commitment. This implies that in-
formation processing does play a role in the development of commitment,
justifying more research into cognitive biases with respect to commitment.
We explained the eﬀect of irrelevant information by the eﬀects this type
of information may have on the intrinsic motivation, via the morale of the
decision-maker. Whereas commitment traditionally has been conceived as
a relatively stable state, explained by referring to economic, psychological
or organizational mechanisms, a direct eﬀect of information and information
quality on commitment had never been considered. In our study it has be-
come clear that information can play an important role with respect to both
aspects of the decision, whereas diﬀerent aspects of information are responsi-
ble for the eﬀects on each outcome of the decision. The experiment seems to
conﬁrm that decision-makers indeed select relevant information and process
this selection in order to establish rational expectations with respect to the
potential success of a project. Looking at the negligible eﬀect of the irrel-
evant information on the formation of their expectations, the participants
indeed distinguished quite well between information relevant to the decision
problem and information that was not. Consequently they also base their al-
location of scarce resources to the project on these expectations, making this
part of the decision rational as well. There was a fairly linear relationship
between those expectations and the level of their resource allocations and no
sign that the resource allocation, i.e. the choice aspect of the decision, was
signiﬁcantly biased by their morale or by aﬀective components of the irrele-
vant information they received. We therefore conclude that, to a substantial
extent, resource allocations are based on information relevant to the decision
problem at hand.
The aﬀective component of information that is not directly relevant to
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the decision-problem appears to play a role in the process of developing com-
mitment to the decision, through its inﬂuence on decision-maker’s morale
and intrinsic motivation. We did not ﬁnd indications that performance ex-
pectations have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on decision-makers’ initial commitment
to the project.
The perceived quality of the information used in the decision-making
process plays an important role in the development of initial commitment,
whereas it does not aﬀect performance expectations. Perceived reliability and
clarity of the information provided to the decision-maker, and therefore the
extent to which decision-makers trust and rely on their sources, apparently
has a considerable eﬀect on their initial commitment and therefore possibly
on their unwillingness to admit and reverse ‘wrong’ decisions in a later stage.
4.5.1 Managerial Implications
Bias in the strength of initial commitment, like other cognitive bias, may
prove to be diﬃcult to avoid entirely. However, the awareness that mat-
ters not strictly relevant to the actual decision problem could inﬂuence the
strength of initial commitment to a decision, should contribute to better
decision-making. When making subsequent decisions with respect to the
continuation or discontinuation of innovation projects or with respect to re-
newed investments, commitment to the initial decisions should be reconsid-
ered and not taken for granted. Knowing what we know now, did we make
the right decisions at the time and what should our attitude to the project
have been? An awareness of the morale at the time of the decision could cer-
tainly make commitment to the decision more independent from that morale
and therefore more rational.
Another managerial implication of these ﬁndings could be, that it is ex-
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tremely important to retrospectively check the quality and reliability of in-
formation used during the initial decisions and its sources when making new
investment decisions. An attitude that could act as a safeguard against inap-
propriate levels of commitment could again be not to take the initial decisions
for granted, when making further investment decisions, but to be prepared
to reconsider them while being aware of company morale at the time of that
initial decision and the quality of information used.
4.5.2 Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research
We still possess little substantial knowledge about managerial decision-making
in an organizational environment that is characterized by high velocity, infor-
mation overload and much ambiguity. We are aware that the present study
has only lifted a corner of the veil and probably created more questions than
it attempted to answer. Although we think we found some thought provok-
ing and rather substantial results, a number of limitations prevent us from
directly generalizing the results to professional decision-making in an orga-
nizational environment. In the ﬁrst place, although we did present ample
information about the involved ﬁrm and its environment, making decisions
solely based upon provided information about an organization, its products
and its environment is very probably not the same as making product deci-
sions in a real organization.
In the second place there is our choice of a student sample. On the one
hand, although the students are trained and interested in decision-making
and have a general understanding of business decision situations, they obvi-
ously do not have much decision-making experience.7 This could entail that
7In Chapter 3 we have observed that experience in decision-making, although it was
considered not to aﬀect the quality (the choice) of the decisions substantially, will aﬀect
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under conditions of time pressure they might be stronger inﬂuenced by irrel-
evant information than practicing managerial decision-makers. On the other
hand, however, practicing managers would probably react much stronger to
aﬀectively colored information than our independent decision-makers, since
this aﬀectively colored information would concern their daily professional en-
vironment. If we want to generalize the results to managerial activities, the
research must be extended to case studies of practicing product managers,
in order to study the incidence, strength and durability of the eﬀects.
Further research could also focus on the moderating eﬀect of other condi-
tions. In our experiment we only varied the aﬀective content of the irrelevant
information. The conditions under which the decisions were made, such as
time pressure, complexity, information quality and information availability,
were not moderated. In order to develop a better understanding of the cog-
nitive phenomena that play a role, and the precise conditions under which
biases in choices and disproportionate commitment start playing a role, we
suggest that in further research those conditions should be varied and brought
up to levels that compare with reality.
What we did not study is how persistent the initially reached level of
commitment to a decision is, if that decision is made under conditions of
substantial uncertainty. Does the level of commitment remain stable, after
the decision has been made? It is important to know this, since this will de-
termine if and when disproportionate initial commitment can really become
a problem. The question rises if and how cognitive, personality, or organi-
zation related factors aﬀect the persistence of disproportionate commitment.
Are there conditions that aﬀect the extent to which information about the
the speed of decision-making and the ability to make decisions eﬀectively under diﬃcult
conditions.
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failure of a project is being taken seriously? In further research attention
should be paid to the temporal development of commitment, and commit-
ment should be measured at diﬀerent points in time after the decision, under
variable conditions. This could be done by measuring the willingness of the
decision-maker to reconsider initial decisions and by measuring the amounts
of resources allocated at later points in time, while varying the aﬀective qual-
ity of relevant (e.g. about failure) and irrelevant information administered.
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Chapter 5
The Role of Information in
High Tech Service Innovation
Success
This chapter is based on a study exploring success factors in ICT-based ser-
vice innovation. Success is associated with more eﬀective decision-making
during the innovation process, as a consequence of the reduction of uncer-
tainty. Eﬀects of inter-ﬁrm diﬀerences in organizational information gath-
ering, diﬀusion and utilization are investigated on a strategic as well as on
an operational level. Data were collected concerning 251 high-tech service
innovations from companies in Europe, the US and Japan. Findings reveal
the important role of a long-term strategic vision, and an organizational
climate that is favorable to innovation. This climate mediates the eﬀects of
organizational intelligence eﬀorts. Experience in the industry does not seem
to play a major role in this turbulent business, but a regular updating of
decision-makers, and the degree to which information is shared informally
in the organization, are found to matter signiﬁcantly.
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5.1 Introduction
Information and communication technology (ICT) based services contribute
increasingly to the growth of the global economy. Revolutionary techno-
logical developments of the past decennia have created innumerable oppor-
tunities for service innovation and new ICT-based services potentially cre-
ate signiﬁcant value for the provider as well as for the users of the services
(Van den Ende and Wijnberg 2001). However, as a result of the tremen-
dous speed of technological developments and the related globalization of
markets, most providers of ICT-based services currently experience hyper-
competition and exceptional turbulence in their marketplace (Bogner and
Barr 2000; D’Aveni 1995; D’Aveni 1994). Increasingly short product life cy-
cles are the result, implying an urgent need for continuous, eﬀective and rapid
innovation (Lehmann 1997). At the same time, turbulence, complexity and
uncertainty in the macro environment of ﬁrms have turned high-tech service
innovation into a very risky matter. Substantial investments are needed for
the development of ICT-based services, while failure rates are high. As a con-
sequence, it has become imperative for ﬁrms to improve the performance of
their new service development processes and increase success rates (Boulding
et al. 1997).
Over the past decades, a steadily growing stream of academic research
attempting to identify innovation success factors has emerged. These stud-
ies have contributed a great deal to our knowledge. Success factors have
been identiﬁed in the ﬁt between the new product and the existing prod-
uct portfolio, the ﬁt between the product and market requirements and in
the relative contribution of supporting functional processes in the innovat-
ing organization, such as the marketing and distribution functions (Cooper
and Kleinschmidt 2000; Dutta et al. 1999; Storey and Easingwood 1993).
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Evidence was also found that an appropriate organization structure (Burns
and Stalker 2001; Cooper 1992; Tushman and O’Reilly III 1996) and the
eﬀective management of the new product or service development (NSD) pro-
cess (Ahlert and Evanschitzky 2002; Jensen and Harmsen 2001) substantially
aﬀect the performance of the innovation process (Cooper and Edgett 1996;
Storey and Easingwood 1993).
Due to a strong focus on issues external to the new product development
process (Martin and Horne 1995) little research has been devoted to factors
aﬀecting the quality of managerial decision-making during the innovation
process. However, decision-making during the NSD process is severely com-
plicated by very high levels of uncertainty and complexity, and we therefore
expect that improvements made with respect to decision-making performance
during the NSD process will substantially aﬀect the success of innovations
(Cooper and Edgett 1996) and innovation process performance (Cyert and
March 1992; Shapira 1997; Simon 1997). By means of their decisions, man-
agers transform information into action (March 1991). Some recent studies
already pointed at the important role organizational communication and in-
formation processes potentially play in determining service innovation suc-
cess (Lievens 1996; Lievens and Moenaert 2000b; Moorman 1995). Because
of this supposedly critical role of information in high-tech service innovation,
the identiﬁcation of information processing related antecedents of decision-
making performance should receive high priority in research. The problem
statement of this study will therefore be:
• Which factors aﬀect, through their inﬂuence on the eﬀectiveness of or-
ganizational information processing and decision-making, the perfor-
mance of the high-tech service innovation process?
In this chapter, an information processing perspective is thus adopted with
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the objective of investigating inter-ﬁrm variance in high-tech service inno-
vation performance. Uncertainty is considered one of the major moderators
of eﬀective and rational decision-making in the extremely turbulent environ-
ment of high-tech service innovation1 (Lievens and Moenaert 2000b). As a
consequence, the extent to which the organization succeeds in reducing the
uncertainty surrounding the decision-makers will contribute to their eﬀective-
ness (Galbraith 1973; Galbraith 1974). We expect that several factors play
a major role in the reduction of the uncertainty surrounding key decision-
makers. Relevant information must be collected and communicated to the
key decision-makers, who must then process the information eﬀectively. In
order to guide the present investigation we derived the following three re-
search questions:
RQ 1: Which factors relating to the content of the information
aﬀect high-tech service innovation performance?
RQ 2: Which organizational factors, related to information pro-
cessing, aﬀect high-tech service innovation performance?
RQ 3: Which factors, relating to the processing of information
by individual decision-makers, aﬀect high-tech service in-
novation performance?
The remaining part of the chapter is structured as follows. First, in the form
of a literature review guided by the research questions, antecedents of eﬀec-
tive information processing and decision-making in the innovation process
are systematically identiﬁed. Propositions are formulated as to the eﬀect
of these antecedents on the probability of innovative success. Subsequently,
these propositions are integrated in a theoretical model. We then present
1See also Chapter Three
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ﬁndings from a study that was designed in order to obtain empirical support
for our propositions. Furthermore, an extensive discussion of the ﬁndings
and managerial implications are provided. Finally, limitations of the current
study and suggestions for further research are presented.
5.2 Literature Review and Development of
Propositions
Uncertainty occurs in diﬀerent forms and at diﬀerent levels during the vari-
ous stages of the innovation process. Both the nature of the uncertainty and
the way decision-makers address it diﬀer substantially for the strategic and
the operational phases of the innovation process. As a result we expect the
antecedents of eﬀective innovation decision-making to diﬀer as well. There-
fore the two phases of the innovation process will be investigated separately.
We start the investigation with the strategically important initial go-no-go
decision phase.
5.2.1 Strategic Innovation Decision Making
Ultimately, each commercial innovation process starts with an evaluation and
approval of a new product or service proposal by the ﬁrm’s top-management.
In most service ﬁrms the marketing or R&D department generates a stream
of ideas and proposals for new services. Information pertaining to customer
beneﬁts produced by the new service, requirements in terms of company re-
sources and details with respect to the development and commercialization
processes are presented to a select group of decision-makers. These man-
agers evaluate the proposals and make a so-called initial go-no-go decision
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for each of them. Since there is inherent variance in the quality, original-
ity and value for the company of the various proposals, the purpose of the
go-no-go decision process is to select those new service projects that will
signiﬁcantly contribute to performance and simultaneously serve the ﬁrm’s
strategic objectives. When a project is considered worthy of developing and
commercializing, it will often be assigned a level of priority. According to this
level of priority company resources are then proportionally allocated to the
development and introduction of the new service. In most cases, the project
is subsequently handed over to a project team that will take responsibility
from then on.
The go-ahead is thus given in a so-called go-no-go decision. Since environ-
mental threats can be neutralized and opportunities seized by a well-chosen
introduction of new products and services, the scope of this go-no-go decision
is strategic (Porter 1980; Porter 1985). The decision to invest in the devel-
opment of one service, and not in another, will have important consequences
for the deployment of resources and development of key competencies, have
an impact on the further evolution of the ﬁrm (Barney 1991; Barney 2001)
and its future well-being and must thus be considered a strategic decision.
We expect that an appropriately made initial go-no-go decision, i.e. the se-
lection of those proposals that are most promising against the background
of company resources and strategy, will increase the probability of success of
individual projects, as well as the overall performance of the ﬁrm, as a result
of a strategically better balanced product portfolio.
Three research questions have been formulated with respect to the role
of information in determining the quality of innovative decision-making. We
will ﬁrst interpret and answer these questions with respect to the initial go-
no-go decision.
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5.2.1.1 Information used in Go-No-Go Decisions
An evaluation of relatively vague innovation proposals against the back-
ground of company objectives and environmental factors is very complicated,
and involves, like any other strategic decision, extreme levels of uncertainty.
The uncertainty can be limited by using appropriate information during the
evaluation process. The extent to which various sources of information are
used is by no means standardized and depends on the organizational routines
that implicitly or explicitly prescribe the acquisition of information prior to
strategic decisions.
Several categories of information can be considered. First, the use of
ﬁnancial information in the go-no-go decision process could create a more
balanced perspective on the resources available and the resources needed
and can therefore contribute to the quality of the decision and the allocation
of the appropriate resources. Second, the use of a marketing plan, contain-
ing information pertaining to the long-term product-market strategy of the
company, will contribute to a better positioning of the new service within
the product portfolio and thus to the allocation of an appropriate amount of
resources to the marketing eﬀort. For similar reasons, the use of the business
plan in the go-no-go decision can lead to the selection of projects that ﬁt
well with the strategic objectives of the company. This will lead to greater
alignment with other products, which seems especially important when in-
vestment decisions are made with respect to very expensive projects. We
expect:
Proposition 5.1 High-tech service innovation projects performed in ﬁrms
where internal information is used in the go-no-go decision process are likely
to be more successful.
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The three information sources discussed so far all contain internal company
data. This information does not create any insight in the existence of market
opportunities. In order to enable decision-makers to judge the proposals for
their commercial viability, external information is therefore also often being
gathered. By means of market research, companies gather information about
market opportunities and competitive threats. We expect:
Proposition 5.2 High-tech service innovation projects selected in ﬁrms where
market research is performed preceding the go-no-go decision are likely to be
more successful.
5.2.1.2 The Role of the Organization
The outcome of the assessment of new service proposals is not only dependent
on which information is presented to the decision-makers, but also on the in-
terpretation of that information in relation to the proposal by the decision
team. In the above we have argued that the go-no-go decision is essentially
strategic in nature. The perspective within which decision-makers consider
a proposal can vary in terms of the time horizon. Operational decisions are
generally taken within a relatively short-term perspective, whereas strategic
decisions are taken within a long-term perspective. The perspective can also
vary in terms of the risk attitude of the decision-makers. Operational deci-
sions are taken in order to limit risk as much as possible, whereas in strategic
decision-making a certain amount of risk is necessarily taken. In order to as-
sess new service proposals as strategic options of the ﬁrm, an entrepreneurial
attitude and a long-term view will contribute to the interpretation of the go-
no-go decision as a strategic decision. We thus expect there to be a positive
relationship between the extent to which the decision-makers take a strategic
perspective while evaluating the proposal and the probability of success:
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Proposition 5.3 High-tech service innovation projects selected in organi-
zations where a long-term perspective and an entrepreneurial attitude are
adopted during the go-no-go decision process are likely to be more successful.
5.2.1.3 Decision Maker Capabilities
Finally, the extent to which decision-makers actually select the relevant cues
from the information and the resulting eﬃciency with which the information
is used play an important role. We expect that the eﬃciency of information
use during the go-no-go decision will depend on the decision-makers involved
and, related, their ability to make highly complex strategic decisions. For
an appropriate evaluation of new service proposals, insight in the strategic
options of the ﬁrm seems to be a necessary condition. Since top management
is most knowledgeable with respect to strategic options as they are the orig-
inator of strategy (Hambrick and Snow 1977; Harrison and Pelletier 1998),
we expect:
Proposition 5.4 High-tech service innovation projects performed in ﬁrms
where top management is involved in the initial go-no-go decision are likely
to be more successful.
Although the involvement of top management in the go-no-go decision seems
to be indispensable, the involvement of operationally knowledgeable man-
agers in the go-no-go decision could help in making the allocation of resources
more realistic. Managers at an operational level are supposed to have more
detailed knowledge of the market requirements, organizational resources and
technological possibilities. We therefore expect:
Proposition 5.5 High-tech service innovation projects performed in ﬁrms
where knowledgeable decision-makers on an operational level are involved in
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the go-no-go decision are likely to be more successful.
5.2.2 Operational Decision-Making in the NSD Pro-
cess
In general, the operational phase of new service development starts when
an approved project is handed over to a project team. Although, strictly
speaking, most decisions relating to the development of the new service are
no longer of a strategic nature, very high levels of uncertainty still occur, as a
result of the speed of technological developments, rapid changes in customer
requirements and all sorts of competitive developments in the marketplace.
Since decisions in the operational phase of the service development must lead
to concrete, precise and executable action, uncertainty needs to be reduced
to a greater extent than in the strategic phase. We therefore expect eﬀective
information acquisition, diﬀusion and use to play an even more important
role in the development stage than in the strategic phase.
5.2.2.1 The Role of Intelligence Gathering
In an environment that is subject to unpredictable and rapid change, the
availability of up-to-date information to the managers involved in the inno-
vation process will improve their decision-making eﬀectiveness. The amount
of eﬀort a ﬁrm puts into intelligence-gathering activities is therefore expected
to play an important role with respect to the performance of the innovation
process (Lievens and Moenaert 2000b):
Proposition 5.6 There will be a positive relationship between the eﬀort a
ﬁrm puts into gathering intelligence and the relative success of innovations
performed in that ﬁrm.
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Organizational intelligence gathering is traditionally assumed to take place in
three domains (Van den Bulte et al. 2002). First, companies generally collect
competitive intelligence, i.e. information about the strategic moves of their
competitors in the marketplace. Second, technological intelligence is gathered
with respect to changes in the dominant technologies in the industry. Finally,
companies put eﬀort in collecting information about trends in consumption
patterns and changing customer requirements. We expect:
Proposition 5.7 There will be a positive relationship between the eﬀort a
ﬁrm puts into gathering intelligence with respect to technology (1), competi-
tor’s strategies (2) and customer requirements (3), and the relative success
of innovations performed in that ﬁrm.
5.2.2.2 The Role of Organizational Factors
The quality of internal and external communication aﬀects information dif-
fusion throughout the organization. We expect that communication will
moderate the availability of information to the decision-makers and there-
fore will have a direct eﬀect on the performance of the innovation process.
However, especially in turbulent environments such as the one surrounding
the high-tech service innovation process, there is often little time available
for formal reporting. We therefore expect informal communication, both
on an internal and on an external level, i.e. with suppliers and customers,
to contribute substantially to the acquisition and diﬀusion of information.
Especially in service innovation the product contains many intangible or ex-
perience aspects, as well as complex aspects that necessarily combine aspects
from diﬀerent knowledge domains, making it diﬃcult to make every detail ex-
plicit. As a result of these circumstances we expect the exchange or transfer
of tacit knowledge to play an important role in the new service develop-
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ment process (Madhavan and Grover 1998). Tacit knowledge is transferred
through informal contact rather than through formal communication. We ex-
pect that informal communication will thus directly inﬂuence the availability
of information to the decision-maker and therefore:
Proposition 5.8 In the case of high-tech service innovation, there will be a
positive relationship between the extent to which the organization stimulates
informal information exchange and the success of innovations developed in
that ﬁrm.
Another factor that will especially aﬀect the speed and accuracy with which
the externally acquired intelligence reaches the decision-maker is what we
would like to call an innovative organizational climate. An innovative cli-
mate consists of an environment stimulating innovation related communica-
tion, and the sharing of information (Burns and Stalker 2001), and it there-
fore improves the transfer of relevant information to and from the decision-
makers. We expect a direct positive eﬀect of such an innovative climate on
the innovative performance of the organization:
Proposition 5.9 In the case of high-tech service innovation, there will be a
positive relationship between the extent to which the organization maintains
an innovative climate and the success of innovations developed in that ﬁrm.
The more eﬀort a company puts into gathering intelligence, the more impor-
tant the creation and maintenance of an innovative climate will be perceived
by the people active in the organization. We therefore expect an innovative
climate also to mediate the eﬀect on innovation process performance of the
eﬀort the company puts into gathering intelligence. In other words:
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Proposition 5.10 In the case of high-tech service innovation, the positive
relationship between the extent to which the organization puts eﬀort into gath-
ering intelligence and the success of innovations developed in that ﬁrm will
be mediated by the extent to which the organization maintains an innovative
climate.
5.2.2.3 Factors Relating to the Decision Maker
Once information has been acquired and diﬀused through the innovating
organization, and communicated to the decision-maker, the manager still has
to make eﬃcient use of it. It is often argued that decision-making improves
when the decision-maker has experience with the subject matter (Perkins and
Rao 1990). Experience will facilitate the rapid selection of relevant cues and
therefore lead to better decisions under time pressure. The level of decision-
maker experience can be considered a proxy for their individual absorptive
capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 1990) built up over the years, allowing the
manager to recognize complex patterns in new information (Simon 1987),
and thus interpret and learn from that new information. This will aﬀect
the extent to which the decision-maker can actually use the information
eﬀectively. We thus expect:
Proposition 5.11 There will be a direct positive relationship between the
amount of experience in key decision-makers involved in the new service de-
velopment process and new service success.
Experience is accumulated on the job, i.e. without any proactive involve-
ment of the decision-makers. However, their absorptive capacity can also be
increased in a proactive way, by attending seminars and courses. In an in-
dustry where rapid developments take place in all knowledge domains, active
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updating seems to be extremely important. Although many companies prop-
agate an attitude of life-long learning, the extent to which this is practiced
in organizations is variable. We expect:
Proposition 5.12 There will be a positive relationship between the extent
to which the involved decision-makers update their knowledge systematically
and new service success.
Proposed relationships with respect to the strategic and the operational
phases of the new service development process are summarized and visualized
in a conceptual model presented in Figure 5.1. In this model, the antecedents
of both sound strategic decision-making and eﬀective operational decision-
making are aﬀecting the chances of innovation success, albeit via diﬀerent
paths.
5.3 Research Design
The purposes of the empirical study were to validate the conceptual model
presented in Figure 5.1, and to explain a substantial part of the variance
in new service performance in terms of variance in information acquisition,
diﬀusion and use, and this at two levels of decision-making, the strategic
level and the operational level. Data therefore had to be collected about
a large number of high-tech service innovations, with suﬃcient variance in
performance.
5.3.1 Sampling
An electronic questionnaire was designed and put on the Internet server of
Maastricht University. Subsequently, we approached the International Asso-
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ciation For Services Management (AFSMI)2, a global organization dedicated
to furthering the knowledge, understanding, and career development of ex-
ecutives, managers, and professionals in the high-technology services and
support industry. Via their electronic mailing list, an invitation to partic-
ipate in the survey, with a short motivation and the endorsement from an
AFSMI oﬃcial (Vice President Europe, Middle East and Africa) was sent
to senior executives from approximately 1500 companies active in high-tech
service sectors. The e-mail clearly stated the purpose and relevance of the
present study, and included a hyperlink directing the participants to the on-
line survey. As an incentive to participate, we oﬀered the participants to
receive a summary of the results via e-mail.
5.3.2 Method
We drew up the questionnaire in the form of a range of positive statements.
We asked the participants to indicate the extent to which they agreed with
those statements on seven-item Likert scales. The scales were anchored on
both extremes and went from ‘strongly disagree’ (1) to ‘strongly agree’ (7).
The questionnaire has been pre-tested on a limited sample for intelligibility
and feasibility in a printed format. The deﬁnitive electronic questionnaire
contained approximately one hundred and ten undisguised statements, top-
ically organized (Judd et al. 1991). We explicitly asked the participants to
answer all questions with respect to one recent speciﬁc service innovation
project.
2See www.afsmi.org
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5.4 Results
5.4.1 Sample Characteristics
A total of 251 usable questionnaires were received within two weeks from
the mailing of the initial invitation. According to the AFSMI oﬃcial, who
regularly organized web-based surveys, the response rate did not signiﬁcantly
deviate from the results of earlier studies. The nonresponse bias was assessed
by means of an examination of diﬀerences between early and late respondents.
The results were non-signiﬁcant. As a consequence, nonresponse bias does
not appear to play a role in the present investigation, and the homogeneity
of the sample has lead us to believe in the external validity of the study
(Armstrong and Overton 1977). As a result of the use of a well-designed
online measurement instrument the number of missing values was extremely
small.
All participants were employed in companies making use of high-tech
services either as a core business or as supporting services for other core
products. In Figure 5.2 the distribution of the participants over diﬀerent
industry sectors is made visible.
From Figure 5.2 it becomes clear that high-tech services already play a
role in many major areas of the global economy. In Figure 5.3, an overview
of the functions of participants in the survey is presented.
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5.4.2 Measures
Existing scales were unavailable to assess most of the constructs of our study.
Based on a review of the innovation success literature we therefore developed
several new measures. First, the perceived performance of the new service
development process had to be assessed. In diﬀerent studies diﬀerent con-
ceptualizations of new service success or performance have been proposed
and used. It can be argued that the conceptualization and measurement
of service performance will depend on the service category under scrutiny.
Diﬀerent performance criteria will exist, for example, with respect to core
services and customer services. In the case of a core service, its ﬁnancial
performance will be an important criterion, whereas in the case of a support-
ing service customer satisfaction may be the most important performance
measure. However, we argue that the fundamental purpose of all services is
to contribute, albeit via diﬀerent routes, to the overall performance of the
company, from both a short-term perspective and a long-term perspective.
We therefore conceptualized new service success as a multidimensional latent
construct and decided to measure it via a large number of indicators, taken
from various studies. We designed a preliminary questionnaire and included
ﬁfteen items in the survey, pertaining to the perceived success of the ser-
vice and its performance in various dimensions. Based upon the results of
the pretest, arrived at by means of an iterative factor analysis, we ﬁnally
selected twelve items to be included in the deﬁnitive questionnaire. First, an
exploratory principal component factor analysis was performed on the twelve
variables in the deﬁnitive questionnaire, which resulted in a three-factor so-
lution (using ’1’ as the cut-oﬀ value for the Eigenvalues), explaining 69 % of
the total variance. For an overview of the composition of the factors we refer
to Table 5.1. Based upon the outcome of the factor analysis we constructed
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three new variables, S1, S2 and S3. The interpretation of the obtained fac-
tors remains a subjective matter (Hair et al. 1998), and must be based upon
the components represented in the factor. Our interpretation of these fac-
tors is that the meaning of S1 lies very close to what we view as the most
salient aspects of success. If the service was successful in terms of S1, we
interpreted this as meaning that the decision to invest in the innovation was
essentially right. Services successful in this sense were obvious successes, but
within a short-term horizon. The meaning of S2 has a deeper, more technical
meaning, in the sense that the new service is a genuine business success; the
new service creates competitive advantage on a long-term basis. The third
success factor seems to point at indirect positive results, and takes other
than ﬁnancial stakeholders into account. When a new service is considered
successful in the sense of S3, it means that the service creates conditions for
improved company performance in the future. Obviously, all three forms of
success are ultimately important for ﬁrm survival, and intentions to stress
one aspect more than another will probably depend on the time horizon that
decision-makers have in mind. A second order conﬁrmatory factor analy-
sis was conducted in Lisrel (Jo¨reskog and So¨rbom 1989). The second order
factor resulting from this analysis was then used as the dependent variable
‘Success’ in the study. The ﬁt values for the second order analysis were quite
good. From these results we can conclude that the three identiﬁed factors
indeed converge in a higher order factor ’New Service Success’. We measured
a GFI of 0.96, AGFI 0.94, NFI 0.96, with χ2 of 61.62 (Df. =47), P=0.12 and
RMSEA of 0.031. Standardized factor loadings and reliability coeﬃcients are
reported in Table 5.1.
In order to be able to ﬁnd support for the propositions regarding the
strategic decision process we included items in the questionnaire inquiring
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Item: The New Service. . . S1 S2 S3 Success
α=.87 α=.84 α=.75 α=.91
Is an Overall Success .69 – –
Success Exceeds Expectations .73 – –
Adds Substantial Value to other Products
and Services
.89 – – } .81
Was a good Idea to Invest in .75 – –
Contributed to Financial Performance .82 – –
Contributed to Commercial Performance
(Market Share)
– .78 –
Improved our Competitive Position – .82 – } .93
Improved Brand Equity & Reputation – .68 –
Enabled Expansion into New Markets – .75 –
Increased In-house Technological Knowl-
edge
– – .69
Increased Employee Satisfaction – – .74 } .79
Created Innovation Opportunities – – .63
Table 5.1: Composition of the Dependent Variables
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into the use of a speciﬁc information source, the involvement of a type of
decision-maker and the adoption of a strategic stance. These questions could
be answered with a simple yes or no, and were transformed into dummy
variables. For an overview of the items included in the questionnaire we
refer to Tables 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7, where the ﬁndings are reported.
Subsequently, a measurement instrument for intelligence activities of the
organization (INTELL) was constructed, based on measures developed by
Van den Bulte et al. (2002). Nine items were included in the questionnaire,
three to measure intelligence activities with respect to developments in the
ﬁeld of technology (TECH), three to measure information gathering with
respect to competitive strategies (COMP) and three to measure intelligence
activities with respect to customer requirements (CUST). We performed a
principal component factor analysis in order to validate the constructs. As
expected, three factors were found, using the common cut-oﬀ value of ’1’
for the Eigenvalues, explaining 79 % of the total variance. Subsequently we
performed a second order conﬁrmatory factor analysis in Lisrel. The factor
loadings, ﬁrst and second order, of this second order analysis are reported in
Table 5.2. Reliability of the multi-item scales is also reported in this table.
Again we measured very good ﬁt statistics. GFI of 0.96, AGFI 0.93, NFI
0.97, with a χ2 of 44.36 (Df. =24), P 0.01 and RMSEA of 0.058. From these
results we can conclude that the three identiﬁed factors indeed converge in
a higher order factor ’intelligence gathering’.
The composition, standardized factor loadings and reliability values of
the other independent factors are reported in Table 5.3. In a conﬁrmatory
factor analysis performed in Lisrel we obtained the following excellent ﬁt
measures: χ2 64.78 (Df=38), P= 0.0047 GFI = 0.96; AGFI = 0.92; CFI =
0.97; RFI = 0.89; RMSEA = 0.053.
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Item TECH COMP CUS INTELL
Information was gathered about: α=.83 α=.90 α=.85 α=.87
User friendliness of Technologies .75 – –
Cost-eﬃciency of Technologies .83 – – } .60
Performance of Technologies .78 – –
Marketing Strategy of Competitors – .85 –
Technological Strategy of Competitors – .86 – } .72
Innovation Strategy of Competitors – .88 –
Changes in Customer Needs – – .79
Changes in the Market – – .82 } .83
Change in User Requirements – – .83
Table 5.2: Organizational Intelligence Activities
5.4.3 Data Analysis
The data set was analyzed using various statistical methods. First the data
were subjected to univariate analyses of variance, in order to determine the
diﬀerences in the means of the success factor, for samples that were split
according to the variables relating to the go-no-go decision. In order to
obtain insight in the structure of the data we conducted a correlation analysis
between all major constructs. In Table 5.4 the correlations between main
constructs are reported.
Furthermore, with respect to the operational part of the model, the data
were submitted to a range of regression analyses, in order to determine the
total amount of variance that was explained by the data. Finally we esti-
mated the ﬁt of the data to the conceptual model presented in Figure 5.1
in Lisrel, making use of the total aggregation method suggested by Bagozzi
and Heatherton (1994).
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Item: Informal Experience Updating Climate
Reliability: α=.62 α=.71 α=.80 α=.72
Much informal Communication
between Departments
.71 – – –
Much informal Communication
with Suppliers/Partners
.67 – – –
Decision-Makers were Experi-
enced
– .63 – –
Decision-Makers were Experts – .63 – –
Decision-Makers were Multidisci-
plinary. Experts
– .75 – –
Updated Regularly in Internal
Seminars
– – .51 –
Updated Regularly in External
Seminars
– – .89 –
Updated in Specialist Semi-
nars/Training etc.
– – .91 –
Fosters Unconventional and Cre-
ative Decision-making
– – – .60
Stimulates Internal Information
Exchange
– – – .81
Stimulates External Information
Exchange
– – – .64
Table 5.3: Conﬁrmatory Factor Analysis Independent Factors
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S1 S2 S3 S Tech Com Cust Inf Clim Exp
S1 1
S2 .673** 1
S3 .553** .575** 1
S .904** .872** .784** 1
Tech .261** .288** .270** .315** 1
Com .050 .147* .056 .095 .376** 1
Cust .306** .360** .247** .357** .425** .520** 1
Inf .301** .228** .148* .276** .262** .171** .284** 1
Clim .343** .359** .325** .398** .447** .246** .484** .211** 1
Exp .200** .167** .085 .185** .207** .034 .164** .113 .109 1
Upd .312** .264** .284** .336** .178** .099 .338** .198** .342** .149*
**. Correlation is signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
*. Correlation is signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
Table 5.4: Pearson Correlation between Main Constructs
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Figure 5.4: Types of Information Used in Go-No-Go Decisions In Items of
Percentage
5.4.4 Propositions Regarding the Strategic Phase
We tested the propositions regarding the strategic go-no-go decision by com-
paring the means of the three success variables, obtained via the above re-
ported factor analysis, as well as the overall success variable in an ANOVA,
using the dummy variables for information sources, function of the decision-
maker and strategic perspective obtained via our questionnaire as factors.
We only included one variable at a time, in order to obtain main eﬀects. In
Figure 5.4 we present an overview of the distribution of information source
usage during the go-no-go decision over all innovation projects. A business
plan was e.g. used during the decision in 63 percent of all innovation projects.
From Figure 5.4 it becomes clear that most companies use reports contain-
ing information with respect to the company itself and the strategy. However,
only in case of one third of the innovations the decision-makers have used
information obtained through market research. In Table 5.5 we present the
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results with respect to the ANOVA of the information sources and the four
success variables. This table shows that each of the sources of internal in-
formation contributes to the success of the innovation in various dimensions.
It also shows that the use of information from market research contributes
substantially to the probability of success in nearly all dimensions.
In Table 5.6 we present the results from an ANOVA performed on the
two dimensions of the attitude towards the initial go-no-go decision on the
various success measures. From this table it can be seen that the adoption of
both a long-term vision and an entrepreneurial stance aﬀect the probability
of success in nearly all dimensions.
In Figure 5.5 we present an overview of the relative involvement of various
managers in the initial go-no-go decision. From this ﬁgure it appears that
the go-no-go decision is mainly the territory of decision-makers on an oper-
ational level, while the CEO or other top managers are involved in slightly
more than half the decisions. In Table 5.7 the results are presented from
the ANOVA that was conducted from the dummy variables associated with
the participation of a member of the managerial staﬀ in the initial go-no-go
decision on the various success factors. The table shows that no diﬀerences in
the means of the success measures were observed between innovations where
operational managers were involved or not. The participation of top man-
agers appears to make a diﬀerence. Participation of the CEO is positively
related to what we have interpreted as ’genuine business success’ (S2). Par-
ticipation of the CIO is signiﬁcantly related to the third dimension of success
and almost signiﬁcantly to overall success, and the participation of the COO
is positively related to nearly all dimensions.
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Between
Groups
Within
Groups
Information Mean
Square
Df Mean
Square
Df F Sig.
Business
Plan
S1 11.590 1 1.480 249 7.831 .006
S2 1.295 1 1.368 249 .947 .331
S3 2.682 1 1.599 249 1.677 .196
S 4.872 1 1.092 249 4.461 .036
Marketing
Plan
S1 2.276 1 1.517 249 1.500 .222
S2 9.818 1 1.334 249 7.362 .007
S3 .185 1 1.609 249 .115 .735
S 2.451 1 1.102 249 2.225 .137
Financial
Analysis
S1 7.230 1 1.497 249 4.828 .029
S2 1.803 1 1.366 249 1.320 .252
S3 1.210 1 1.605 249 .754 .386
S 3.396 1 1.098 249 3.093 .080
Market Re-
search
S1 9.218 1 1.489 249 6.189 .014
S2 13.453 1 1.319 249 10.199 .002
S3 3.326 1 1.596 249 2.083 .150
S 8.665 1 1.077 249 8.046 .005
Table 5.5: Testing of Propositions I
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Figure 5.5: Involvement in the Go-No-Go Decision in Items of Percentage
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Between
Groups
Within
Groups
Mean
Square
Df Mean
Square
Df F Sig.
Long Term
Vision
S1 18.674 1 1.451 249 12.865 .000
S2 21.556 1 1.286 249 16.757 .000
S3 18.536 1 1.535 249 12.073 .001
S 19.576 1 1.033 249 18.950 .000
Entrepre-
neurship
S1 19.213 1 1.449 249 13.257 .000
S2 20.062 1 1.292 249 15.523 .000
S3 5.355 1 1.588 249 3.372 .068
S 15.194 1 1.051 249 14.461 .000
Table 5.6: Testing of Propositions II
Table 5.7: Testing of Propositions III (ANOVA)
Between
Groups
Within
Groups
Function Mean
Square
Df Mean
Square
Df F Sig.
CEO S1 .123 1 1.526 249 .081 .777
S2 10.263 1 1.332 249 7.707 .006
S3 4.467 1 1.592 249 2.806 .095
S 3.036 1 1.099 249 2.761 .098
CIO S1 2.941 1 1.515 249 1.942 .165
S2 1.239 1 1.368 249 .906 .342
S3 12.110 1 1.561 249 7.757 .006
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Table 5.7: continued
Between
Groups
Within
Groups
Function Mean
Square
Df Mean
Square
Df F Sig.
S 3.824 1 1.096 249 3.488 .063
CFO S1 .237 1 1.526 249 .156 .694
S2 1.508 1 1.367 249 1.103 .259
S3 .802 1 1.606 249 .499 .480
S .699 1 1.109 249 .631 .428
COO S1 8.453 1 1.493 249 5.664 .018
S2 8.535 1 1.339 249 6.376 .012
S3 5.953 1 1.586 249 3.754 .054
S 7.813 1 1.080 249 7.233 .008
Prod. Mgr. S1 .382 1 1.525 249 .250 .617
S2 .929 1 1.369 249 .678 .411
S3 .213 1 1.609 249 .132 .717
S .215 1 1.111 249 .193 .661
Service
Mgr.
S1 .247 1 1.525 249 .162 .688
S2 .299 1 1.372 249 .167 .683
S3 .619 1 1.607 249 .385 .536
S .317 1 1.100 249 .286 .593
Other Mgrs S1 .212 1 1.526 249 .139 .710
S2 .215 1 1.372 249 .157 .692
S3 .007 1 1.610 249 .004 .947
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Table 5.7: continued
Between
Groups
Within
Groups
Function Mean
Square
Df Mean
Square
Df F Sig.
S .003 1 1.112 249 .003 .956
In our view, there is no doubt about the existence of multiple interaction
eﬀects. For lack of existing theory we did not develop propositions with re-
spect to these interaction terms. Furthermore, the variables do not explain
unique variance. Clearly, some overlap exists between the contributions of
diﬀerent information sources, and between the strategic capabilities of diﬀer-
ent managers. We provide an overview of the propositions and their status
in Table 5.8.
Table 5.8: Overview of the Propositions Part 1
Nr. Description Status
S1 S2 S3 S
P 5.1 High-tech service innovation projects
performed in ﬁrms where internal infor-
mation is used in the go-no-go decision
process are likely to be more successful:
Business Plan
√
– –
√
Marketing Plan –
√
– –
Financial Information
√
– – –
168 CHAPTER 5. THE ROLE OF INFORMATION
Table 5.8: continued
Nr. Description Status
S1 S2 S3 S
P 5.2 High-tech service innovation projects
selected in ﬁrms where market research
is performed preceding the go-no-go de-
cision are likely to be more successful.
√ √
–
√
P 5.3 High-tech service innovation projects
selected in organizations where a
long-term perspective and an en-
trepreneurial attitude are adopted dur-
ing the go-no-go decision process are
likely to be more successful.
√ √ √ √
P 5.4 High-tech service innovation projects
performed in ﬁrms where top manage-
ment is involved in the initial go-no-go
decision are likely to be more success-
ful.
CEO –
√
– –
CIO – –
√
–
CFO – – – –
COO
√ √ √ √
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Table 5.8: continued
Nr. Description Status
S1 S2 S3 S
P 5.5 High-tech service innovation projects
performed in ﬁrms where decision-
makers on an operational level are in-
volved in the go-no-go decision are
likely to be more successful.
– – – –
5.4.5 Propositions Regarding the Operational Phase
First, we regressed the three obtained success factors, as well as the second
order overall success factor in a multivariate regression on all postulated
independent variables. The results of these regressions are presented in Table
5.9.
From Table 5.9 it becomes clear that positive signiﬁcant eﬀects are found
for two of the intelligence factors (Tech and Cust) with respect to most of
the success factors, as well as negative signiﬁcant eﬀects for competitive in-
telligence gathering (Comp) with respect to S1 and overall success. This
implies that our propositions P5.6 and P5.7 are supported by the data for
technical and customer intelligence, but rejected for competitive intelligence,
as we found the opposite eﬀect there. A positive signiﬁcant eﬀect was demon-
strated between informal communication and two of the success factors, S1
and overall success, implying partial support for P5.8.
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We found positive signiﬁcant eﬀects for the innovative climate with respect
to all success factors, implying that our data fully support P5.9.
With respect to the factors relating to the decision-maker, Table 5.9
demonstrates that there is no signiﬁcant relationship between the decision-
maker’s experience and innovative success, which indicates that there is no
support in the data for P5.11. We did ﬁnd support, however, for our propo-
sition P5.12, stating that there would be a positive relationship between the
extent to which decision-makers would update their knowledge on a regular
basis on the one hand, and innovative success on the other. Positive and sig-
niﬁcant relationships were demonstrated with respect to all success factors,
with the exception of S2.
5.4.5.1 Mediation Test
In proposition P5.10 it was posited that the inﬂuence of the amount of eﬀort
a company puts into gathering intelligence (Independent Variable) on the
extent to which the resulting innovation would be considered a success (De-
pendent Variable) would be mediated by the extent to which the organization
maintains an innovative climate (Mediator). In order to test for mediation
(Baron and Kenny 1986), we applied the Sobel test (MacKinnon and Dwyer
1993; MacKinnon et al. 1995; Sobel 1982) to the factors obtained in the
second order analyses for the IV and the DV and the ﬁrst order factor for
the Mediator.
The test statistic was calculated according to the following formula:
z-value = a*b/SQRT(b2*s2a + a
2*s2b + s
2
a*s
2
b)
Where a is the unstandardized path coeﬃcient of a regression of the IV
(Intelligence) on the Mediator (Climate), b and c the unstandardized path
coeﬃcients of a regression of the mediator and the IV on the DV (Innovation
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Figure 5.6: Mediation. Source Preacher and Leonardelli (2001)
Success). Sa and sb are the standard errors of a and b respectively.
In a two-tailed Z-test of the hypothesis that the mediated eﬀect equals
zero in the population, we obtained a P-value of ¡0.0001, and a Z-value of
4.2124. Since 1.96 is the critical value of the test ratio, containing the central
95% of the unit normal distribution, we conclude that there is indeed a
mediation eﬀect. The data therefore support our proposition P5.10.
Based upon the ﬁndings from the regression analyses and the result from
the mediation test it was concluded that the structure of our conceptual
model of the operational phase of the new service development process ade-
quately represents reality.
5.4.5.2 Estimation of the Model
In order to estimate the relationships in the conceptual model, a regression
analysis was performed in LISREL. With the objective of constructing prox-
ies for the constructs in the model, the total aggregation method (Bagozzi
and Heatherton 1994) was used. With respect to the dependent variable,
all twelve indicators were taken together. Inspection of the incremental
goodness-of-ﬁt criteria made clear that the estimated model has a decent
ﬁt (cf. Hu and Bentler 1999) to the data: GFI = 0.98; AGFI = 0.90; CFI =
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Figure 5.7: Structural Equations Model
0.97; RFI = 0.83; RMSEA = 0.086. Results are presented in Figure 5.7.
In Table 5.10, an overview is presented of the propositions that were devel-
oped with respect to the operational stage of the high-tech service innovation
process and their status.
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Table 5.10: Overview of the Propositions Part II
Nr. Description Status
Domain S1 S2 S3 S
P 5.6
P 5.7
There will be a positive rela-
tionship between the eﬀort
a ﬁrm puts into gathering
information and the relative
success of innovations per-
formed in that ﬁrm.
Technical
Competitive
Customer
–
–
(
√
)
–
–
√
√
–
–
√
–
√
P 5.8 In the case of high-tech service innovation,
there will be a positive relationship be-
tween the extent to which the organization
stimulates informal information exchange
and the success of innovations developed
in that ﬁrm.
√
– –
√
P 5.9 In the case of high-tech service innovation,
there will be a positive relationship be-
tween the extent to which the organization
maintains an innovative climate and the
success of innovations developed in that
ﬁrm.
√ √ √ √
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Table 5.10: continued
Nr. Description Status
S1 S2 S3 S
P 5.10 In the case of high-tech service innovation,
the positive relationship between the ex-
tent to which the organization puts eﬀort
into gathering intelligence and the success
of innovations developed in that ﬁrm will
be mediated by the extent to which the
organization maintains an innovative cli-
mate.
N.A.N.A. N.A.
√
P 5.11 There will be a direct positive relationship
between the amount of experience in key
decision-makers involved in the new ser-
vice development process and new service
success.
– – – –
P 5.12 There will be a positive relationship be-
tween the extent to which the involved
decision-makers update their knowledge
systematically and new service success
√
–
√ √
5.5 Discussion and Conclusion
We conducted the present study with the purpose of investigating the role of
information and information processing activities in determining the prob-
ability of high-tech service innovation success. Eﬀects were studied in the
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strategic and operational phases. For each stage we identiﬁed a range of
information processing factors and formulated propositions with respect to
their expected eﬀects on innovation success. The propositions were sum-
marized in a theoretical model, which was tested by means of an empirical
study. An overview of the results of the ﬁrst part of the study was pre-
sented in Table 5.8, an overview of the results of the second part in Table
5.10. From these overviews it becomes clear that the information processing
perspective on the organization is an appropriate and productive theoreti-
cal framework for the study of high-tech service innovation. It has provided
valuable answers to the three research questions that were formulated at the
beginning of the chapter, and helped us substantially in answering the prob-
lem statement. When we consider the reported values with respect to the
extent to which our model explained the total variance in innovation success,
we must be quite satisﬁed. With respect to the ﬁrst sub question it has be-
come clear that selection and acquisition of information, potentially playing
a major role in the reduction of the uncertainty surrounding the decision-
makers, contribute to the probability of success of the new service. This
observation applies for both levels of analysis we studied, i.e. the strategic
and the operational level. It has also become clear, that not all information
is equally relevant. Whereas the business plan, the marketing plan and ﬁ-
nancial information all play a role with respect to diﬀerent forms of success,
the eﬀect of the use of market research in the go-no-go decision must also
be considered an important source of information. In the second phase of
the process we again obtained diﬀerent eﬀects with respect to diﬀerent types
of information. Strikingly, the gathering of competitive information has a
signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on innovation success. It could be that compa-
nies gathering competitive information are too much focused on competitive
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action and therefore perform less in the innovation process. This has po-
tential consequences for the allocation of company resources to intelligence
gathering in diﬀerent domains. Our most remarkable ﬁnding is that mar-
keting intelligence in the form of market research contributes considerably
to the probability of success on both levels. The importance of the use of
customer information seems to contradict the conceptualization of the high-
tech service industry as an entirely technology-driven industry. Technology
and the acquisition of technological information may certainly be important
factors in the development of new services, but based upon our ﬁndings we
must conclude that the customer plays an even more important role when it
comes to the introduction of successful new services.
With respect to the second research question, inquiring into the contribu-
tion of organizational factors to the diﬀusion and use of information, based
upon the results that have been obtained in this study it can be concluded
that the organizational routines that determine the way in which the go-no-
go decisions are made, and the use of information play an important role.
With respect to the operational part of the innovation process, the data con-
ﬁrmed that the free ﬂow of information is facilitated by the factors that were
identiﬁed, i.e. the stimulation of informal communication, as well as an open
culture.
With respect to the third research question, it can be concluded that
factors relating to the individual decision-makers involved in the decisions
also play a role on both levels. It is clear from our results that a strategic
perspective is important during the go-no-go decision, as well as the partici-
pation of strategically competent managers in the decision process. Contrary
to our expectations, we did not ﬁnd any support for our proposition that
experience of the decision-makers plays a role in innovation success. This
178 CHAPTER 5. THE ROLE OF INFORMATION
could be explained by the tremendous turbulence in the macro environment
of the organization. Acquired experience and knowledge lose their validity
very rapidly and may therefore not contribute to better decision-making. On
the other hand the date convincingly supported the proposition that regu-
lar updating of the decision-makers leads to considerably better results in
innovation success.
Concluding, the present study has contributed to a number of diﬀerent
strands of research. First, a signiﬁcant contribution was made to the high-
tech service innovation literature. A number of antecedents of high-tech ser-
vice innovation success have been identiﬁed in factors aﬀecting the reduction
of uncertainty. Second, a substantive contribution was made to literature re-
lating to market-orientation or more speciﬁcally, customer orientation, since
the ﬁndings prove a signiﬁcant eﬀect of marketing related functions, i.e. the
collection and use of marketing information, on the probability of high-tech
service success. It was also demonstrated, that the information processing
perspective can be considered very promising on both a strategic level, as
well as on a tactical level. A substantial part of the variance in success can
actually be explained from the variance in factors aﬀecting the eﬃciency of
information acquisition, diﬀusion and processing. The research demonstrates
clearly that it matters which information is used during the go-no-go decision
and that it matters who is involved in the decision.
5.5.1 Managerial Implications
Based upon the reported ﬁndings a number of recommendations can be made
to high-tech service ﬁrms. First, the results with respect to the strategic
phase lead to the general recommendation that the initial go-no-go decision
for each new service must indeed be dealt with as a decision with strate-
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gic consequences. Second, we recommend that companies use both types of
information, internal company documents and reports as well as externally
gathered market related information, in the go-no-go decision. Considering
the current state of aﬀairs, it has become clear that only few companies use
both sources. Certainly with respect to the use of market research infor-
mation during initial go-no-go decisions, currently used by little more than
10 percent of the ﬁrms in our sample, we expect that much can be gained.
Furthermore, we recommend that the decision team take a long-term perspec-
tive, and an entrepreneurial attitude towards the go-no-go decision. Since we
found signiﬁcant diﬀerences in new service success between companies that
had the CEO, CIO and COO participate in the go-no-go decision and those
who did not, while this is currently the case in a relatively small percent-
age of high-tech service ﬁrms, it seems certainly worth considering involving
especially those top managers in the strategic decisions at the outset of the
new service development process. In a negative sense, we must conclude that
involving the CFO or the managers at an operational level in the go-no-go
decision, which is currently the case in many companies, does not appear
to lead to the selection of more successful projects. Although we did not
measure the eﬀect of top-management involvement in initial go-no-go deci-
sions on overall long-term performance of the ﬁrm, we would certainly expect
there to be such an eﬀect as a result of a more strategically coherent product
portfolio.
The investigation with respect to the operational phase leads us to the
conclusion that ﬁrms can substantially improve the chances of innovation
success by installing an appropriate information infrastructure, because in-
formation plays such an important role. An eﬃcient real-time information
platform, providing key decision-makers with selective up-to-date and rele-
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vant information about developments in customer requirements and technol-
ogy, could be an important success factor. More speciﬁcally we can make the
following recommendations. First, it has become clear that the structured
acquisition of information with respect to developments in technology and
customer requirements can make a substantial diﬀerence in the success of
innovations. This implies that ﬁrms should invest in structured intelligence
activities in these two dimensions. Intelligence activities should focus on
the identiﬁcation of trends in consumer needs, and e.g. patterns of satisfac-
tion/dissatisfaction with existing services, both provided by the ﬁrm as well
as by its competitors. Feedback from e-service quality monitoring could be
used as an input for new service development, both on a strategic as well
as on an operational level. The structural gathering of technological intelli-
gence will also contribute to the eﬀectiveness of operational decision-making:
probably to both the speed and the quality of the new service development
process. In our sample, the acquisition of information relating to competitors’
strategic moves does not make a positive contribution. On the contrary, a
signiﬁcant negative eﬀect was found for the relationship between competitive
intelligence and new service success. It seems therefore recommended to use
competitive information exclusively at a strategic level. Second, an open, in-
formal culture that is favorable to innovation clearly and signiﬁcantly aﬀects
the chances of success. It can therefore be recommended to create the condi-
tions that facilitate the informal exchange of information between colleagues
from diﬀerent departments and teams, but also between innovation managers
and customers and suppliers. Third, and ﬁnally, we recommend that compa-
nies stimulate and facilitate the regular updating of their innovation related
staﬀ, by means of organizing internal seminars for knowledge exchange as
well as oﬀering them the opportunity to attend external seminars.
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5.5.2 Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research
As with every study, a number of limitations are necessarily associated with
this chapter. The role of information with respect to new service success
was expected to be more important at the operational level, than at the
level of the go-no-go decision. Still we feel that the go-no-go decision should
be studied in much more detail, since the factors we identiﬁed explain a
relatively unsubstantial part of the variance in innovation success, whereas we
expected factors aﬀecting the quality of the go-no-go decision to contribute
substantially. This may imply that either the soundness of the go-no-go
decision does not have a substantial impact on the success of innovations in
the short run, or that important factors are still missing.
Perceived innovation success of the new service was used as a proxy for
both the soundness of the strategic decision process, and the eﬀectiveness of
operational decision-making. The go-no-go decision could be studied inde-
pendently of the actual success of the innovation, allowing the identiﬁcation
of other factors playing a role in the process, which are now possibly diﬃcult
to determine. However, in order to develop a more detailed model of the
go-no-do decision we suggest that case studies3 be conducted, in order to
determine the intricacies of the relationships between diﬀerent factors.
The uncertainty decision-makers must address in the go-no-go decision is
also distinct in nature from the more practical uncertainty occurring in the
operational phases. In the operational phase uncertainty must be reduced,
because it would otherwise block the process. However, during the go-no-
go decision a higher level of residual uncertainty is acceptable, and much
of the uncertainty seems actually to be reduced precisely by making the
decision. There are also more creative aspects to strategic decision-making,
3Such as the study we reported in Chapter 3.
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not based on external information, but rather on information that is internal
to the decision-makers (Kahneman and Tversky 1982). We do not clearly
understand the way uncertainty is reduced by making the decision rather
than by collecting and processing information. More conceptual research
seems to be needed here in the ﬁrst place.
The purpose of the present research was essentially exploratory. A num-
ber of factors have been identiﬁed that play a role in creating an organiza-
tional atmosphere that is favorable to innovation, to the diﬀusion of infor-
mation and knowledge throughout the ﬁrm, but we must acknowledge that
this area as such is substantially under researched. We expect there to be
various dynamic reciprocal and probably self-enforcing eﬀects between col-
lection, diﬀusion and use of information. Research is needed to study these
factors in more detail.
We also recommend that reliable and more precise measurement instru-
ments be developed for constructs reﬂecting organizational information ﬂow
characteristics. With respect to the information ﬂow and the identiﬁcation
of factors impeding or facilitating the ﬂow of marketing and technological
intelligence through the organization, network analysis could prove to be an
appropriate methodology.
Chapter 6
Discussion and Conclusion
The ﬁnal chapter of the dissertation consists of an overview of the research,
a summary of the results, managerial implications and suggestions for future
research.
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6.1 Introduction
The overall aim of this study was to investigate the unique task conditions
and information requirements of the decision-makers in the high-tech service
innovation process on the one hand, and to ﬁnd antecedents and modera-
tors of eﬀective decision-making on the other. The underlying aim of the
study was to provide service providers and decision-makers with a number
of tools to improve decision-making eﬀectiveness under the unique circum-
stances they encounter, and thus enable them to increase the performance of
the innovation processes. In the present investigation a range of diﬀerent per-
spectives and methodologies have been employed. The results of the study
have enriched existing literature in a number of ways. In this chapter the
results of preceding chapters are summarized and integrated. The chapter
is organized as follows. In Section 6.2 the ﬁndings from the diﬀerent studies
are summarized, integrated and discussed. In Section 6.3 the theoretical and
managerial implications of the study are discussed. In Section 6.4 the study
is concluded, limitations are discussed and suggestions for further research
presented.
6.2 Summary of the Findings
In this section the results from the preceding chapters are recapitulated. In
Chapter One the problem statement that would guide us through the dif-
ferent parts of the study was presented and motivations for the study were
provided. In Chapter Two behavioral literature concerning decision-making
under uncertainty and the use of managerial intuition was reviewed and the
relationship between task conditions and both the eﬀectiveness in reducing
uncertainty, and the validity of various decision styles were explored. Most
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important result of this conceptual study was the identiﬁcation of two funda-
mentally diﬀerent semi-rational decision-making styles, which had not been
explicitly distinguished in the literature. Consequently the cognitive contin-
uum was extended and transformed into a cognitive style matrix. Further-
more, we made a critical attempt to structurally investigate the scope of the
decision-making styles: Factors moderating the validity of decision-making
styles under the turbulent conditions presented by the high-tech service inno-
vation process have been identiﬁed. Subsequently, by means of an in-depth
case study, the task conditions of the decision-makers in high-tech service
innovation were explored in Chapter Three, and a model was constructed
regarding antecedents and moderators of eﬀective decision-making. The an-
tecedents of eﬀective decision-making were conceptualized in this study as
the factors counteracting the task-related factors that were perceived to im-
pede eﬀective decision-making. In Chapter Four we developed a theoretical
understanding of the eﬀects of information on the strength of commitment
managers develop to their decisions, when they are made under severe un-
certainty. Finally, in Chapter Five, we applied an information processing
perspective to the new service development process on an organizational
level of analysis. Eﬀects on innovation success were identiﬁed in a number
of factors related to information processing in the organization.
6.3 Contributions
In this section theoretical and practical contributions of the study will be
discussed.
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6.3.1 Theoretical Contributions
The present research makes a number of contributions to the literature. In
providing an integrated conceptual model of antecedents and moderators of
decision-making style eﬀectiveness, integrating theories from cognitive psy-
chology and management decision-making literature, we have connected two
important lines of thought and opened the way for a further development of
a very promising area of research. Studies in the ﬁeld of cognitive psychol-
ogy have provided detailed insight in the ways the human brain processes
information, while management decision-making literature has been espe-
cially interested in the relative eﬀectiveness of decision-making styles under
very challenging circumstances. The connection of the two areas leads to
deeper insight in the range of antecedents of eﬀective decision-making in the
unique context of decision-making under substantial uncertainty, complexity
and dynamics.
Furthermore, case methodology has been used for the study of individ-
ual decision-making under great uncertainty. It was demonstrated that this
methodology can be very productive in an area that has so far mainly been
studied in experiments, which are lacking the richness in behavioral detail
provided by the case study methodology. The study of human decision pro-
cesses in a real world environment will ﬁnally do justice to the unique way
the human brain copes with extremely complex situations and turbulence,
and will also provide much more realistic insight into the bounds of human
rationality, and the factors that may play a role in alleviating these bounds
under such circumstances.
In order to study decision-making in minute detail, experiments can be
very useful, provided that their results are interpreted carefully. A major
conceptual contribution to behavioral theories of decision-making was the
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insight that managerial decision-making can productively be conceptualized
as an information processing activity leading to both a choice and a degree
of commitment to that choice. In order to fully capture decision-making
eﬀectiveness, we need to consider both decision-making results, since both
results have equally important consequences for the extent to which managers
control the performance of processes.
Finally, we have demonstrated the usefulness and productivity of applying
an information processing view on the organization for the study of success
factors in high-tech service innovation.
6.3.2 Managerial Implications
Practical implications of the results of the four studies are manifold. First,
recommendations can be made to the individual decision-makers active in
the new service development process, either on a strategic level, or on an
operational level. With respect to the cognitive style we must conclude that
most likely ﬂexibility, adaptivity and a deliberate combination of experien-
tial and rational cognition will produce the most eﬀective decision-making
style, as long as the decision-maker remains aware of the factors limiting the
scope of both styles and the dangers lurking in the turbulence of the envi-
ronment and the risks of information overload. In order to validate private
experience accumulated and accessed through experiential cognition, we rec-
ommend decision-makers to share their thoughts with peer experts and to
consider group decision-making, especially under conditions of great uncer-
tainty. The importance of a continuous updating of the individual knowledge
base has been shown to be very important. Therefore some suggestions can
also be made to ﬁrms active in the high-tech service industry. It seems
recommended to create a number of conditions facilitating eﬀective decision-
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making in the high-tech service innovation process. This can be done, ﬁrst
by selecting ﬂexible decision-makers that do not rigidly stick to one exclusive
decision style, and are eager to learn and update their knowledge, in terms of
both explicit knowledge and experientially gathered tacit knowledge. Second,
ﬁrms can improve innovation conditions by developing an open, unrestrained
culture. The organized gathering of intelligence in a number of domains, such
as technology and customer requirements will increase the openness of the
organization to its environment. Companies should also realize that an ‘in-
formation system’ or platform that makes the gathered intelligence available
to the decision-makers in real-time and in a digestible format is a neces-
sary condition of improving decision-making eﬀectiveness. Decision-makers
should also be oﬀered the opportunity to learn as much as possible. Finally,
the organization could create decision-making platforms, where experts could
make diﬃcult decisions together.
6.4 Conclusion
The dissertation has made a start with the development of a comprehen-
sive theoretical understanding of decision-making under uncertainty under
the unique conditions present in the high-tech service innovation process.
The various conceptual models that were built were respectively based upon
extensive qualitative and quantitative research. Central constructs of the
thesis are decision-making eﬀectiveness and task conditions. The ﬂexibility
of using appropriate decision-making styles under diﬀerent circumstances, an
integrative view, and the combination of multidisciplinary absorptive capac-
ity and regular internal and external updating of the managers were found
to be important antecedents of eﬀective decision-making in the innovation
6.4. CONCLUSION 189
process. The best-adapted decision strategy was found to be a ﬂexible mix
of analysis, common sense and active sensemaking. Furthermore manage-
rial commitment to decisions was conceptualized as a decision outcome, with
information antecedents diﬀerent from the information antecedents of the
choice outcome. Finally we identiﬁed a range of information collection, dif-
fusion and processing related orgnizational antecedents of eﬀective innova-
tion decision-making. Overall these ﬁndings have greatly increased our un-
derstanding of the requirements of eﬀective decision-making under extreme
uncertainty, as it occurs in the high-tech service innovation process.
6.4.1 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research
Limitations of each of the studies have been discussed in detail at the end
of each chapter. We therefore focus on more general directions for future
research in the study of decision-making under uncertainty, service innovation
and the information processing perspective on the ﬁrm.
With respect to the study of managerial decision-making and its eﬀec-
tiveness under challenging circumstances, we can only stress that research
is still in its very early stages. More research is urgently needed, both on a
conceptual level and empirically. Concerning conceptual research, to further
pursue the multidisciplinary approach we adopted in Chapter Two seems
a very promising avenue. By integrating ﬁndings from epistemology, neu-
ral science, cognitive psychology and research in managerial decision-making
a much more complete conceptualization of the phenomenon of decision-
making under extremely challenging conditions is possible, than in any of
the disciplines separately. In parallel with the developments on a conceptual
plane, it will be necessary to conduct empirical research in order to falsify
and validate theoretical progress. It seems therefore appropriate to coher-
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ently conduct further empirical research in terms of a combination of case
study or ﬁeld research, and experimental studies.
The study of managerial decision-making practice by means of case study
research in Chapter Three has proven very useful and productive in terms
of theory development. Nonetheless, the developed theory now needs to
be reﬁned and operationalized, in order to be objectively validated. As a
consequence, there is a need for more research, both in terms of a reﬁnement
of the theoretical framework and in terms of the development of measures
for the constructs that make up the theoretical framework. It seems highly
recommendable to include the social network of the decision-makers in further
research, since the network in which they are embedded may play a very
important role with respect to the extent to which they are able to reduce
uncertainty, and thus their decision-making eﬀectiveness under challenging
circumstances. This implies that social network methodology may prove very
useful in the further study of managerial performance.
The study we conducted in Chapter Four must be replicated under vary-
ing circumstances. A ﬁrst attempt was made to measure the biasing eﬀects of
information overload on two diﬀerent outcomes of decision-making. In order
to obtain more insight in the development of commitment, and the role of
information in this development, more experimental research is needed.
Finally, having demonstrated in Chapter Five that the information pro-
cessing view on the organization can be very successful and productive, more
research is needed here too, in order to reﬁne the measurement instruments.
Replication in diﬀerent industries seems very useful in order to determine
the scope of the eﬀects we observed. A ﬁrst attempt was made to study the
eﬀects of information use on the initial go-no-go decision in high-tech service
innovation. More research is certainly needed in order to develop a better
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understanding of the role of information and cognitive styles in the strate-
gic decision process in determining the decision-makers’ eﬀectiveness in the
selection of projects and the allocation of resources. Here too, we suggest
that the process ﬁrst be studied in detail, by means of case methodology.
Furthermore the role the embeddedness of the decision-makers in the knowl-
edge network of the organization plays with respect to the decision-making
eﬀectiveness should be explored.
With these suggestions for further research we conclude the dissertation.
In the four studies that we have reported in this dissertation we have tried to
develop and apply a number of really new perspectives on the highly intrigu-
ing phenomenon of ’decision-making under uncertainty’. If we succeeded in
producing a number of substantially new insights and in creating opportuni-
ties for a productive further exploration of the phenomenon, we may consider
this mission accomplished.
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Nederlandse Samenvatting
Inleiding
Wereldwijd spelen informatie- en communicatietechnologie (ICT) een steeds
grotere rol in de dienstensector. Niet alleen tijdens de ontwikkeling van
nieuwe diensten wordt veelvuldig gebruik gemaakt van ICT, maar ook bij de
uiteindelijke levering van de diensten aan de consument spelen deze vormen
van technologie een steeds belangrijker rol. Meer en meer bedrijven bren-
gen allerlei hoogtechnologische diensten, in de vorm van ondersteunende,
faciliterende of aanvullende diensten, maar ook in de vorm van op zichzelf-
staande producten, op de markt. Deze diensten zijn toegankelijk via au-
tomaten of terminals (zelfbedieningstechnologie), het internet (e-diensten),
mobiele telefoons (m-diensten) of combinaties hiervan. We kunnen hierbij
denken aan elektronische bank- en verzekeringsdiensten, elektronische infor-
matievoorziening, elektronische reisboekingen en allerlei vormen van onder-
steunende klantendiensten (customer service) etc.
Door razendsnelle technologische ontwikkelingen, vooral in de vorm van
miniaturisering van de gebruikte elektronische apparatuur en de snel toene-
mende bandbreedte en snelheid van datacommunicatie, de snel veranderende
behoeften en eisen van de consument, en de globalisering van de markt heerst
er in de hoogtechnologische dienstensector echter grote turbulentie. De con-
currentie is zeer hevig, waardoor de consument steeds hogere eisen aan de
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prijs-kwaliteitverhouding van de aangeboden diensten kan stellen. Bovendien
is de levenscyclus van de nieuwe diensten, voornamelijk ten gevolge van snelle
technologische ontwikkelingen en de hevige turbulentie in de markt, vaak bij-
zonder kort. Voortdurende innovatie, enerzijds door het transformeren of in-
crementeel aanpassen en verbeteren van bestaande diensten, anderzijds door
het op de markt brengen van volledig nieuwe producten, is daarom voor veel
bedrijven in de elektronische dienstensector van levensbelang. Ook is het
regelmatig aanbieden van volledig nieuwe diensten voor veel bedrijven de
aangewezen manier om munt te slaan uit het bezit van een bestaande loyale
klantenkring, via cross-selling praktijken, en in veel gevallen de enige manier
om groei te bewerkstelligen.
Innovatie is dus van levensbelang in de sector, maar het beheren en be-
heersen van het innovatieproces is geen sinecure en het mislukkingpercentage
van nieuwe hoogtechnologische diensten is zeer hoog, terwijl de noodzakelijke
investeringen vaak eveneens erg groot zijn. De moeilijkheden beginnen al
bij een poging om een antwoord te vinden op de strategische vragen of een
bepaalde dienst voor een bedrijf commercieel interessant kan zijn, of de dienst
de merkwaarde zal doen toenemen, nieuwe markten zal openen etc. Grote
onzekerheid met betrekking tot toekomstige technologische ontwikkelingen,
ontwikkeling in de markt, de onvoorspelbaarheid van de innovatiestrategiee¨n
van concurrenten en snel veranderende consumentenbehoeften en -gedrag
maken het nemen van strategische beslissingen tot het ontwikkelen en op de
markt brengen van een nieuwe dienst buitengewoon moeilijk.
Ook nadat een positieve beslissing genomen is om een bepaalde nieuwe
dienst in principe te ontwikkelen, moeten er tijdens de productontwikkelings-
fase nog veel beslissingen genomen worden op operationeel vlak, die te maken
hebben met zaken waarover grote onzekerheid heerst. Dit is opnieuw te wij-
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ten aan de enorme dynamiek van de sector. Daarnaast is het ontwikkelen van
nieuwe hoogtechnologische diensten een buitengewoon complex en multidis-
ciplinair gebeuren, waarbij ook iedere operationele beslissing ve´rstrekkende
gevolgen heeft.
In de literatuur is al lang een verband vastgesteld tussen de mate waarin
het management een eﬀectieve besluitvorming in praktijk brengt en de be-
haalde bedrijfsresultaten. Wanneer het management het innovatieproces on-
der controle heeft, door middel van eﬀectieve besluitvorming, mogen we aan-
nemen dat de kans op positieve resultaten, in de vorm van de mate van
succes van de nieuwe diensten, ook toeneemt. In de praktijk kan dat bedrij-
ven die hun innovatieproces beter beheersen, door middel van eﬀectievere
besluitvorming, ook substantieel concurrentievoordeel opleveren. De vraag
rijst dus, hoe men de eﬀectiviteit van de besluitvorming tijdens het inno-
vatieproces in de ICT dienstensector kan verhogen. Dit brengt ons bij de
centrale vraagstelling van de dissertatie.
• Hoe kan de eﬀectiviteit van de besluitvorming in het innovatieproces van
op informatie en communicatietechnologie gebaseerde diensten vergroot
worden?
Om de vraagstelling op gepaste wijze te kunnen uitwerken, hebben we haar
opgesplitst in vier deelvragen, die we vervolgens in vier afzonderlijke en op
zich zelf staande studies behandeld hebben. We brengen verslag uit over deze
studies in de hoofdstukken Twee tot en met Vijf van deze dissertatie.
Verband tussen de Taakomstandigheden en de Eﬀectiviteit van
Besluitvormingsstijlen
De eerste deelvraag, behandeld in het onderzoek waarover in Hoofdstuk Twee
verslag uitgebracht wordt, luidt:
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• Bestaat er een verband tussen de besluitvormingscontext, d.w.z. de
taakgerelateerde omstandigheden waaronder de manager beslissingen
moet nemen, en de relatieve eﬀectiviteit van verschillende besluitvor-
mingsstijlen?
In dit hoofdstuk hebben we onderzocht welke besluitvormingsstijlen er in de
literatuur onderscheiden worden, onder welke omstandigheden deze besluitvor-
mingsstijlen gebruikt kunnen worden en welke factoren een rol spelen ten
aanzien van beperkingen in de validiteit van de op die manier genomen
beslissingen. Gebaseerd op het relatieve gebruik van twee cognitieve infor-
matieverwerkingssystemen worden er traditioneel een intu¨ıtieve, een analyti-
sche en een semi-rationele besluitvormingsstijl onderscheiden. Gebaseerd op
een literatuuronderzoek stellen we in dit hoofdstuk voor om de semi-rationele
besluitvormingsstijl uit te splitsen in wat wij genoemd hebben een ‘gezond
verstand stijl’ die gepaard gaat met een hoge mate van eﬃcie¨ntie en een
zeer selectief gebruik van informatie enerzijds en een strategische besluitvor-
mingsstijl anderzijds, die gekenmerkt wordt door een intensief gebruik van
zowel analytische informatieverwerking als van experientie¨le cognitie.
Vervolgens hebben we de vier stijlen ge-evalueerd met betrekking tot hun
relatieve geschiktheid voor gebruik onder verschillende omstandigheden. Ons
onderzoek heeft geleid tot het inzicht dat iedere manager gebruik maakt
van een combinatie van cognitieve processen, die fundamenteel verschillend
zijn in hun informatiebehoeften en de manier waarop ze tot een resultaat
leiden. Niet alleen zal een eﬀectieve manager zich door de probleem- en
taak-gerelateerde omstandigheden moeten laten leiden bij het kiezen tussen
verschillende beslissingsstijlen, maar hij zal zich tevens rekenschap moeten
geven van de inherente beperkingen die de onderliggende cognitieve processen
aan het gebruik van de verschillende stijlen opleggen. Samenvattend kunnen
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we met betrekking tot een valide gebruik van de vier ge¨ıdentiﬁceerde stijlen
zeggen, dat:
• Een overwegend rationele beslissingsstijl gerechtvaardigd is wanneer er
voldoende ondubbelzinnige en complete informatie aanwezig is, en het
beslissingsprobleem een grote mate van overzichtelijkheid bezit.
• Een overwegend op common-sense gebaseerde beslissingsstijl gerecht-
vaardigd is wanneer het beslissingsprobleem routinematig en niet ex-
treem belangrijk is, er voldoende informatie is en er redelijke tijdsdruk
heerst.
• Een overwegend op het gebruik van intu¨ıtie gebaseerde beslissingsstijl
gerechtvaardigd is, wanneer het beslissingsprobleem relatief routine-
matig is, maar weinig expliciet.
• Een overwegend strategische beslissingsstijl de beste oplossing is, wan-
neer het beslissingsprobleem ongestructureerd en niet routinematig is,
er een combinatie van in sommige opzichten weinig, en in andere opzichten
veel maar dubbelzinnige informatie beschikbaar is, en wanneer er re-
latief snel relatief grote veranderingen in de omstandigheden optreden.
Ook werden er in dit hoofdstuk verschillende factoren ge¨ıdentiﬁceerd die de
validiteit van het gebruik van de verschillende stijlen modereren, zoals tijds-
druk, turbulentie, en de aanwezige ervaring.
Antecedenten van Eﬀectieve Besluitvorming in
Hoogtechnologische Diensteninnovatie
In moderne innovatieprocessen, waar de besluitvormingsautoriteit sterk gede-
centraliseerd is, speelt de productmanager een zeer belangrijke rol in het
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succesvol ten uitvoer brengen van individuele innovatieprojecten. Er is erg
weinig bekend met betrekking tot de factoren die een rol spelen in het tot
stand komen van eﬀectieve besluitvorming op het niveau van de productma-
nager. In het onderzoek waarover we in Hoofdstuk Drie verslag uitbrengen
hebben we derhalve de volgende twee deelvragen behandeld:
• Wat zijn precies de taakgerelateerde omstandigheden van de managers
die het innovatieproces in de hoogtechnologische dienstensector moeten
beheersen en welke factoren hebben de sterkste invloed op de eﬀectiviteit
waarmee zij het proces beheersen?
En vervolgens:
• Welke antecedenten van snelle en eﬀectieve besluitvorming kunnen we
identiﬁceren in het hoogtechnologische dienstverleningsinnovatieproces?
Welke factoren in verband met het gebruik van informatie, de besluitvor-
mingsstijl en de besluitvormingsarchitectuur van het bedrijf dragen bij
tot een hoge mate van eﬀectieve besluitvaardigheid?
We hebben deze vragen onderzocht door middel van een uitgebreide ca-
susstudie, die we uitgevoerd hebben in de Nederlandse mobiele telecommuni-
catiedienstensector. De belangrijkste bevinding is, dat besluitvorming in het
diensteninnovatieproces gehinderd wordt door een combinatie van onzeker-
heid, complexiteit en tijdsdruk. Managers gaan in de regel met deze factoren
om, door middel van een ﬂexibele instelling ten aanzien van het gebruik van
verschillende beslissingsstijlen. Ze kunnen de verschillende denkstijlen echter
pas goed inzetten, wanneer ze een heldere voorstelling hebben van de nieuw
te ontwikkelen dienst. Deze voorstelling bestaat uit inzicht in de raakvlakken
van de nieuwe dienst met de eigen organisatie, de consument, de technologie
en de regulerende wetgeving en industriestandaarden. De expertise die nodig
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is wordt voornamelijk verkregen door intensieve ervaring in de productma-
nagersfunctie.
Besluitvorming: Keuze en Engagement, het Probleem van
Informatieovervloed
Een belangrijk probleem, dat zich in moderne managementpraktijk veelvuldig
voordoet is het voorkomen van een overvloed aan informatie. In Hoofdstuk
Vier, waarin we over een besluitvormingsexperiment rapporteren, zijn we
daarom vervolgens dieper ingegaan op de volgende deelvraag:
• Welke rol speelt een overvloed van informatie bij het tot stand komen
van eﬀectieve besluitvorming?
In dit hoofdstuk hebben we ons in eerste instantie gebogen over de vraag
wat precies als de uitkomst van een besluit gezien mag worden. In de gang-
bare besluitvormingsliteratuur wordt besluitvorming algemeen opgevat als
een keuze. Wij stellen voor om de uitkomst van een beslissing niet eenzijdig
als een keuze op te vatten, maar als een keuze enerzijds en de ontwikkeling
van een bepaalde mate van engagement ten aanzien van die keuze anderzijds.
Op grond van bevindingen gerapporteerd in bestaande escalatieliteratuur ar-
gumenteren we, dat beide uitkomsten van het beslissingsproces van belang
zijn voor de eﬀectiviteit van de besluitvorming. Een keuze kan juist en on-
juist zijn, maar de eﬀectiviteit van besluitvorming kan zowel door een grote
mate of zelfs escalatie van het engagement bij een foutieve keuze, of een zeer
geringe mate van engagement bij een ‘correcte’ keuze toch danig in gevaar
gebracht worden. Vervolgens hebben we in de vorm van een besluitvor-
mingsexperiment bepaald in hoeverre de beide uitkomsten bepaald worden
door verschillende vormen van informatie. Uit ons onderzoek is gebleken,
dat verschillende vormen van informatie verschillende eﬀecten hebben op de
224 NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING
keuze en de mate van engagement. Informatie die niet relevant is voor de
uitkomst van de keuze van de manager, maar die wel zijn moreel be¨ınvloedt,
heeft weldegelijk invloed op de grootte van het init¨ıele engagement waarmee
de manager zijn beslissing omringt. Op grond van deze observaties stellen
we voor om de literatuur met betrekking tot fouten (bias) in de rationele
besluitvorming uit te breiden. Irrationaliteit kan blijkbaar niet alleen een
rol spelen in de totstandkoming van de keuze, maar evenzeer in de totstand-
koming van het init¨ıele engagement. Uit de bevindingen van het onderzoek
waarover we in dit hoofdstuk gerapporteerd hebben valt af te leiden, dat de
besluitvormer precies bij het ontwikkelen van engagement ten aanzien van een
keuze in zekere mate be¨ınvloed worden door factoren die irrelevant zijn voor
het beslissingsprobleem. Een belangrijke implicatie is, dat de manager zich
rekenschap dient te geven van het feit dat zijn engagement ten aanzien van
bijvoorbeeld een bepaald innovatieproject ten dele bepaald wordt door fac-
toren die niet rechtstreeks met dat innovatieproject te maken hebben, zeker
voor zover de beslissingen in verband met dat innovatieproject genomen wer-
den onder omstandigheden van informatie ‘overload’ en grote tijdsdruk. Bij
het nemen van vervolgbeslissingen is daarom enige reﬂectie op zijn plaats.
Succesfactoren in het Innovatieproces in de Hoogtechnologische
Dienstensector
Nadat we in de Hoofdstukken Twee tot en met Vier vooral gekeken hadden
naar factoren die de eﬀectiviteit van de besluitvorming bepalen op het niveau
van de individuele manager, hebben we in Hoofdstuk Vijf vooral gezocht naar
factoren gerelateerd aan de verwerking van informatie binnen de organisatie,
die de eﬀectiviteit van de besluitvorming in het innovatieproces be¨ınvloeden.
De deelvraag die we in dit hoofdstuk behandeld hebben is de volgende:
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• Welke factoren, gerelateerd aan de informatieverwerking, be¨ınvloeden
de waarschijnlijkheid dat een nieuwe dienst een succes wordt, door hun
eﬀect of de eﬀectiviteit van de besluitvorming tijdens het innovatiepro-
ces?
We hebben deze vraagstelling voor twee verschillende fases van het inno-
vatieproces onderzocht. In eerste instantie hebben we gekeken naar de fase
waarin op strategisch niveau beslist wordt over het al dan niet commer-
cialiseren van een productvoorstel. Vervolgens hebben we onderzocht welke
factoren een rol spelen tijdens de ontwikkelingsfase van de nieuwe dienst. We
hebben op grond van een uitgebreide literatuurstudie een aantal proposities
opgesteld en op grond van deze proposities een theoretisch model van het
eﬀect van de informatieverwerking op de eﬀectiviteit van de besluitvorming
geconstrueerd. Dit model hebben we vervolgens geschat op grond van em-
pirische data die we verzameld hebben in een wereldwijd uitgevoerde enqueˆte.
De belangrijkste bevindingen uit dit onderzoek zijn enerzijds de constatering
dat een informatieverwerkingsperspectief buitengewoon vruchtbaar kan zijn
voor het onderzoek naar succesfactoren in diensteninnovatie en anderzijds
de identiﬁcatie van een aantal factoren die een positief eﬀect hebben op de
slagingskans van nieuwe diensten. Succesfactoren werden in dit onderzoek
gevonden in het aannemen van een strategische houding ten aanzien van
de go-no-go beslissing, het gebruik van zowel interne informatie, alsook van
resultaten van marktonderzoek tijdens die beslissing en tenslotte de partici-
patie van topmanagers in die strategische beslissing. Met betrekking tot het
operationele deel van het innovatieproces mogen we op grond van deze studie
concluderen dat gestructureerde informatievergaring op het gebied van ver-
anderingen in consumentenbehoeften en –gedrag, alsmede op het vlak van
de technologie een positieve bijdrage leveren. Deze positieve bijdrage wordt
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gemedieerd (mediated) door een open communicatieklimaat in de organisatie.
De mate waarin de managers ervaring hadden in hun werk vertoont geen
positief verband met het succes van innovaties, maar de mate waarin zij
conferenties en zowel interne als externe seminars bezoeken wel. Ook werd
vastgesteld, dat bedrijven waar informele communicatie een belangrijke rol
speelt en gestimuleerd wordt eﬀectiever innoveren. In tegenstelling tot wat
in de meeste literatuur gesuggereerd wordt, vonden we in onze data een sig-
niﬁcant negatieve correlatie tussen innovatiesucces en de mate waarin een
bedrijf competitieve informatie vergaart. Een voorzichtige implicatie is, dat
bedrijven zich wellicht niet al te veel moeten aantrekken van wat de con-
current uitvoert, maar des te meer moeten luisteren naar hun (potentie¨le)
klanten: d.w.z. voldoende middelen aanwenden om hun innovatiestrategie
klantgericht te maken.
Conclusie
De verschillende studies die in het kader van het proefschrift werden uit-
gevoerd hebben aangetoond dat een informatieverwerkings- en besluitvor-
mingsperspectief op het diensten innovatieprobleem zeer vruchtbaar kan zijn.
We hebben in Hoofstuk Vijf ook empirisch aangetoond, dat er een signiﬁcant
verband bestaat tussen verschillende factoren gerelateerd aan informatie-
verwerking en innovatiesucces. Verder hebben we met behulp van een scala
aan methodes op verschillende niveaus inzicht verworven in factoren die de
eﬀectiviteit van de besluitvorming in het innovatieproces bij leveranciers van
hoogtechnologische diensten be¨ınvloeden.
Gebleken is, dat we die factoren onder andere kunnen vinden in de exper-
tise van de besluitvormers, het gebruik van verschillende soorten informatie
en de mate waarin de besluitvormer zijn cognitieve stijl aanpast: enerzijds
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aan de eisen van de taakgerelateerde omgeving, maar anderzijds ook aan
de aanwezigheid van valide informatie en kennis. Tevens hebben we moeten
constateren dat het bedrijfseconomisch onderzoek naar besluitvorming onder
onzekerheid en de factoren die een rol spelen met betrekking tot de eﬀec-
tiviteit ervan op veel vlakken nog in een beginstadium verkeert. We hebben
daarom in de verschillende hoofdstukken een aantal gebieden aangegeven,
waar ons inziens dringend behoefte is aan vervolgonderzoek. Wil dit onder-
zoek bruikbare inzichten opleveren voor de verbetering van de eﬀectiviteit
van besluitvorming, dan zal zich dit moeten richten op de bestudering van
besluitvormingsprocessen onder realistische omstandigheden.
Suggesties voor Vervolgonderzoek
Het onderzoek naar de besluitvorming onder onzekerheid staat nog in de
kinderschoenen en er kan en moet in deze wetenschap grote vooruitgang
geboekt worden door verder onderzoek. Met name willen we noemen de
vruchtbare combinatie van onderzoek naar besluitvorming in de neurofysische
wetenschappen, cognitieve psychologie, kentheorie en de managementweten-
schappen. Dit lijkt een traject dat kan leiden tot een beter begrip van het
mechanisme van de besluitvorming onder onzekerheid en van de factoren die
de eﬀectiviteit van managers onder zeer moeilijke omstandigheden bepalen.
Om tot een omvattende wetenschap van de besluitvorming te komen dient er
zowel op theoretisch vlak als, bij voorkeur hiermee verbonden, op empirisch
gebied onderzoek verricht te worden. Het lijkt vooral zinvol, om onder-
zoeksvragen in een combinatie van veldonderzoek en laboratoriumonderzoek
te onderzoeken.
In Hoofdstuk Drie van deze dissertatie is gebleken hoe productief de ca-
susmethodologie kan zijn bij het in detail bestuderen van besluitvormingspro-
cessen en de gerelateerde theorievorming. De gevormde theorie dient echter
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verﬁjnd te worden en kan bovendien verder verrijkt worden met inzichten
uit andere bedrijfstakken. Daarnaast lijkt het ook aangewezen om aan de
hand van de ontwikkelde constructen meetinstrumenten te ontwikkelen, die
een empirische validering van de theorie mogelijk maken.
Het onderzoek uit Hoofdstuk Vier van deze dissertatie moet als een eerste
aanzet gezien worden in het onderzoek naar de ontwikkeling van engagement
en de rol die informatie in deze ontwikkeling speelt. Meer empirisch onder-
zoek is nodig om de theorie verder te ontwikkelen en het geldigheid van de
vastgestelde relaties onder variabele omstandigheden te onderzoeken. Tevens
geeft het onderzoek in dit hoofdstuk de aanzet tot het onderzoeken van
de rol die een overvloed aan informatie heeft op het besluitvormingsgedrag
van managers. Hier stellen we voor, dat verder onderzoek dient aan te to-
nen in hoeverre informatieovervloed in de dagelijkse managementpraktijk de
besluitvorming, of het hieraan gerelateerde engagement, negatief be¨ınvloedt.
Tenslotte heeft het onderzoek in Hoofdstuk Vijf aangetoond hoe zinvol
het innemen van een informatieverwerkingsperspectief op de organisatie kan
zijn bij de bestudering van succesfactoren in diensteninnovatie. Ook dit
onderzoek heeft geleid tot een aantal pistes voor vervolgonderzoek. Met
name de go-no-go beslissing dient verder onderzocht te worden. Door middel
van casusonderzoek zou een gedetailleerd beeld gevormd kunnen worden van
het beslissingsproces, alsmede van de factoren die de uiteindelijke selectie
bepalen. Met behulp van sociale netwerkmethodologie zou de inbedding van
de besluitvormers in het informatienetwerk van de organisatie in beeld ge-
bracht kunnen worden. Ook de rol die verschillende besluitvormingsstijlen
spelen bij deze strategische beslissingen zou verder onderzocht moeten wor-
den, omdat informatie in deze beslissing een minder grote rol lijkt te spelen
bij de reductie van onzekerheid en het tot stand brengen van een eﬀectieve
besluitvorming dan in operationele beslisingsprocessen.
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NEW PRODUCT DECISION-MAKING EXPERIMENT 2001
Maastricht University
INSTRUCTIONS (Please Read Carefully)
Thank you for participating in our decision-making experiment. As ex-
plained in the attached information, you are supposed to assume the role
of a decision-maker in a publishing ﬁrm that will make a number of resource
allocation decisions to the best of his/her ability. The decision-making ex-
periment is in no way competitive: there is no best solution. Please read
the full instructions before starting.
1. Please consider the Information with which we supplied you in the fol-
lowing order:
• Description of You and your Job (page 3)
• Description of the Company (page 3-4)
• Description of the Assignment (page 5)
• Description of the New Product (page 6)
• Description of the Business (page 7)
• Description of the Market (page 8-9)
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• Extra Information (separate package will be handed out)1
2. After you will have read all information, we will ask you to make a number
of resource allocation decisions.
3. After making these decisions you will be asked a number of questions
about the decision-making process. They will have the following format:
EXAMPLE:
Statement: Disagree Agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Bill Clinton was a Good President 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1This refers to the packages containing the colored e-mail messages
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Jan Smith: Description of Yourself and your Job
Your name is Jan Smith; you are 32 years of age, and unmarried. Your
mother is Dutch and your father American. You are based in Maastricht, at
the European Headquarters of GlobEdo Inc., a US-based global educational
publishing company. You are currently the European Director of Sales and
Marketing for GlobEdo Inc, reporting to the Vice President of International
Sales in the U.S. You were hired for this job two years ago. Before assum-
ing this position, you have been working for three years as a very successful
sales representative for GlobEdo Inc. in the United States, where you have
been elected rookie of the year in your ﬁrst year. Before that, you studied
English Literature at the University of York. You have won numerous sales
awards and are a very hard worker. In your current position, based on your
knowledge of the market and on your in-depth product knowledge, it is your
personal responsibility to compose a highly competitive and successful prod-
uct portfolio for Europe, Africa and the Middle East, present and defend your
budgets at the International Division of GlobEdo Inc. Second part of your
job is to make the necessary resource allocations for successful marketing,
distribution and sales eﬀorts in Europe, Africa and the Middle East. You
have a team of seventeen regional sales managers reporting to you. They
work with their sales teams all over Europe, Africa and the Middle East and
are working hard to generate sales. Sales ﬁgures and costs are both impor-
tant topics on your yearly appraisal, as you receive a bonus-plan based on
average proﬁt generated in your market. In general the sales specialists that
work in your territory have a higher education background. You are aware
that they lack speciﬁc sales training and you think that next year you will
spend substantial resources on improving their sales techniques.
GlobEdo Inc.: Description of the Company
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GlobEdo Inc. is an originally US-based, currently globally operating edu-
cational publishing company. The company evolved from a highly specialized
scientiﬁc publisher, basically only publishing manuscripts from Nobel Lau-
reates, some ﬁfty years ago, to a global player in the educational publishing
industry. They currently publish in twenty languages. Products vary from
English as a Second Language, via all sorts of Textbooks for Higher and Pro-
fessional Education, to Professional Training books in many diﬀerent subject
areas. Subject Area’s vary between Psychology, Medicine, Computer Science,
and Engineering to Business and Economics. GlobEdo Inc. is currently a
medium sized company, employing some 800 people worldwide. Although
the company has grown relatively fast in the seventies and eighties, it has
retained its family owned style. They have oﬃces in over ﬁfty countries, and
a very well organized distribution system, with warehouses on all continents.
The company does not own any printing facilities, but makes use of many
diﬀerent professional printers, spread over the globe. High quality materials
are printed in the US and Europe. If the quality of the printing is not im-
portant, the company employs printers in the Far East. The company has
a relatively decentralized product policy, adapted to a very heterogeneous
market.
The US division produces most best selling books, generally in full color
and highly professional looking, as they have the largest editorial and pro-
duction budgets. The production of some of the more successful textbooks
costs between 100.000 and more than two million dollars each. The produc-
tion of such a textbook can take more than a year. Not only the textbook is
developed during that time, but also a rich array of supplementary materi-
als, both for students and lecturers. Think of personalized book-speciﬁc web
sites, slide shows, multimedia materials, test banks, instructor’s manuals etc.
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The average sales of such a textbook are between 10.000 and 40.000 to
50.000 copies a year. The pricing is currently around $ 75.00 in the US, and
around 50.00 in Europe.
Sales have grown on a worldwide basis by approximately ten percent
annually for the last couple of years, but margins have shrunk alarmingly. A
very large media group has acquired the company recently. The new owners
insist on double-digit growth over the full product line. Many employees
think that in an educational business, where quality is very important, it will
be very diﬃcult to reach this growth ﬁgure in a conventional way. It may
be needed to move into new niche markets, where there is less competition.
Although the supplementary package, accompanying textbooks, is taking a
more and more important position, Glob Edo is still very much a book-
centered publisher. Little eﬀort has been put into the development of stand-
alone multimedia products, as the company policy has always been that book
production is their core competence. Nonetheless, some editors and many of
the Sales and marketing Staﬀ feel that the company policy on this point is
too conservative. They would rather move forward, as they call it, and start
shifting from a book centered core competence to an educational contents
core competence, that would allow them to move fast into new media and
capitalize on their editorial expertise and emerging demand. Overseas oﬃces
on all continents produce their own, regionally adapted books, as well as
original products. They are responsible for the selection, marketing, sales
and distribution of internationally produced books.
There is a lot of pressure from the US division to sell their products, as
for their turnover they count on about 40% of international sales. There
is, however, little enthusiasm to make adaptations to the products for in-
ternational markets. The editors consider it a very costly matter and do
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not really support the overseas divisions at this point. Over the years, the
Boston-based company has built a very strong general reputation with its
customers in terms of quality and reliability. They have established a gen-
erally well-motivated, loyal workforce. There is a rather strong and distinct
company culture that has always united employees from diﬀerent divisions,
backgrounds and countries. Worldwide employees meet at least twice a year
at the US-based Annual Sales Meeting and the National Sales Meeting. If
business is booming, the company treats its employees with parties.
Your Assignment: Decision Making
After studying the provided information package, consisting of the de-
scription of the company, the market, your job, the new product and the
e-mails, you will have to make the following decisions: Should GlobEdo Eu-
rope introduce the radically new product ‘Working Model Web-based Edu-
cational Edition’ to the European, African and Middle Eastern Market or
not and if so, how much should relatively be invested in the marketing, sales,
distribution and support of the new product.
Like every managerial decision, the decision to include Working Model
Web Based Educational Edition in your Product Portfolio needs to be made
very quickly and independently. There is no time to wait for the ﬁrst sales-
results from the US. If the product is to be introduced in Europe, for Strate-
gic reasons, introduction to market must be simultaneously with the US.
Production and Distribution managers in the US have already called you
several times; to insist you make a decision soon, as they need your fore-
casts yesterday rather than today. They need your forecasts in order to
negotiate with the alliance partners and schedule production and distribu-
tion. They need to know how many manuals they need to print and in
which language. As they will centrally organize the training sessions, they
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must know how many people will attend etc. You know for sure that no
other company has oﬀered anything similar on the educational market and
your ﬁrst mover advantage could be lost soon. However, you also realize
that it is rather unpredictable what a green light from you would imply
precisely. If Working Model Web based Educational Edition should be suc-
cessful, it might require a substantial share of your resources. There is an
undeniable and serious risk of failure, but if the product is successful, poten-
tial proﬁts could be very important and a large new market potential would
be opened up, which would certainly have implications for your position in
the company. The other way round too, probably. . .
Working Model Web Edition New Product Informa-
tion Sheet
Product ID: 0-201-898898-9 (2001)
Authors: P.D. James (MIT), I. Banks (KR), and J. Bond (GE)
Technical Requirements: IBM Compatible, Win 98/2000, Proc. Pentium
Min. 550 Mhz., 128 MB RAM, Network or ISDN or ADSL Internet Connec-
tion
Educational Subscription Price: 150 USD/Per Annum (Domestic), 100
USD/Per Annum (Int’l)
Cross-sold to users of: Engineering Mechanics, Dynamics, Statics, Uni-
versity Physics, etc.
Website: http://www.workingmodel.com/
This new product is a result of a triad technology alliance between GlobEdo
Inc., Knowledge Revolution Inc., a small Engineering Solutions Company,
producer of the revolutionary motion simulation software Working Model c©
and Supernet Inc. a global Application Service Provider.
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The new product is a Web based Educational Version of the revolutionary
Professional Simulation and Motion Analysis Software ”Working Model”, as
it is used in many engineering Companies in the US, like e.g. Boeing. Com-
pared to the original version, retailing for about $ 27,000, the Educational
Web based Version is only limited in the amount of moving objects that can
be analyzed. Subscription to the Web based Educational Version of Working
Model will cost about $150 per annum in the US market and about $ 100
per annum in the European Market.
NB: this is a radically new type of product. This is especially true for
GlobEdo Inc. The Company has its core competencies in producing and
marketing best-selling global, pedagogically well-developed traditional text-
books for Higher Education (Colleges, Universities). Although the product
is complementary to existing products and potential customers for the new
product are familiar, the existing Sales Force has no previous experience in
selling web-based software services.
Product Strengths:
This Web based multimedia product allows the user to build and ana-
lyze complex dynamic mechanical systems on any desktop computer that is
connected to the Internet via a high-speed ISDN or ADSL connection. The
unique combination of the revolutionary simulation software, an extremely
user-friendly User-Interface with a unique set of interactive tutorials make
this product an absolutely radical innovation.
Working MODEL Web Edition has interfaces to many of the most com-
mon mathematical packages, like Mat Lab c©, Mathematica c© and MS Excel
c©. Working Model, Web Edition includes an enormous library of pre-deﬁned
components, which can be used to build simulations. GlobEdo Inc. has de-
signed a pedagogically unequalled workbook and interactive tutorials with
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the software. Together they form a sound, innovative learning system for a
very complex topic.
Known Product Weaknesses:
The software assumes the use of State of the Art computers, minimally
equipped with Pentium III 550 MHz, plus a very fast, high-bandwidth Inter-
net connection. These are not yet available in most Educational Institutions
in Europe. However, this situation is changing rapidly in a number of coun-
tries.
Working Model is basically non-metric (uses Imperial measures, like Inches,
Feet, Pounds), although equations in any unit system can be used. The orig-
inal software is not yet well known in Europe.
The Higher Education Publishing Business
Publishing for Higher Education has become big business. The indus-
try structure has evolved from a large number of idealism-driven amateur-
like nationally or regionally focused small businesses twenty years ago, to a
limited number of highly organized and streamlined professional publishing
companies now, which bitterly compete for a rather stagnant global market.
Increasing standardization in education policies on a worldwide scale has al-
lowed the production of a limited number of global educational products that
could at least in principle be adopted on a global scale, although in many
cases the standardization is still in a beginning phase.
A large market segment is formed by ﬁrst and second-year courses, in
Universities and Colleges, where enrollments are relatively high. The com-
petition in this market segment is at its ﬁercest, although competition in the
industry in general is ﬁerce; there are, however, also many elective courses
that have a global market large enough for best-selling textbooks. There is
strong demand from university and college lecturers for state of the art prod-
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ucts, incorporating the latest available knowledge and technology on the one
hand. Conservatism reigns on the side of school administrators. This leads
to a strange unbalance between forecasted demand for innovative products
and actual demand. This implies that investments in radically new products
are generally very high, whereas the risk of failure is high as well, because
most competitors are ﬁghting for the same, rather well known opportunities
and niches in the market.
The major players in the Global Textbook Market are three well-established
US-based Companies. They all publish very high quality educational materi-
als supported by multimedia packages, which are reasonably well suited to the
European Market. At the same time there are a few much smaller European
Publishers. They are probably too small to make the investments necessary
to produce a competing product of the same quality. However, there obvi-
ously exists a market opportunity in the Educational Software Market and
it could well be that Software Companies are developing competing prod-
ucts. Other alliances between publishers and software companies, like the
alliance between Knowledge Revolution and GlobEdo cannot be excluded.
They would, however need to cooperate with the publishers, it is generally
assumed, as they do not possess the pedagogical expertise and reputation
necessary in the domain of educational publishing.
Market Opportunities:
This is the ﬁrst Engineering Mechanics Simulation package that becomes
available for the European Educational Market. There is strong demand
for similar software packages that help the student discover complex and
notoriously diﬃcult subject matters like Dynamics, in an entertaining and
interactive way. Dynamics is taught in very similar ways all over the world.
Every engineering student must take courses in Engineering Dynamics. The
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total market potential is very large. GlobEdo is already an important player
in the traditional Engineering Dynamics Textbook market, having a market
share of 60% in the US and 30 % in Europe: 25.000 copies of the best-selling
‘Engineering Mechanics, 10th edition’ book are sold in Europe alone, on a
yearly basis.
The new product could easily be sold as a supplement to existing text-
books, as well as a stand alone educational tool. It can be foreseen, that
many extensions will be made available for speciﬁc topics, as Knowledge
Revolution already has many professional extensions available for diﬀerent
industries. This would open up an enormous market. Also, the basic simu-
lation technology could be used in other domains than Engineering. Simu-
lation is recognized as a very good educational tool in many scientiﬁc areas
like Business, Chemistry, Physics, and Astronomy etc.
Market and other Threats:
Other, possibly Europe-based, publishers may come out soon with en-
tirely European Versions, that may need less strong computers, have metric
units and are based on professional packages that are widely spread in Eu-
rope. GlobEdo Inc. European division currently does not have the resources
to produce such an adapted European version, as this is very expensive and
would require long term investments as well as strategic alliances with tech-
nology providers. It cannot be denied, that editorial expertise at GlobEdo
Inc. is concentrated in the US.
On the other hand, there is also uncertainty about the following devel-
opments in the European Market: Will schools and universities continue
using educational software in English throughout the EU? As for the Col-
leges where a large part of the market is, there are voices that software will
need to be in the teaching language. Trends exist to translate and adapt
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International Educational Material to local languages. This consideration
may keep European publishers from developing a European version for some
time.
The educational program of many universities is changing and standard-
ization throughout the EU is increasing. The course Engineering Dynamics,
where the Working Model Web based Student Edition software could be
used, might move up from the ﬁrst year to the second year. This would
have serious implications for the size of the market. First year students buy
obligatory material such as books much more faithfully, than second year
students. Additionally, for second year materials, there is a ﬂourishing sec-
ond hand market. This would obviously not impact the subscription rates to
Web based Services such as Working Model Web based Student Edition.
End of Information Package
